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This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The common theme is the anlaysis
of the effects of powerful outside influencers such as central banks or states on the investment
decisions or voting outcomes of individuals. In chapter 1, I look at the effects of monetary
policy uncertainty on the withdrawal behaviour of the investors in (corporate) bond funds,
both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In chapter 2 (co-authored with Maur-
izio Michael Habib and Simone Manganelli), we analyze the effects of ECB monetary policy
announcements on the portfolio of euro area fund investors. Chapter 3 (co-authored with
Nikolay Marinov) models the role of outside powers in the electoral process. Brief summaries
of the chapters follow.
Chapter 1
Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Financial Stability:
Withdrawal Incentives in Corporate Bond Funds
This chapter looks at monetary policy uncertainty and its repercussions on financial stability
from the perspective of the investors in a corporate bond fund. In the context of a model of
a bond fund run, I focus on changes in fundamental uncertainty. I contrast the predictions
of my model in settings both with and without strategic complementarities with certain
empirical patterns. I extract a novel measure of monetary policy uncertainty from official
FOMC communications. This measure can be understood analogous to a private signal,
consisting of both a mean and a variance.
I test a number of theoretical predictions using a sample of U.S.-domiciled corporate
bond funds. Instead of focusing on (unexpected) changes in the level of monetary policy
from a portfolio perspective as in the subsequent chapter, this chapter looks at the effects
of monetary policy uncertainty on outflows from certain types of mutual funds – corporate
bond funds – that should be characterized by a relatively high degree of strategic comple-
mentarities.
I find that the average prediction of FOMC members with respect to the future level
1
of interest rates is associated with higher withdrawals. This holds both for funds mainly
investing in corporate bond funds and those that mainly invest in government bond funds.
A higher level of uncertainty in the predictions of the future level of the interest rate is
associated with inflows into corporate bond funds. There is no evidence of a positive effect
on the flows of government bond funds. This is consistent with the model’s predictions for
a moderate level of strategic complementarities in corporate bond funds. In the absence
of strategic complementarities increasing uncertainty can have the opposing effects. This
might explain the differing withdrawal patterns from government bond funds.
Chapter 2
The Portfolio of Euro Area Fund Investors and ECB
Monetary Policy Announcements
This chapter has been written during my time at the Financial Research Division of the
ECB and is joint work with Maurizio Michael Habib and Simone Manganelli. It has been
conditionally accepted for publication in the Journal of International Money and Finance.
We study the impact of ECB monetary policy surprises on the portfolio allocation of
euro area fund investors. Our daily dataset covers the period between 2012 and mid-2016.
Our findings show that ECB monetary policy affected fund investors mainly via its impact
on asset prices and exchange rates. Overall, we find little evidence of investors actively
reallocating their portfolio in the aftermath of significant monetary policy announcements.
In order to study the impact of ECB policies on the portfolio of euro area investors, we
track the evolution of an aggregate portfolio of investment funds that are based in Luxem-
bourg, the largest financial centre for the euro area investment fund industry, which mainly
attracts euro area investors. We study how investors, on aggregate, choose investment funds
at the fund category level. To identify the relevance of the different channels of transmission,
we construct measures of active portfolio reallocation, driven by the redemptions or injec-
tions of underlying investors, and of passive portfolio reallocation, triggered by valuation
effects related to changes in asset prices and exchange rates. As common in the literature on
the impact of monetary policy decisions, we identify the announcement effects of traditional
and unconventional policies by looking at the intraday change in key euro area interest rates
around major events, such as ECB Governing Council meetings.
The significant valuation effects associated with these price movements passively shifted
the asset allocation of euro area investors towards riskier securities, like funds investing in
European and Emerging Market equity, and away from European bond funds. These effects
are more pronounced for unconventional measures, such as the Asset Purchase Programme
(APP). Some active reallocation into emerging equity markets following ECB actions is
2
observed for institutional investors. Overall, our daily reallocation measures capture reallo-
cation mostly at the margin.
Chapter 3
Process or Candidate: The International Community
and the Demand for Electoral Integrity
This chapter is joint work with Nikolay Marinov and has been published in the American
Political Science Review. We introduce a conceptual distinction between processes, the
“how” of elections, and parties competing in them, the “who” of elections. We use this
distinction to develop a theory of electoral intervention. The theory is built on a formal
model of elections with bias. Domestic parties compete for office using their resources and
popularity. Whether they win or not is also a function of the institutional rules of the game.
Outsiders have a choice of investing in the how, the who, or both. Outside actors care about
cleaner (more legitimate) contests and about the policy platform of the prospective leaders.
The model produces predictions on three quantities of interest: the amount and mix of
resources invested by the outsider in the election, incumbent win or loss, and the degree
of fraud (or compliance with democratic rules). A key insight we seek to convey is that
outsiders’ interest in elections of other countries can be conceived of as a mixture of two
types of concerns: geo-politics and democratic liberalism. We show why outside powers
would not invest exclusively in one strategy, i.e., the “how”, or the “who” in elections. We
also allow for the strategic adjustment of the behaviour of one power in anticipation of the




Monetary Policy Uncertainty and
Financial Stability: Withdrawal
Incentives in Corporate Bond Funds
1.1 Introduction
While the Federal Reserve has kept its policy rate unchanged for exactly 7 years between
December 2008 and December 2015, the ECB lowered its deposit facility rate to -0.4 in
March 2016 and has kept it at this level to date (June 2018). During these periods – apart
from educating the public on unprecedented asset purchase programmes – central bank
actions with respect to policy rates have been focused on the communication of the future
path of interest rates. This has lead to episodes of differing uncertainty with respect to
the future level of interest rates. Implicit and explicit forward guidance have essentially
converted uncertainty into one of the main policy instruments of central banks.
In financial markets, uncertainty has a large influence on the decisions of each agent. In
addition to uncertainty about the future state of the economy (fundamental uncertainty),
market participants face uncertainty about the actions of others that might affect the payoffs
of their own decisions (strategic uncertainty). Most theoretical models of run phenomena
look at settings in which strategic uncertainty is the dominant factor, and focus on changes
in the latter, driven e.g. by differences in the liquidity of certain assets. The models’
predictions are then usually contrasted with the long-run empirical evidence (e.g. Chen
et al. (2010) or Goldstein et al. (2017)).
This paper looks at monetary policy uncertainty and its repercussions on financial sta-
bility from the perspective of the investors in a corporate bond fund. In the context of
a model of a bond fund run, I will focus on changes in fundamental uncertainty. I will
contrast the predictions of my model with certain empirical patterns in settings both with
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and without strategic complementarities. Based on the degree of unanimity in the FOMC
“dot plots”1 (cf. Figure 1.1) I extract a novel measure of monetary policy uncertainty from
official FOMC communications. This measure can be understood analogous to a private sig-
nal, and consists of both a mean and a variance. I test a number of theoretical predictions
using a sample of U.S.-domiciled corporate bond funds. Instead of focusing on (unexpected)
changes in the level of monetary policy from a portfolio perspective, see e.g. Bubeck et al.
(2017) or Koijen et al. (2017), this paper looks at the effects of monetary policy uncertainty
on outflows from corporate bond funds – funds that should be characterized by a relatively
high degree of strategic complementarities. I revisit three different strands of the literature
and provide several connections.
First, flows of mutual funds have been studied extensively (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Edelen,
1999; Greene et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010).2 Recently the focus has shifted to corporate
bond funds (Chen and Qin, 2017; Goldstein et al., 2017). So far however the effects of
uncertainty have not been studied in the context of mutual funds – even though the early
literature on coordination problems in macroeconomics (Morris and Shin, 2002) has placed a
lot of emphasis on this particular feature. Additionally, in classic portfolio selection problems
uncertainty (usually proxied by past volatility) plays a key role (Levy and Markowitz, 1979).
This paper studies the effects of uncertainty on mutual fund flows in a run framework.
Second, there is an extensive literature on runs. The seminal contribution of Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005) derives a unique equilibrium in the bank run framework of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and looks at the limiting case of uncertainty ε → 0, which leads to the
coordination of investors on the Laplacian action as outlined in Morris and Shin (2003) or
Angeletos and Lian (2016).3 Most of the follow-up theory papers that study the behaviour
of depositors and investors use refined global games techniques to pin down investor beliefs.4
This paper studies the effects of uncertainty away from the limiting case in a coordination
problem among the investors of a corporate bond fund – both theoretically and empirically.
Third, recent developments in the conduct of monetary policy have inspired a small theo-
retical5 and empirical literature centered around the concept of monetary policy uncertainty.
1Essentially the “dot plots” are a form of cheap talk or non-binding communication. However reputational
concerns of the central bank etc. might make the statements binding to a certain extent. The question
how the single dots are aggregated into future policies is an interesting follow-up question. Gru¨ner and
Kiel (2004) look at the influence of different aggregation mechanisms on the distribution of reports of the
individual agents.
2Greene et al. (2007) includes an analysis of analysis of the effects of redemption policies on fund flows.
3Hence, in this class of theoretical models the precision of the private signal that agents receive, has no
influence on the equilibrium action of the agents. At the same time, the infinitely precise signal essentially
removes any remaining uncertainty with respect to fundamentals.
4How certain assumptions influence the selection of the equilibrium is described in Frankel et al. (2003).
This particular feature has been questioned by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and subsequent generalizations
have been proposed by Morris et al. (2016)
5Sinha (2016) looks at the effects of monetary policy uncertainty shocks in a New-Keynesian DSGE
model. Campbell et al. (2014) look at its effects on the risk properties of US Treasury bonds in a New
Keynesian macro model.
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Figure 2. FOMC participants’ assessments of appropriate monetary policy: Midpoint of target range or target level for 
the federal funds rate 
Percent 












Note: Each shaded circle indicates the value (rounded to the nearest 1/8 percentage point) of an individual par-
ticipant’s judgment of the midpoint of the appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the appropriate target 
level for the federal funds rate at the end of the specifed calendar year or over the longer run. One participant did not 
submit longer-run projections for the federal funds rate. 
Figure 1.1: September 2017 FOMC “dot plot” published by the Federal Reserve
Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170920.pdf
Approaches to measure uncertainty based on both the implied volatility computed from op-
tion prices and the realized volatility computed from intraday prices of interest rate futures
(Chang and Feunou, 2013) have been proposed alongside news-based measures (Husted
et al., 2017). Finally the effects of monetary policy uncertainty on financial market prices
(Kurov and Stan, 2018), term premia (Bundick et al., 2017) and macroeconomic outcomes
(Istrefi and Mouabbi, 2017) have been studied. Monetary policy uncertainty is related to
central bank transparency.6 Frankel and Kartik (2018) and Tamura (2018) study the effects
of the precision of central bank information in the classic setup where output and inflation
are the outcomes – similar to the framework of Barro and Gordon (1983), Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986) and Gru¨ner (2002). My aim is to look at the effects of monetary policy
uncertainty on financial stability in the context of run models.
Following the model of speculative attacks on currency pegs (Morris and Shin, 1998)
6For a summary see Geraats (2002).
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there have been various papers that focus on the role of public and private information in
such settings: Heinemann and Illing (2002), Metz (2002), Hellwig (2002), Morris and Shin
(2004) and Bannier and Heinemann (2005). In the context of regime change games and
information “manipulation” by the incumbent government, this literature has recently been
revived: Edmond (2013), Iachan and Nenov (2015) and Ahnert and Kakhbod (2017).7
The framework that studies runs driven by fundamentals has been established by Gold-
stein and Pauzner (2005). This framework has been extended in various ways. Matta and
Perotti (2016) derive an equilibrium under liquidity risk that is correlated with fundamen-
tal risk, but conceptually different. Moreno and Takalo (2016) look at optimal (welfare-
maximizing) transparency in a run environment with uniformly distributed noise, two-sided
strategic complementarities and monotone payoffs in case of withdrawal. An extension
endogenizes the risk choice of banks. There have been a number of extensions that look
specifically at (mutual) funds: Liu and Mello (2011) derive the optimal cash holdings of a
(hedge) fund with a fixed return under uncertainty with respect to the fraction of redemp-
tions. Chen et al. (2010) use a theory model to motivate their empirical findings on the
flow-performance relationship of equity mutual funds. This model has been extended by
Lewrick and Schanz (2017a) to cover flow-induced price adjustments of mutual fund shares,
commonly known as “swing pricing”.8 Morris et al. (2017) use a reduced form version of the
model of Chen et al. (2010) to study endogenous cash choices of fund managers. Similarly
Schmidt et al. (2016) report comparative statics on the effects of a change in the fraction of
informed agents on the run threshold in money market funds. These are derived in a simple
Gaussian global games setup. Morris and Shin (2016) look at fund managers’ adjustments
of their bond holdings under “last-place aversion” when funds are susceptible to runs. A
simplified version of this model is used in Feroli et al. (2014) to motivate the empirical ev-
idence on market tantrums and monetary policy that the authors present. Except Moreno
and Takalo (2016) and Schmidt et al. (2016) all papers use a global games framework under
vanishing noise.
Similarities between bank runs and the strategic considerations of fund investors have
been pointed out among others by Jeremy Stein in 2014: “So much activity in open-end
corporate bond and loan funds is a little bit bank like. [...] It may be the essence of
shadow banking [...] giving people a liquid claim on illiquid assets.”9 Much earlier, Markus
Brunnermeier (2009) has argued that models that involve run incentives may extend to
7Among recent working papers using a Gaussian structure are: Szkup (2014) derives comparative statics
in “simple” global games. Kolbin (2015) looks at the choice of precision of communication by a government,
both under commitment and without commitment, Quigley and Toscani (2016) focus on the role of public
information.
8The same authors study optimal swing pricing rules in a general equilibrium framework without infor-
mative signals in Lewrick and Schanz (2017b).
9“Fed looks at exit fees on bond funds”; Financial Times; June 16, 2014; https://www.ft.com/content/
290ed010-f567-11e3-91a8-00144feabdc0 (obtained: 04/01/2018)
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“equity holders, such as investors in a hedge fund or mutual funds”. He argues that this is
due to an “early-mover advantage [that] arises to the extent that fund managers sell liquid
assets first” and hence “a first-mover advantage can make financial institutions in general,
not only banks, subject to runs”.
1.2 The model
I describe the withdrawal behaviour from bond funds in a simple model along the lines of
Morris and Shin (2004) with two dates t ∈ {1, 2} and a continuum of agents, called investors.
Prior to t = 1 each investor contributes one unit of capital to the corporate bond fund. At
t = 1 the investors have an alternative investment opportunity with a risky return that
depends on the future monetary policy stance.
Agents may withdraw their funds at t = 1 in order to consume or to invest in the
alternative asset. Alternatively they can remain with the fund until t = 2 and consume at
this date. Below I describe in detail the corporate bond fund and the alternative investment
opportunity.
1.2.1 Investors
There exists a continuum of investors with a mass normalized to 1 + λ. Investors are
endowed with a single unit of wealth. Prior to t = 1 agents invest all of their wealth in a
bond fund for a duration of up to two periods. Agents are risk-averse and maximize their
total consumption.
There are two types of investors, early investors (E) and late investors (L). Early investors
have consumption needs at t = 1. Late investors value consumption only at date t = 2.
Uncertainty about investor types is resolved at date t = 1, however each investor only learns
her own type. With probability λ
1+λ
an investor is impatient and has consumption needs
only in the first period. Her utility function is
uE(c1, c2) = log(c1).
Hence, withdrawing from the fund at t = 1 is always her dominant strategy. The remaining
mass of agents is patient and derives utility from consumption at date t = 2.10 These
investors maximize
uL(c1, c2) = log(c2).
10Among others Sussman (1992) uses patient agents that only care about consumption in period 2. In
my model, this ensures that investors cannot escape the effects of monetary policy.
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Late investors face a choice between remaining with the fund, or investing in the alternative
asset in order to transfer their wealth and consume at date t = 2.
1.2.2 Corporate bonds
An individual corporate bond of firm k is an asset that requires an upfront investment of 1
and generates a risky return when it matures at t = 2. There are two things that prevent
investors from investing directly in corporate bonds:
• Individual corporate bonds are risky investments and it is hard for investors to assess
the ex-ante probability of default pk of firm k. The expected payment of an individual
bond at t = 2 will be Rk = pk ·0+(1−pk) ·Qk, where Qk indicates a repayment of the
principal with interest. However, I assume that the return of a sufficiently diversified
investment portfolio can be approximated by a safe return of R. Investors will prefer
to invest in such a portfolio of bonds.
• Bonds are often issued with a minimum settlement amount in the order of magnitude
of 100, 000 US-$. Hence no single retail investor is able to acquire a diversified portfolio
via the primary market.
The secondary market for bonds has many particularities. Bloomberg estimates that
about 80% of deals in corporate bonds are still done by phone or over a chat service.11
Additionally, bonds are traded very infrequently. Citigroup estimates that out of the 26,000
publicly publicly registered bonds in 2014, 3,000 (11%) never traded at all over the course
of the year and a further 5,000 (20%) traded on 5 days or fewer and just 277 (1%) traded
daily.12
Due to the implied lack of reliable pricing information, it is reasonable to assume a price
of pk < 1 for individual bonds that have to be sold at date t = 1. A possible justification
could be an adverse selection argument. Bonds that are for sale might be individual bonds
with a particularly high pk.
1.2.3 The alternative investment opportunity
There is an alternative investment opportunity (cash holdings in the second period) that
requires one unit of capital at t = 1. The return of this alternative asset depends on the
monetary policy stance Θ. Monetary policy has no direct influence on the payoff of bonds.
The central bank reveals the true level of Θ after withdrawal decisions have been made by
11“Electronic Bond Trading Gains Ground,” Bloomberg, 15 February 2018 (https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-02-15/electronic-bond-trading-gains-ground-as-market-finally-matures)
12“When agents lose their principals – Fixed income liquidity revisited,” Citi Research, August 2015
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the investors. Late investors withdrawing at t = 1 need to invest in an asset with return Θ
and consume c2 = Θ.
This implies that late investors will be affected by monetary policy. Either directly
through the returns on the alternative investment or indirectly through the influence of
monetary policy on withdrawals from the corporate bond fund.
1.2.4 The corporate bond fund
The bond fund enables agents to both invest in the bond portfolio and – if they turn out
to be an early investor – fulfil their liquidity needs at date t = 1. The corporate bond fund
cannot distinguish early investors from late investors. Prior to t = 1 the fund invests the
contributions of its investors into a diversified portfolio of bonds that yields a safe return of
R at date t = 2. The remainder of the fund’s assets is kept in cash, in order to serve the
anticipated amount of early withdrawals.
There is a mass of investors p1 that withdraws at t = 1, the fund offers d1. The remaining
mass of investors 1 + λ − p1 redeems at t = 2 and obtains d2. In order to serve early
withdrawals the fund prefers cash holdings of p1d1 over early liquidation of fund assets. The
illiquid market for the assets of the fund implies that the bond fund cannot trade a fraction
of the portfolio at a prices above 1. This assumption is also the driver of the strategic
complementarities in the following.13 The remaining funds 1 + λ − p1d1 are invested in
bonds. Given cash holdings of p1d1 feasible payoffs are those that fulfil:
(1 + λ− p1d1)R ≥ (1 + λ− p1)d2.
Early withdrawals p1 = λ + l can consist of early investors and late investors. For now, I
want to derive the optimal contract the bond fund should offer for a given mass l of late

































13This assumption is similar to the assumption 0 < α < 1 in Liu and Mello (2011), combined with the
assumption that the bond fund will never go bankrupt since withdrawals stay below a certain threshold,
e.g. due to the inactivity of a large proportion of the investor population (Chen et al., 2010).
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For a given d1, the second period payoff depends on early withdrawals l and is denoted by:
d2(l) =
(1 + λ− (λ+ l)d1)R
1− l
When plugging in the above feasibility constraint of the bond fund the maximization problem
is solved by d∗1 = 1 and d
∗
2 = R.
14 This is driven by the assumption that cash holdings are
p1d1, implicit in the feasibility constraint, and the fact that the coefficient of relative risk
aversion equals 1 for all c1 and c2. The managers of the bond fund know that the mass p1
of agents withdrawing at date t = 1 is at least λ.
A more advanced contract design problem would specify an optimal schedule d1(l) and
d2(l) instead of two deterministic payoffs, taking into account both monetary policy and the
reaction of investors. Appendix A.1 outlines how one would solve a slightly more general
version of this problem with late investors that react optimally to monetary policy and the
deterministic choices of d1 and d2.
In the following I assume that the fund will offer the following contract:
Assumption 1. The fund will never go bankrupt and offers d1(l) = 1 to early redeemers.
Without affecting the remaining investors, the fund can only pay d1 = 1 using cash
holdings. Hence, if p1 > λ the fund needs to liquidate some of its assets. However, since
the fund’s portfolio consists of illiquid corporate bonds that trade at αk < 1, unexpected
liquidation is subject to a discount on the terminal value of the fund at date t = 2. I assume
that the fund is always able to generate enough revenue in order to fulfil withdrawals at
t = 1. In order to account for the illiquidity of the assets, the payoff of late redeemers d2(l)
needs to be decreasing in l for l > 0. The no-bankruptcy assumption implies that the bond
fund can sell its entire portfolio for a price of 1.
An alternative justification for d1 = 1 would be mark-to-market pricing of the fund
shares. Before anybody withdraws the fund can always offer d1 = 1 by using cash reserves
instead of quoting net asset values below 1.
To simplify matters, I will use a strictly monotone function for the second period payoff of
the corporate bond fund, d2(l) = R ·e−κl. The parameter κ ∈ [0, 1] measures the strength of
the externality that early withdrawals impose upon those remaining with the fund until date
t = 2 caused by the illiquidity of the underlying assets. It holds that ∂d2(l)
∂l
= −κRe−l < 0.






(1 + λ) (1 + λ− λd1)R = 0.
Contrary to the assumptions of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), u(c) = log(c) does not fulfil the condition that
RRA = −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 since RRA = 1.
15It is desirable to assume that the total sum of the payoffs of the fund is decreasing in l, hence late
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Assumption 2. The fund offers d2(l) = R · e−κl at date t = 2. Additionally it holds that
R > eκ.
Setting κ = 0 shuts down strategic behaviour among the investors. Of particular interest
will be scenarios with κ > 0. In these specifications the payoff of staying with the fund
decreases in the proportion of investors that withdraw early.
Implicitly, this assumes a pricing schedule for fund assets that satisfies the following
assumptions (i) the price of a fund asset is smaller than 1 for l > 0 and weakly larger than
1 for l = 1 (ii) the fund will never go bankrupt in the first period (iii) the price schedule
implied by d2(l) = R · e−κl is increasing in l. If one wants to maintain both (i) and (ii)
without assuming that the potential fraction of withdrawals l has some upper bound that
ensures that the fund never goes bankrupt in the first period, assumption (iii) needs to hold
at least in the neighbourhood of l = 1. If the fund can go bankrupt already in the first
period, this will lead to a non-monotonicity in the payoff of staying as in Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005). The increasing price schedule could be justified by the fact that the market
will assume that the fund will sell its most unattractive assets first. The larger the portfolio
share that is liquidated by the fund, the higher the perceived average quality of the assets
and hence the price the market is willing to pay for these.
1.2.5 Timing of actions and payoffs
Table 1.1: Payoffs of assets in the economy
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Individual bonds Early liquidation -1 αk < 1 0
Held to maturity -1 0 (1− pk)Qk
Bond portfolio Early liquidation∗ -1 α ≤ 1 0
Held to maturity -1 0 R
Bond fund Early withdrawal -1 1 0
Held to maturity -1 0 Re−κl
Cash holdings First period -1 1 0
Second period 0 -1 Θ
∗A price of α = 1 can only be achieved by selling the entire portfolio.
Table 1.1 shows the payoffs of the assets available in the economy. Individual bonds can
redeemers receive d2(l) with
∂d2(l)








be pooled in an joint portfolio and are sold as bond funds. Furthermore investors may hold
cash.
Figure 1.2 summarizes the timing of the fund withdrawal game. Nature draws an agent’s
type. Subsequently agents decide between withdrawing and not withdrawing their fund
shares. The most important element of the payoff structure are the strategic complementar-
ities induced by the feature that the payoff of staying with the fund decreases in the amount
of early withdrawals l.
t = 1
t = 2










c2 = R · e−κl
Figure 1.2: Timing of actions and payoffs
1.3 Solving the model
I will first solve a model without strategic complementarities. Then I will show how “strate-
gic uncertainty”, induced by the externalities that withdrawals impose upon the remaining
investors of the fund, alters the behaviour of investors in equilibrium.
1.3.1 The late investor’s problem
Each late investor faces a decision between redeeming at date t = 1 and investing in the
alternative asset or redeeming at t = 2. If the investor liquidates her fund shares at t = 1
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she obtains a utility of
uL = log(Θ) = θ.
She will consume the proceeds from withdrawing that have been re-invested into the storage
technology. The returns of the storage technology are determined by the monetary policy
stance Θ. If the investor remains with the fund her utility level will be
uL = log
(
R · e−κl) = log(R)− κl = r − κl.
This allows me to show the effects of changes in the information structure in an environ-
ment with a tractable payoff structure.
1.3.2 Information structure
The monetary policy stance θ is a random variable. It is distributed according to θ ∼
N(θ¯, α−1). The ex-ante distribution of the return of the alternative investment opportunity
is common knowledge among all agents. The monetary policy stance θ is realized at date
t = 1 but is unobserved by the agents.
Communication of central bank policies may not always be precise and might even be
deliberately vague. As a consequence one would expect a certain level of dispersion in
private information. I model this dispersion via private signals with variance 1/β.
Before choosing between redemption dates, each investor receives a private signal xi,
xi = θ + εi, εi ∼ N(0, β−1).
I assume that εi is i.i.d. across individuals and independent of θ. The parameter α denotes
the precision of prior information and the parameter β denotes the precision of the private
signal. The parameter θ¯ describes the expected level of monetary policy in the long run. In
the short- and medium-term there might be random deviations from this level.
Upon observing her private signal xi each agent will update her information ρi with





The posterior belief is the mean of the signal received by the agent and its prior mean
θ¯, weighted by their relative precision. Hence the posterior distribution of θ is a normal




16A detailed proof of this Bayesian updating step in terms of its optimality for the case of a conjugate
prior distribution (i.e. both the prior and the private signal are normally distributed) can be found in
Theorem 9.5 of (DeGroot, 1970).
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1.3.3 Optimal withdrawal without strategic complementarities
Setting κ = 0 switches off the externality that withdrawal from the fund imposes on the
remaining investors. Hence, there is no coordination problem among investors. Implicitly,
this assumes that assets of the corporate bond fund can be liquidated at a price of α = 1. In
this case, the withdrawal decision is purely driven by the investor’s own signal with respect
to the returns of the alternative asset.
Lemma 1. A late investor withdraws her money from the corporate bond fund if
E(θ|ρi) = ρi ≥ r.
Since the Bayesian posterior is a weighted mean of both the common prior and the private
signal, both α and β have an influence on the withdrawal behaviour of investors. Since the
payoffs do not depend on the behaviour of other investors, fundamental uncertainty is the
only remaining source of uncertainty in this case.
1.3.4 Optimal withdrawal with strategic complementarities
For the case of optimal withdrawal under strategic complementarities, I describe the sym-
metric equilibrium in “switching strategies” around a threshold ρ∗. Investors’ strategies
map from public and private information into their action space. A switching strategy takes
the form:
σi(ρi) =
withdraw when ρi ≥ ρ∗not withdraw otherwise
Agents withdraw their money from the fund, if the expected return from the alternative in-
vestment opportunity exceeds a threshold level ρ∗, and stay with the fund otherwise. If there
is a unique equilibrium in switching strategies then this equilibrium is the only equilibrium
that survives a process of iterative elimination of dominated strategies (cf. Appendix A.2).
Strategic complementarities turn the withdrawal decision of the agents into a Bayesian
game. The optimal withdrawal decision of an agent depends on the withdrawal decisions of
the other agents. Withdrawal is optimal whenever:
E(θ|ρi) ≥ E(r − κl|ρi).
There is a threshold of individual beliefs ρ∗ at which the agents are exactly indifferent
between withdrawing and maintaining their investment with the corporate bond fund. For
the marginal investor i with ρi = ρ
∗ it holds that:
ρ∗ = r − κE(l|ρ∗).
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In a symmetric equilibrium, given the marginal investor’s belief ρ∗, the expected propor-
tion of investors that withdraw is equal to the probability that any other agent’s belief j is
above this threshold:







































This holds since signals are i.i.d. Hence another investor’s εj is independent from the
marginal investor’s belief ρ∗.
Theorem 1. For the corporate bond fund with strategic complementarities (κ 6= 0) there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium characterized by the run threshold ρ∗ which solves:
r − ρ∗
κ
= 1− Φ (√γ (ρ∗ − θ¯)) .
A sufficient condition that ensures the uniqueness of the equilibrium is κ2γ < 2pi. Private
signals need to be sufficiently precise compared to the prior, since γ increases in α and
decreases in β. Furthermore, a higher degree of strategic complementarities requires private
signals to be even more precise in oder to ensure a unique belief threshold.
The existence of other equilibria is ruled out in Appendix A.2 via iterative elimination
of dominated strategies. The starting point of the proof is the existence of two dominance
regions: below ρ = r − κ and above ρ¯ = r. In the graph the upper and lower bounds of
these dominance regions are marked by the intersection of the 45◦-line with the two dashed
lines.
Figure 1.3 plots the tradeoff between withdrawing and maintaining the fund investment
from the perspective of the marginal agent with belief ρ∗. The expected payoff of withdraw-
ing is ρ∗ while the expected payoff of not withdrawing is r − κ (1− Φ (√γ (ρ∗ − θ¯))). At
the optimal run threshold with respect to beliefs ρ∗ the agent is indifferent between these
two options.
Strategic complementarities lead to a strictly lower run threshold. This follows immedi-
ately from Theorem 1.








Figure 1.3: Equilibrium choice of run threshold ρ∗ with κ > 0
Lemma 2 implies that strategic complementarities lead to higher withdrawals for any
given realization of monetary policy θ.
1.4 Monetary policy
Having established a unique equilibrium in switching strategies, I will now turn to the
analysis of comparative statics with respect to changes in the information structure. I have
introduced θ as a parameter that is driven by the policy actions of a monetary authority,
e.g. a central bank.
Policy actions are influenced by a latent unobserved factor that leads the central bank
to randomly over- or undershoot its long-term policy θ¯. The central bank has built a
certain expertise and/or reputation with respect to the implementation of monetary policy
captured by the parameter α. This reputation could be driven by past performance or
other institutional features. Jointly θ¯ and α determine the common prior of the investor
population with respect to the policy actions of the central bank.
Given the realized monetary policy stance θ the central bank communicates its policy
to investors via private signals θ + εi. The degree of ambiguity in the communication of
future policies is captured by a parameter β that denotes the precision of central bank
communication. The parameter β denotes the inverse of the variance of the distribution of
εi. This imprecision in communication leads to uncertainty with respect to the future level
of interest rates.
I argue that this type of fundamental uncertainty resembles the deliberate attempts of
various central banks to communicate their future policies – subject to a certain degree of
uncertainty – via measures commonly known as “forward guidance”. These central banks
provide information on the future path of interest rates along with some information re-
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garding the uncertainty of those predictions. The “dot plot” of the Federal Reserve is
an example of such a policy. It contains information on the future path of interest rates.
Additionally, the level of disagreement among FOMC participants indicates the level of
uncertainty inherent in these communications.
The interaction between uncertainty about fundamentals, and strategic uncertainty, in-
duced by complementarities among the actions of the agents, will be at the center of this
section. Much of the attention in the literature has been placed on the effects of uncer-
tainty in the limit, e.g. εi → 0. This effectively eliminates uncertainty about fundamentals,
such that uncertainty about strategic behaviour is the only remaining factor. I will look
at the effects of uncertainty away from such limiting cases, contrasting the effects of pure
fundamental uncertainty with the case in which both fundamental and strategic uncertainty
matter for the final outcome.
1.4.1 Strategic withdrawal and the realized monetary policy stance
It follows from Lemma 2 that strategic complementarities lower the run threshold with
respect to the beliefs of individual investors. The amount of withdrawals l(θ) is determined
















Since xi = θ + i is normally distributed with i ∼ N(0, 1β ), I can express withdrawals l(θ)


















< l(θ). This pins down the effects
of strategic uncertainty on the withdrawal behaviour of agents. Figure 1.4 shows that
strategic complementarities shift the entire withdrawal schedule to the left and increase the
amount of withdrawals at any given realization of θ.
The graph of l(θ) in Figure 1.4 shows three areas in which small changes in the realization
of θ have different consequences. For small realizations of θ not running is an almost
“stable” outcome while for very large θ the money will always be withdrawn almost in
full. Small changes barely affect these outcomes. For intermediate values around the signal
threshold x∗(ρ∗, θ¯), however, a small change in the realization of θ has a larger effect on







Figure 1.4: Incidence of withdrawals l(θ)
1.4.2 The role of the prior expectation θ¯
A shift in the prior expectation θ¯ affects withdrawals via two channels. First, it lowers the
run threshold ρ∗. An increase in θ¯ shifts r− κ (1− Φ (√γ (ρ∗ − θ¯))) to the right. It is now
optimal to choose a lower run threshold. Since the function r − κ (1− Φ (√γ (ρ∗ − θ¯))) is
monotonously decreasing in θ¯, the effect does not depend on additional parameters. How-
ever, since it is not possible to solve for ρ∗ in closed form it is not possible to provide evidence








Figure 1.5: A higher level of θ¯ lowers the run threshold ρ∗ (θ¯2 > θ¯1)
Additionally, due to the increase in θ¯ (e.g. θ¯2 > θ¯1) the threshold signal is lower even
without strategic complementarities (κ = 0). It holds that x∗(r, θ¯2) < x∗(r, θ¯1). The negative
effect on the run threshold ρ∗ sketched in Figure 1.5 lowers the threshold signal even further.
The financial stability effects of higher expected interest rates are exacerbated by strategic
complementarities.
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This illustrates the importance of expectations for the emergence of a run. Assume
two situations in which agents have received exactly the same signal distribution, but had
different ex-ante expectations. Both the indirect effect via the decrease in ρ∗ and the direct
effect of the increase in θ¯ on the threshold signal lower x∗(ρ∗, θ¯). Therefore an increase in θ¯
will lead to a higher fraction of the population joining the run. Strategic complementarities
exacerbate these effects.
1.4.3 Monetary policy uncertainty
I argue that central banks may influence uncertainty via the precision of central bank com-
munication. This directly affects investor beliefs. Higher monetary policy uncertainty leads
to a lower value of the parameter β.17
Higher uncertainty in the private signal decreases the uncertainty about the expected
proportion of agents with beliefs higher than the threshold ρ∗. Agents put more weight
on the common prior and hence beliefs are more similar. While higher monetary policy
uncertainty increases the uncertainty about fundamentals, it decreases strategic uncertainty
– uncertainty about the actions of others.
The effects on the run threshold, however, depend on the prior expectation θ¯ in this
case. Figure 1.6 shows that if the marginal investor’s belief lies above θ¯, higher monetary
policy uncertainty will lead to a higher run threshold ρ∗. This will be the case whenever
θ¯ < r− κ
2
, i.e. expected monetary policy is at a relatively low level compared to the returns
from the corporate bond fund, taking into account the level of strategic complementarities
κ. Instead, if θ¯ > r − κ
2
, higher uncertainty has a detrimental effect on financial stability
and lowers the run threshold. Such a scenario is depicted in Figure 1.7. At θ¯ = r − κ
2
a
change in the uncertainty has no effect on ρ∗.
Regardless of monetary policy uncertainty, at ρ∗ = θ¯ the marginal type will expect
exactly half of the late investor population to withdraw. Staying with the fund will lead
to the same payoff, r − κ (1− Φ (√γ (θ¯ − θ¯))) which is equal to r − κ
2
, regardless of β.
The expected payoff of withdrawing is denoted by the 45◦ line from the perspective of the
marginal investor with belief ρ∗. If expected monetary policy θ¯ is equal to r − κ
2
this line
crosses the payoff of staying exactly once at r − κ
2
and uncertainty has no effect on ρ∗.
At the same time at ρ∗ = θ¯, there will be the intersection of all functions that describe
the payoffs of staying with the fund for any level of monetary policy uncertainty. Hence
the effects of uncertainty differ for cases in which this intersection lies to the right of r − κ
2
compared to cases in which this intersection lies to the left of r− κ
2
. For the case of θ¯ < r− κ
2
,
ρ∗ will lie to the right of θ¯ and hence the expected payoff of staying will be higher if monetary
17To simplify notation I have introduced the parameter γ. When the precision of communication β
decreases, the parameter γ increases. This is formally shown in Appendix A.3.
21
policy uncertainty increases. This increases the running threshold as shown in Figure 1.6.
For the case of θ¯ > r − κ
2
uncertainty decreases the payoff of staying and hence there is








Figure 1.6: Increase in monetary policy uncertainty leads to a higher run threshold in a regime








Figure 1.7: Increase in monetary policy uncertainty leads to a lower run threshold in a regime
of high interest rates (β2 < β1, θ¯ > r − κ2 )
In order to derive the effects of uncertainty on withdrawals, I first analyze the case
without strategic complementarities (κ = 0). In this case the threshold signal at which an
agent decides to run is at x∗(r, θ¯) = r+ α
β
(r− θ¯). For θ¯ > r the threshold signal will increase
if β decreases, for θ¯ < r there will be a decrease in the threshold signal with a decrease in






depend on whether the realized state θ is
larger or smaller than the threshold signal.
For the case with strategic complementarities, additionally I need to take into account




signal x∗(ρ∗, θ¯) = ρ∗ + α
β
(ρ∗ − θ¯) will increase for ρ∗ > θ¯, partly due to the increase in
ρ∗ – otherwise the effect additionally depends on α. In the case θ¯ > r − κ
2
, the threshold
signal x∗(ρ∗, θ¯) = ρ∗ + α
β
(ρ∗− θ¯) will decrease if ρ∗ < θ¯, again in other cases the effects may
depends on α. Alternatively one could assume β >> α such that comparative statics of the
threshold signal are implied by the run threshold. This would mean that private signals are
much more precise than the prior expectation.
Even if I assume that comparative statics are pinned down by the effects on the run




x∗(r, θ¯) − θ
))
depend on the realized state θ.
Ideally I would compute E[l(θ)] here. I would need Φ to be a convex function in order to
apply Jensen’s inequality to derive an upper bound of expected withdrawals.
1.5 Social welfare
Since the effect of changes in the expected future level of monetary policy and monetary
policy uncertainty on expected withdrawals are not immediate, I will focus on ex-post social
welfare in this section.
In the context of my simple model, defining the first best allocation is straightforward.
I need to ensure that the patient investors choose the investment opportunity with the
highest consumption levels. Everyone should withdraw if r < θ and no one should withdraw
whenever r > θ. This is reflected by the sharp discontinuity in the blue dotted line in
Figure 1.4 that describes the optimal withdrawal behaviour by patient investors. I have
verified before, that it always holds that ρ∗ < r. Since high levels of uncertainty reduce ρ∗
for θ¯ > r− κ
2
one can also ensure that ρ∗ < θ¯. This implies that x∗(ρ∗, θ¯) = ρ∗+ α
β
(ρ∗−θ¯) < r,
since the first summand is smaller than r and the second summand is negative. Figure 1.4







Figure 1.8: Ex-post optimal withdrawal schedule
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In the red area below l(θ) the uncertainty with respect to the true value of θ leads
to withdrawal rates that are inefficiently high, while in the blue area above l(θ) it would
actually be optimal if everyone would join the run. In the red area, those that run are
disadvantaged due to a low return of the alternative investment, while those that decide to
remain in the investor base of the bond fund suffer from the externality caused by those
that withdrew their money from the fund. In the green area those that decide to remain
in the investor base of the bond fund suffer both from the low returns of the fund (even
in absence of a run) and the externalities caused by withdrawals. Changes in monetary
policy uncertainty both shift x∗(ρ∗, θ¯) and have an influence on the shape (steepness) of
l(θ). Hence they affect the absolute and relative sizes of the red and green area.
1.6 Empirical implications
This section summarizes the results of the analysis of comparative statics. Most of the
previous literature that has looked at uncertainty effects has pointed out a similar shift in
the direction of the effects as the one in the κ > 0-case in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Effects on the run threshold ρ∗
Setting κ > 0 κ = 0
θ¯ < r − κ
2
θ¯ > r − κ
2














no effect no effect
In order to put into perspective the comparative statics effects derived from a run model
with those from a setting without strategic complementarities, one needs to go one step fur-
ther and analyze the effects on the threshold signal (and the withdrawal schedule). What
is often overlooked is that changes in the information structure have an effect even in the
absence of strategic complementarities – hence to explain certain effects strategic comple-
mentarities are not strictly needed.
Interestingly, in contrast to changes in the mean of the signal, the effects of higher
uncertainty on the threshold signal in cases with strategic complementarities (κ > 0) do not
always coincide with the effects in absence of strategic complementarities (κ = 0). Under the
assumption that signals are precise compared to prior uncertainty they will only coincide in




, while the model predicts opposing effects outside these intervals.
Strategic uncertainty is the main driver behind this result (see above).
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Table 1.3: Effects on the threshold signal x∗
Setting κ > 0 κ = 0
θ¯ < r − κ
2
θ¯ > r − κ
2
θ¯ < r θ¯ > r
Increase in prior
expectation θ¯ ↑
lower signal lower signal lower signal lower signal
Increase in MP
uncertainty β ↓
higher signal∗ lower signal∗∗ lower signal higher signal
∗ holds if ρ∗ > θ¯ or alternatively β >> α, ∗∗ holds if ρ∗ < θ¯ or alternatively β >> α.
Next, I will try to identify the predictions that are most relevant for the empirical im-
plications of the model. Usually, investors in a portfolio of corporate bonds ask for some
return in excess of the expected long-term interest rate, e.g. due to the lower level of liquid-
ity of corporate bonds. Therefore, the scenario θ¯ > r can only occur due to a sudden and
sharp reversal of interest rates. In such a case, the expected long-term monetary policy can
be above the nominal returns on corporate bonds. Whether the case of θ¯ < r − κ
2
or the
case of θ¯ > r − κ
2
is empirically relevant should mainly be driven by the degree of strategic
complementarities κ that prevail in the market. A relatively low (perceived) κ would make
the case for θ¯ < r − κ
2
.
Hypothesis 1. If investors expect κ = 0 or κ >> 0 they should react to higher uncertainty
by running at a lower threshold and hence there should be higher withdrawals for a given
realization of signals. If they expect the level of strategic complementarities κ to be moderate
the model predicts a reduction in outflows for an increase in monetary policy uncertainty.
For the effects of a level shift in the expected interest rate, the predictions of the model
with strategic complementarities and the simple case of κ = 0 coincide.
Hypothesis 2. Regardless of the scenario, I expect investors to withdraw from the bond
fund if the level of the expected interest rate θ¯ increases.
The next sections will provide some evidence regarding these predictions.
1.7 Data
Empirically, one of the main challenges is to identify real-world measures that reflect the
information structure of the global games setup. Ideally, in addition to providing an “aver-
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Figure 1.9: FOMC “dot plot” released on 13 December 2017 in scorecard format
Source: Federal Reserve
I will argue that the information provided in the “dot plot”, that forms a part of the
quarterly-released FOMC projections material18 enables me to connect the concept of a
noisy central bank signal with an empirical counterpart. These “dot plots” aggregate the
projections of 15-1919 FOMC members, each dot representing “an individual participant’s
judgement of the midpoint of the appropriate target range for the federal funds rate or the
appropriate target level for the federal funds rate at the end of the specified calendar year
or over the longer run”, rounded to the nearest 1/8 percentage point. Via the FOMC’s
website these projections are available in “scorecard” format (cf. Figure 1.9). The “dot
plot” projection information was first published in January 2012. I have obtained the full
history of FOMC projections 2012-2017.20
18The so-called “Economic projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank
presidents under their individual assessments of projected appropriate monetary policy”.
19These projections are voluntary, hence the number of “dots” can vary both across projections horizons
and FOMC dates.
20The data was obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve through using web-scraping routines.
26
For each FOMC release I compute the mean projection and its standard deviation in
order to explain the flows of mutual funds in the subsequent months (in a robustness check

















FOMC projections: mean(FOMC) median(FOMC) range(FOMC) sd(FOMC)
Figure 1.10: Comparison of different forward-looking monetary policy measures 2012-2017
Source: Federal Reserve
The median and the mean projection closely track each other, with the exception of
2012-2014 when the median stayed at zero for a considerable amount of time. Both the
standard deviation and the range of the projections show a similar pattern: at first there
are fluctuations around a relatively low level of disagreement, then from 2014-2016 there
is higher disagreement among FOMC members, while in the more recent past the FOMC
projections have become more unanimous, again. My findings are robust regardless of the
choice of measures based on the mean/standard deviation or median/range. The strong
correspondence between mean and median as well as standard deviation and range is also
reflected in the pairwise correlations in Table 1.4.
The “dot plots” published by the Federal Reserve are one of many potential sources of
information on the future path of interest rates. Other possible sources are survey measures
reflecting the opinions of financial market participants, such as the quarterly “Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters”21 or measures based on financial market prices. Via the Nelson-Siegel
approach one can infer the term structure of interest rates from on the universe of out-
standing treasury securities. This approach has been further developed e.g. by Gu¨rkaynak
et al. (2007). I compare the FOMC projections information to 1-year treasury forward rates
(SVEN1F01) computed with the methodology of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) obtained from
21Data is provided via the Philadelphia Fed: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/
real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/
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the Federal Reserve.22 While the level of SVEN1F01 is highly correlated with the FOMC
projections, the realized volatility of the previous 21 days of SVEN1F01 does not show a
strong association with the cross-sectional standard deviation of the FOMC projections.
Table 1.4: Pairwise correlations of monetary policy measures (incl. stock market measures)




sd() -0.02 0.01 0.33
mean(FOMC) -0.11 -0.31 0.81 0.23
sd(.) -0.09 -0.03 0.16 0.05 0.39
median(.) -0.12 -0.31 0.85 0.26 0.99 0.34
iqr(.) -0.13 0.01 0.47 0.21 0.59 0.73 0.59
range(.) -0.08 -0.11 0.25 -0.01 0.47 0.95 0.44 0.66
Note: The column sd() refers to the 21-day standard deviation of the series SVEN1F01, the columns sd(.), median(.) and
iqr(.) refer to measures extracted from the FOMC dot plots.
Additionally, Table 1.4 reports the correlations with monthly returns of the S&P 500
stock market index and the monthly closing price of the VIX index, which captures the
stock market’s expectation of volatility implied by S&P 500 index options. The correlation
of stock market returns and volatility with the forward-looking measures of monetary policy
is very limited. Table 1.5 shows summary statistics of all variables included in the analysis
that do not vary across funds.
Table 1.5: Summary statistics: monthly variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
mean(FOMC)t 69 1.162 0.648 0.303 2.316
sd(FOMC)t 69 0.508 0.181 0.178 0.852
median(FOMC)t 69 1.043 0.687 0.250 2.125
iqr(FOMC)t 69 0.456 0.308 0 1
range(FOMC)t 69 1.870 0.732 0.750 3.375
S&P 500t (%) 69 0.0101 0.0280 -0.0647 0.0797
VIXt 69 15.39 3.497 9.510 28.43
SVEN1F01t 69 0.828 0.409 0.222 1.634
sd21(SVEN1F01)t 69 0.0608 0.0310 0.0135 0.182
The data on mutual fund flows is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). The sample period is January 2012 – December 2017 since the “dot plots” were first
published by the Federal Reserve in 2012. I select corporate bond funds according to a fund’s
portfolio share of corporate bonds.23 If the average percentage of corporate bonds exceeds
22Source: https://www.quandl.com/data/FED/SVEN1F-US-Treasury-One-Year-Forward-Rate-Curve
23Portfolio shares are reported in the quarterly CRSP mutual funds summary dataset.
28
50%, a fund is classified as a corporate bond fund.24 In the sample of corporate bond funds
I exclude index funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and exchange-traded notes (ETNs).
This is in line with the previous literature and excludes funds with limited discretion over
which assets are to be sold first. Complementarities should be strongest for funds that
remain in the sample. Figure 1.11 shows that during the sample period there have been
large inflows and/or valuation gains in the segment of corporate bond funds, leading to an



















Figure 1.11: Monthly Total Net Assets of corporate bond funds 2012-2017
Source: CRSP
The CRSP mutual fund database reports end-of-month returns (Returni,t) and total net
assets (TNAi,t). I apply the following formula in order to obtain monthly fund flows:
Flowsi,t (%) =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 (1 + Returni,t)
TNAt−1
· 100
This approach is standard in the literature using data obtained via the CRSP mutual fund
database (see e.g. Chen et al. (2010) or Chen and Qin (2017)). Returns are calculated based
on the daily net asset value of the fund and have been adjusted for dividend payments by
the data provider.25 A significant number of investors choose to reinvest fund distributions
24In a robustness check I use the selection criterion of Goldstein et al. (2017). The authors use a set of
objective codes: (1) Lipper objective code in the set (‘A’,‘BBB’, ‘HY’, ‘SII’, ‘SID’, ‘IID’), or (2) Strategic
Insight objective code in the set (‘CGN’, ‘CHQ’, ‘CHY’, ‘CIM’, ‘CMQ’, ‘CPR’, ‘CSM’), or (3) Wiesenberger
objective code in the set (‘CBD’, ‘CHY’), or (4) ‘IC’ as the first two characters of the CRSP objective code.
25For more details see p. 9 of the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database Guide available
via WRDS.
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automatically instead of receiving them in cash. If investors choose their dividends to be
paid in cash they are reported as outflows. However, if investors are rational there should
be no difference between these automatic (passive) outflows and other active in- or outflows.
I include only fund shares with an average TNA larger than 5 million US-dollar. The
variable Flowsi,t (%), which is imputed using the above formula, was trimmed on the fund-
level such that flows do not exceed 2500% or fall below -100%.
Constant aggregate inflows are particularly visible in 2012-2014 and 2016-2018 while the
period 2014-2016 was characterized predominantly by net outflows. Figure 1.12 shows that
during the period that was characterized by higher monetary policy uncertainty, flows have

























FOMC projections: mean(FOMC) sd(FOMC) CRSP: Net inflows
Figure 1.12: Monthly net inflows of corporate bond funds 2012-2017
Source: Federal Reserve, CRSP
The remainder of the empirical analysis will look at the relationship between future
monetary policy and fund flows at the level of a single fund. Summary statistics of fund-
level variables are reported in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Summary statistics: fund-level variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
TNAi,t 90,026 591.4 1,878 0.100 41,840
Returni,t 90,026 0.00383 0.0128 -0.206 0.182
Flowsi;t (USD million) 90,026 1.925 91.57 -6,934 8,941
Flowsi;t (%) 90,026 2.534 44.84 -99.93 2,500
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1.8 Empirical approach
I will test some implications of the theory outlined in the previous sections in a simple
fixed-effects panel setup. This approach is similar to Chen et al. (2010) who motivate
their hypotheses with respect to the flow-performance relationship in equity funds using a
theoretical model based on a global game of fund investors.
I look at the effects of future monetary policy on fund flows. A complicating factor
is that – while performance varies across funds – expectations of monetary policy show
meaningful variation only over time and across investors. For the latter source of variation,
however, data is hard to obtain. This poses challenges for identification. As a first pass, I
will estimate the following fixed-effects panel specification:
Flowsi,t (%) = β1 ·mean(FOMC)t + β2 · sd(FOMC)t
+β3 · Returni,t−1 + β4 · log(TNA)i,t−1
+γ · Controlst + µi + εi,t
I am mainly interested in the regression coefficients of the level (β1) and the dispersion
(β2) of central bank signals available throughout period t
26 on fund flows. I control for
time-constant determinants of flows on the fund level (the fund fixed effect µi), as well as
the fund’s return in the previous period, the log of a fund’s total net assets (TNA) in the
previous period and some macro control variables, e.g. the monthly return of the S&P 500
and the VIX closing price at the end of the month.
The monetary policy signal is informative with respect to the outside investment option.
A fund’s portfolio is mostly given and can only marginally change its basic characteristics
over the short- to medium-term. This holds especially if one assumes that fund holdings
are held to maturity and deliver certain fixed coupon payments.
A higher return on the outside option should therefore lead to outflows from the bond
fund. Depending on the degree of strategic complementarities, higher monetary policy
uncertainty – or uncertainty with respect to the returns of an investment opportunity that
lies outside the fund – can lead to a lower or higher willingness by investors to maintain
their fund investment. The effects also depend on the investors’ prior mean. My theoretical
predictions are summarized in Table 1.3.
For the consistency of my estimators I need all regressors (see equation above) contained
in xi,t to fulfil E(x
′
i,sεi,t) = 0, s, t = 1, ..., T . The unobserved effect µi is allowed to be
arbitrarily correlated with xi,t for all t.
Monetary policy is unlikely to respond to shocks to flows in a particular segment once
26For example the information contained in the dot plot released on 13 December 2017 will be assigned
to flows in January 2018 and onwards.
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we control for some general economic variables such as the returns of the S&P 500 (only the
fund-specific shocks would then be captured via εi,t, not those that are essentially caused by
macro variables or shocks to future monetary policy) and some fund specific variables such
as lagged fund returns and lagged fund size. It is also unlikely that stock markets (S&P
500, VIX) react to these unexplained withdrawal shocks in bond markets.
The case is harder to make for fund-level variables. For example, I would need both past
and future fund returns to be uncorrelated with unexplained withdrawal shocks (i.e. those
that are not caused by bad returns or high stock market returns). While the inclusion of the
regressors “Returni,t−1” and “log(TNA)i,t−1” should help at ruling out a correlation between
εi,t and previous values of the fund level regressors, I also need unexplained withdrawal
shocks to be uncorrelated with future values of these regressors, e.g. future returns.
There are numerous papers that look at the flow-performance relationship (e.g. Chen
et al. (2010) and Goldstein et al. (2017)). The argument is usually, that past performance
affects flows (something I take into account). However, I would need unexplained the un-
explained component of (past) fund-level flows to have no effect on future performance as
well. Given that the effects of withdrawals on future performance are one channel through
which mutual funds might exhibit strategic complementarities this assumption is less likely
to hold.
The same needs to hold for the correlation between the error term and the future values
of total net assets, a stock measure. Shocks to flows in percent of total net assets have
to be uncorrelated with past and future values of total net assets. I include this variable
since the flows of large funds are usually less responsive to shocks and exhibit smaller flows
in percentage terms. However herding behaviour of investors might lead to a correlation
between outflows and total net assets on the level of a single fund.
Via the inclusion of interaction terms – e.g. a monthly level of corporate bond fund
holdings (currently not available in the CRSP data) – future studies could further explain
how the level of strategic complementarities shapes the relationship between monetary policy
uncertainty and fund flows. By using data at a higher frequency one could also try to look at
the relationship between uncertainty and fund flows in times of market stress. These periods
are characterized by particularly low levels of market liquidity which might exacerbate the
extent of strategic complementarities.
1.9 Empirical results
The baseline results in Table 1.7 show that there is a negative relationship between the
expected level of future monetary policy and corporate bond fund flows. My estimation
results are based on fixed effects estimations with standard errors that are clustered on the
fund-level (marked with i/· in the last row of the regression tables), on the month-level
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(·/t) as well as using a two-way clustering approach on the fund- and month-level (i/t). An
increase by 1 percentage point in the mean FOMC projection for the end of the following
year is associated with outflows of 2 % of a fund’s total net assets over the course of a
month. An increase by 1 percentage point corresponds to an increase by approximately 1.5
standard deviations.
Table 1.7: FOMC projections and fund flows of corporate bond funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%)
mean(FOMC)t -1.241*** -2.082*** -2.208*** -2.208*** -2.208***
(0.268) (0.313) (0.340) (0.309) (0.379)
sd(FOMC)t 1.135 3.124*** 3.350*** 3.350*** 3.350**
(0.959) (1.005) (1.021) (1.187) (1.295)
Returni,t−1 22.38* 15.72 11.95 11.95 11.95
(12.64) (13.22) (13.64) (19.60) (19.82)
log(TNA)i,t−1 -2.167*** -11.94*** -11.95*** -11.95*** -11.95***
(0.241) (1.205) (1.209) (1.306) (1.365)
S&P 500t (%) 8.294 8.294 8.294
(7.994) (7.782) (8.272)
VIXt -0.0855 -0.0855 -0.0855
(0.0553) (0.0630) (0.0649)
Observations 83,803 83,799 83,799 83,799 83,799
R-squared 0.010 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE i/. i/. i/. ./t i/t
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Higher uncertainty – captured by the level of disagreement among FOMC participants
– is associated with inflows into corporate bond funds. Hence, investors seem to be more
willing to maintain investments in corporate bond funds vis-a`-vis other investment options if
there is a higher level of disagreement as measured by the standard deviation of the FOMC
projections. These findings are robust to the use of alternative measures that capture the
distribution of the FOMC projections (cf. Table A.1 in the Appendix).
Using a different sample of corporate bond funds as in Goldstein et al. (2017) also confirms
the negative association between the level of future monetary policy and fund flows and the
positive relationship with uncertainty measures (cf. Table 1.8).
Using a different measure of expected monetary policy – treasury forward rates captured
by the variable SVEN1F01t – I can confirm the negative relationship between the future
level of monetary policy and fund flows. There is also a positive relationship between the
realized volatility of forward rates and fund flows, but this relationship is not as robust as
the one identified using the standard deviation of FOMC projections (cf. Table A.2 in the
Appendix).
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Table 1.8: FOMC projections and fund flows of corporate bond funds (Goldstein criteria)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%)
mean(FOMC)t -0.354 -0.791*** -0.672*** -0.672** -0.672**
(0.241) (0.240) (0.247) (0.278) (0.321)
sd(FOMC)t 1.910*** 2.428*** 2.285*** 2.285*** 2.285***
(0.725) (0.719) (0.732) (0.806) (0.844)
Returni,t−1 46.22*** 28.74*** 30.20*** 30.20** 30.20**
(11.30) (10.17) (10.68) (14.69) (15.11)
log(TNA)i,t−1 -1.564*** -8.452*** -8.453*** -8.453*** -8.453***
(0.174) (0.852) (0.852) (0.990) (0.970)
S&P 500t (%) -1.640 -1.640 -1.640
(6.152) (7.716) (7.805)
VIXt 0.0667 0.0667 0.0667
(0.0485) (0.0562) (0.0587)
Observations 89,325 89,322 89,322 89,322 89,322
R-squared 0.008 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE i/. i/. i/. ./t i/t
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.10 Withdrawal incentives in government bond funds
In the theoretical section I have argued that the effects of uncertainty are largely mitigated
by the degree of strategic complementarities investors are facing upon withdrawal. This
section will look whether my findings with respect to monetary policy uncertainty prevail
in a sample that should be largely free from such effects. The assets of funds in this sample


























FOMC projections: mean(FOMC) sd(FOMC) CRSP: Net inflows
Figure 1.13: Monthly net inflows of government bond funds 2012-2017
Source: Federal Reserve, CRSP
In order to obtain a sample of funds that shows reduced strategic complementarities
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upon withdrawal I look at funds with an average of more than 75 % of assets invested in
government bonds – and include also index funds and ETFs. In these products I expect
a lower level of strategic complementarities since assets have to be sold according to index
weights and sales of relatively more illiquid assets cannot be postponed. Summary statistics
of fund-level variables are reported in Table 1.9.
Table 1.9: Summary statistics: fund-level variables for government bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
TNAi,t 30,174 784.1 2,478 0.100 39,300
Returni,t 30,174 0.000625 0.0270 -0.389 0.433
Flowsi;t (USD million) 30,174 -0.289 127.9 -4,629 5,268
Flowsi;t (%) 30,174 2.119 42.96 -98.60 2,401
Figure 1.13 shows the evolution of fund flows in this sample. These patterns differ from
the sample of corporate bond funds.
Table 1.10: FOMC projections and fund flows of government bond funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%)
mean(FOMC)t 0.296 -2.555*** -2.244*** -2.244*** -2.244***
(0.504) (0.573) (0.603) (0.514) (0.564)
sd(FOMC)t -2.614** 1.285 1.295 1.295 1.295
(1.222) (0.880) (0.871) (1.168) (1.146)
Returni,t−1 17.03 19.24 18.02 18.02** 18.02
(12.01) (12.07) (11.95) (7.613) (11.92)
log(TNA)i,t−1 -1.404*** -8.374*** -8.367*** -8.367*** -8.367***
(0.285) (1.935) (1.935) (1.613) (1.890)
S&P 500t (%) 25.63** 25.63** 25.63**
(10.51) (10.29) (10.66)
VIXt 0.111 0.111 0.111
(0.105) (0.0802) (0.0940)
Observations 30,097 30,097 30,097 30,097 30,097
R-squared 0.006 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE i/. i/. i/. ./t i/t
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Indeed, for government bonds, I do not find evidence of a significant positive effect of
monetary policy uncertainty in any of our specifications (the pooled regression coefficient is
even negative). This points in the direction that strategic complementarities are seemingly
less important for these funds (cf. Table 1.10).
1.11 Conclusions
My model describes the role of various theoretical channels through which uncertainty re-
garding the future level of interest rates affects the redemption behaviour of investors. I dis-
tinguish between fundamental uncertainty and strategic uncertainty and show how strategic
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uncertainty alters the behaviour of fund investors. My main finding connects the direction
of the effects of uncertainty to the strength of strategic complementarities among investors.
Depending on the degree of strategic complementarities, higher monetary policy uncertainty
can lead to a lower or higher willingness by investors to maintain their fund investment.
The effects also depend on the investors’ prior mean.
I complement these findings with an empirical analysis of the effects of FOMC commu-
nications on withdrawals from US-based bond funds. I find that the average prediction of
FOMC members with respect to the future level of interest rates is correlated with higher
withdrawals. This holds both for funds mainly investing in corporate bond funds and those
that mainly invest in government bond funds. A higher level of uncertainty in the predictions
of the future level of the interest rate is associated with inflows into corporate bond funds.
There is no evidence of such a positive effect on the flows of government bond funds. This is
consistent with the model’s predictions for a moderate level of strategic complementarities
in corporate bond funds (κ > 0, θ¯ < r − κ
2
). In the absence of strategic complementarities
(κ = 0) increasing uncertainty can have the opposing effects (cf. Table 1.3). This might
explain withdrawal patterns from government bond funds.
Overall, this is a first pass on the effects of uncertainty in the communication behaviour
of a central bank on financial stability and the behaviour of investors. There is an active
discussion in the policy sphere on the existence and the extent of strategic complemen-
tarities in corporate bond funds. My analysis shows, that a moderate level of strategic
complementarities may explain the differences in the effects of uncertainty on withdrawals
between corporate bond funds and government bond funds. While most central banks do
not have an explicit financial stability mandate, these considerations might still be taken
into account in the design of forward guidance schemes.
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Chapter 2
The Portfolio of Euro Area Fund
Investors and ECB Monetary Policy
Announcements1
2.1 Introduction
Since the start of the global financial crisis in 2008, central banks around the world have
stimulated the economy by aggressively cutting interest rates and implementing unconven-
tional monetary policies. This paper studies the impact that ECB monetary policy surprises
between 2012 and mid-2016 have on the portfolio allocation of euro area fund investors. Our
main finding is that these investors are only indirectly affected by monetary policy actions
via their impact on asset prices and exchange rates. We find little evidence of investors
actively reallocating their portfolios, following significant monetary policy announcements.
Most studies have analysed the transmission of monetary policy via the banking system
and financial markets. We want to study whether there is a channel of transmission which
goes through the asset allocation behaviour of institutional and retail investors. In particular
we look into the class of investment fund investors. From an asset pricing perspective,
monetary policy shocks affect investors’ behaviour only insofar as they affect the stochastic
discount factor and therefore risk premia. A formal analysis of the links between monetary
policy and asset allocation would first try to assess how monetary policy shocks affect the
statistical joint distribution of the returns of the portfolio asset classes and then derive
its implications for the allocation. We bypass altogether the intermediate step of studying
the statistical properties of the asset returns and look instead directly at the impact that
monetary policy shocks have on allocations.
Central banks can affect investors’ behaviour via several channels. One main channel can
1This chapter is joint work with Maurizio Michael Habib and Simone Manganelli.
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be referred to as the Signalling Channel. Changes in monetary policy stance usually affect
expectations about future rates, that is the risk neutral components of interest rates. In
frictionless finance models, central banks’ actions provide new information to investors and
affect the forward rates and bond prices, without affecting the positions that arbitrageurs
hold in equilibrium and therefore they do not affect risk premia (see, for instance, Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014)). As a consequence, the signalling channel should not have an impact on
active reallocation (due to actual changes in portfolio shares), but should have an impact
on passive reallocation (due to the effects on prices).
A second important channel, which typically goes under the name of Portfolio Balance
Channel, works through the effect that monetary policy operations have on risk premia.
The idea of the Portfolio Balance Channel goes back to Tobin (1965) and rests on the
key assumption that investors have specific preferences for certain types of financial assets.
This may due to differences in preferences, transaction costs or regulatory restrictions. The
theoretical implication of this assumption is that changes in the supplies of government
bonds to private investors via central bank purchases will affect their prices and yields. For
instance, according to preferred habitat models a la Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood
and Vayanos (2014), following surprises in purchases of long term Treasury bonds by the
central bank, investors will be forced to hold smaller positions in long term bonds and bear
less duration risk, which in turn will lead to a decrease in risk premia and an increase
in bond prices. Because of their effect on the stochastic discount factor, monetary policy
shocks associated with the portfolio balance channel should have an impact both on the
active and on the passive reallocation of investors.2
In order to study the impact of ECB policies on the portfolio of euro area investors, we
track the evolution of an aggregate portfolio of investment funds that are based in Luxem-
bourg, the largest financial centre for the euro area investment fund industry which mainly
attracts euro area investors. We study how investors, on aggregate, choose investment funds
at the fund category level, e.g. bond funds versus equity funds, not the portfolio allocation
of fund managers. To identify the relevance of the different channels of transmission, we
construct measures of active portfolio reallocation, driven by the redemptions or injections
of underlying investors, and of passive portfolio reallocation, triggered by valuation effects
related to changes in asset prices and exchange rates, as proposed by Ahmed et al. (2016)
and previous work. As common in the literature on the impact of central banks’ monetary
policy decisions, we identify the announcement effects of traditional and unconventional
policies looking at the intraday change in key euro area interest rates around major events,
such as ECB Governing Council meetings.
2Haldane et al. (2016) provide a broader list of the various channels through which unconventional
monetary policies are expected to work, including those channels that are more relevant to our study:
policy signalling, portfolio balance, as well as confidence, exchange rate, bank lending and market liquidity
premia.
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Our main findings show that ECB monetary policy affected investment fund investors
mainly via its impact on asset prices and exchange rates. The significant valuation effects
associated with these price movements passively shifted the asset allocation of euro area
investors towards riskier securities, like funds investing in European and Emerging Mar-
ket equity, and away from European bond funds. These effects are more pronounced for
unconventional measures, such as the Asset Purchase Programme (APP). Some active re-
allocation into emerging equity markets following ECB actions is observed for institutional
investors. Overall, our daily reallocation measures capture reallocation mostly at the mar-
gin – with daily standard deviations between 0.02 and 0.1 percentage points. The lack of
active reaction of retail investors is consistent with Calvet et al. (2009) and Ivkovic´ and
Weisbenner (2009) who find little evidence of a disposition effect of past winners for mutual
funds. Our findings are also consistent with the growing literature on rational inattention
of informationally constrained investors (see for instance Gabaix and Laibson (2001) and
Alvarez et al. (2012)). If information is costly to acquire and process, it is optimal to al-
ternate long periods of inaction with brief periods in which information is processed and
portfolios are rebalanced.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a review of the related
literature. Section 3 presents the investment funds data and explains the construction
of our measures of active and passive portfolio rebalancing. Furthermore, we introduce
the identification strategy for the impact of ECB monetary policy announcements, with
a particular focus on major unconventional measures. Section 4 describes the empirical
methodology and summarizes our joint estimation approach. Section 5 discusses the main
results and Section 6 presents further robustness checks and extensions of the main model.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Our paper is related to many studies about the impact of standard and non-standard mon-
etary policy measures. Borio and Zabai (2016) provide a review of the flourishing literature
on this topic and introduce a useful taxonomy to distinguish balance sheet policies aimed
at influencing financial conditions beyond the short-term rate, from forward guidance that
manages expectations regarding the future path of policy rates and negative interest rate
policy. Overall, they find ample evidence of a significant impact of these policies on financial
conditions, but only tentative evidence regarding their impact on output and inflation.
The focus of our paper is more specifically on ECB policies and their immediate impact
on financial markets and investors, rather than on their broader impact on the economy.
It is therefore closer to studies such as Rogers et al. (2014) who show that ECB monetary
policy surprises had a positive impact on stock markets, led to a compression in spreads
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between core and periphery euro area countries and an appreciation of the euro exchange
rate, at least until 2014, the period covered by their study. During this first phase, the
confidence channel was the predominant channel of transmission, as the ECB promoted
financial stability and confidence in the integrity of the eurozone. In addition, Fratzscher
et al. (2016a) show that the ECB unconventional monetary polices between 2007 and 2012
had positive financial spill-overs to advanced economies and emerging markets and lowered
credit risk among banks and sovereigns in the euro area and other G20 countries. The
launch of a quantitative easing programme targeting public sector securities in January 2015,
following the introduction of a negative deposit facility rate since mid-2014, characterises a
second phase of ECB unconventional monetary policies, where the signalling and portfolio
balance channel take the centre stage and the intended policy objective is the flattening of
the yield curve. The early assessment of the APP is generally positive. The launch of the
programme persistently reduced long-term sovereign bond yields (Andrade et al., 2016) and
the related APP announcements had a price impact that generally increased with maturity
and riskiness of assets, with significant spill-overs to non-targeted assets, such as corporate
bonds (Altavilla et al., 2015). The APP announcement had international spillovers, boosting
equity prices around the world and causing a broad-based depreciation of the euro, but it
did not lead to an increase in portfolios flows to emerging market economies (Georgiadis
and Gra¨b, 2016).
Our paper is closely related to a relatively new strand of literature which uses investment
funds data to study the impact of monetary policy on portfolio investment decisions, since
these data are particularly useful to test the portfolio balance channel of unconventional
monetary policies. It is important to note that, over time, the overall portfolio allocation
of investment funds is influenced by the behaviour of two types of agents: (i) underlying
investors – through injections in and redemptions from funds – and (ii) asset managers.
Similarly to several other papers, we identify the changes in asset allocation driven only by
underlying investors, not by asset managers, because flow data allow a cleaner identification
of short-term shifts in asset allocation – since flows are available at a daily frequency,
whereas detailed asset allocation data are only available at a monthly frequency. Moreover,
as noted by Raddatz and Schmukler (2012), over the short-run managers usually allow
shocks to returns to pass-through to country weights. Table 2.1 summarises the main
findings of this empirical literature, clarifying how conventional or unconventional monetary
policies have been identified. Overall, the existing evidence suggests that monetary policy
easing by major central banks is associated with a shift towards riskier assets, even though
these are not necessarily domestic equity securities, but may include foreign securities.
Specifically, positive monetary policy surprises, i.e. those associated with an unexpected
easing of monetary policy, lead to a rotation of the portfolio towards developed market
equity by asset managers (Cenedese et al., 2015) or by underlying investors (Curcuru et al.,
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2015). Similarly, Hau and Lai (2016) show that loose monetary policies in the euro area
are associated with a shift out of money market funds towards equity. However, Banegas
et al. (2016) and Kroencke et al. (2015) find the opposite result in the case of US Fed
monetary policy shocks. Indeed, Fratzscher et al. (2016b) show that US Fed QE1 and QE2
had opposite effects on flows to US equity, suggesting that it is important to distinguish
carefully the type of monetary shock. The evidence of spill-over of an expansionary domestic
monetary policy to foreign securities is more coherent and convincing. Notably, with the
exception of US Fed QE1 (Fratzscher et al., 2016b), monetary policy easing by the Fed
prompts a rebalancing of portfolio towards non-US equity ((Cenedese et al., 2015; Fratzscher
et al., 2016b; Kroencke et al., 2015)). Similarly, unconventional ECB monetary policies –
until 2012 – led to larger flows to emerging market bond and equity funds and developed
market bond funds (Fratzscher et al., 2016a).
Papers that include more detailed information regarding the asset allocation of specific
investors – such as Joyce et al. (2014) for UK-based institutional investors or Bua and
Dunne (2017) for Irish investment funds – find evidence of rebalancing from government
bonds, the primary targets of the Bank of England or ECB operations, towards corporate
bonds or closer substitutes, such as foreign government bonds. In particular, Bua and Dunne
(2017) stress that the portfolio balance channel of the ECB’s public sector asset purchase
programme operated through purchases of foreign assets, in particular by funds not holding
euro area government bonds and not directly exposed to the ECB APP. At the same time,
Koijen et al. (2016) and the report by the Bundesbank (2017) confirm the important role
of foreign investors as the main counterpart of ECB APP operations.
Finally, since we distinguish active rebalancing by fund investors from passive return
effects, the results in our paper can be related to the ample literature on the behaviour of
individual investors chasing returns or selling past winners, surveyed by Barber and Odean
(2013) and, in particular as regards fund investors, by Levy and Lieberman (2015).
Our paper contributes to this literature in several different ways. First, it is the only
study zooming in on ECB policies and portfolio decisions of euro area investors, together
with Fratzscher et al. (2016a). Compared to the latter study, which covers ECB policies
until 2012, we extend the sample to mid-2016, including in particular the Asset Purchase
Programme. In addition, we construct our measures of ECB monetary policy surprises,
based on the impact of announcements on euro area short-term and long-term interest
rates. Similarly to the most recent studies using investment funds data,3 we analyse proper
portfolio shifts, not just flows, through the measure of active reallocation. Compared to
the other studies, to our knowledge, this is the first paper using daily data to identify the
contribution of each component – active versus passive – to the total reallocation of a broad
3Ahmed et al. (2016) is a recent example, but also Grinblatt et al. (1995) or Curcuru et al. (2011).
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portfolio, in particular highlighting the contribution of a proxy of the passive exchange rate
component against the passive return effect.
The next two sections explain our identification of monetary policy surprises and the
construction of active and passive reallocation measures, respectively.
Table 2.1: Survey of empirical evidence
Study Data Identification Main findings
Banegas et al. (2016) ICI fund flows, US-
based funds, monthly
(2000-14)
Deviation of Fed fund
rate from Taylor rule
based on survey data
Unexpected Fed tightening (shock
to the path of monetary policy) as-
sociated with outflows from bond
and inflows to equity mutual funds




for different time peri-
ods
QE leads to rebalancing by fund
managers from EU government
bonds (targeted by CB operations)
towards corporate bonds or closer
substitutes, such as foreign govern-
ment bonds
Cenedese et al. (2015) EPFR country flows,
global funds, monthly
(2008-14)
Intraday change in US
long-term yields and
actual US Fed opera-
tions
US unconventional monetary poli-
cies prompt rebalancing of fund
managers to non-US securities, in
particular DM equity, and away
from US securities







Active reallocation of underlying
investors to DM equity and out of
DM bonds following Fed and ECB
easing
Fratzscher et al. (2016b) EPFR fund and coun-
try flows, global and
US-based funds, daily
(2007-10)
Event dummy and ac-
tual US Fed operations
US Fed QE1 in 2008 triggered a
portfolio rebalancing by underly-
ing investors into US equity and
bond funds and out of EM funds.
US Fed QE2 since 2010 had the op-
posite effect
Fratzscher et al. (2016a) EPFR fund and coun-
try flows, global and
EA-based funds, daily
(2007-12)
Event dummy and ac-
tual ECB operations
Some evidence of stronger inflows
by underlying investors into EA
periphery equity and, in some
cases, bond markets, partly rebal-
ancing from highly-rated EA coun-
tries. Positive impact on flows to
EM equity and bond funds and
DM bond funds
Hau and Lai (2016) LIPPER fund flows,
EA-based funds, quar-
terly (2003-10)
Change in real interest
rates across EA coun-
tries
Loose monetary policy associated
with an increase in inflows by un-
derlying investors into equity and
outflows from money market funds
Kroencke et al. (2015) EPFR fund flows, US-
based funds, weekly
(2006-2014)
Weekly changes in US
2-year and 10-year
Treasury yields
Fed easing associated with reallo-
cation by underlying investors to
non-US assets. Yield curve flatten-
ing associated with a shift out of
equities and into US bonds




Actual BoE operations Reallocation of fund managers
from UK gilts to corporate bonds
following BoE quantitative easing
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2.3 Data
This section presents the investment fund data and explains the construction of our port-
folio of euro area investors. In particular, it introduces the concepts of active and passive
reallocation that shall be used throughout the rest of the paper as main dependent variables.
We also explain how monetary policy shocks are identified.
2.3.1 Investment funds data and Luxembourg-based funds
Our sample is daily and runs from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2016. We downloaded data
for investment funds based in Luxembourg from the EPFR database. This dataset has been
extensively used in the recent literature on the impact of monetary policy (cf. previous
section), but it has also been used to study the impact of funding shocks on emerging
markets asset prices (Jotikasthira et al., 2012) and to analyse capital flows to emerging
markets (Fratzscher, 2012).
In the EPFR dataset, new funds are continuously added, while other funds might drop
out of the sample, creating structural breaks in our series on a daily basis. For this reason,
we fix our fund universe as of the 1st of January 2012 in order to eliminate any entry bias
in our sample and we control for the possible exit of funds through internal consistency
checks.4
The coverage by EPFR of investment funds domiciled in other euro area countries is
increasing over time, but still relatively low, and this led to the decision to focus on
Luxembourg-based funds. This decision, however, is not only driven by data availabil-
ity but also justified by the fact that Luxembourg is the most important financial centre
for the euro area investment fund industry. This is a large industry with EUR 10.6 trillion
assets under management (AuM) for equity and bond funds (including funds of funds and
excluding money market funds) as of the second quarter of 2016, of which around one third,
EUR 3.7 trillion are located in Luxembourg.5 Crucially, euro area investors account for the
bulk of cross-border equity investment in Luxembourg, 72% of the total stock of derived
Luxembourg equity liabilities according to the IMF CPIS dataset.6 Therefore, we may claim
that Luxembourg-based funds are broadly representative of an average euro area investor.7
4Following Kroencke et al. (2015), it is possible to reconstruct an internally consistent series of TNA and
identify these potential structural breaks. We find major inconsistencies – larger than 1% of fund category
TNA - for 52 fund category-day combinations out of 9,328 and include a dummy variable in our regressions
to control for these breaks. Moreover, we double check the results with a different sample, fixing the universe
as of the 1st of January 2014.
5The industry is highly concentrated in a few countries of the euro area. The four largest domiciles by
assets under management (Luxembourg, Germany, Ireland and France) account for more than 80% of total
AuM between 2010 and mid-2016.
6See also Figure B.3. In balance of payments statistics, the purchase of a share of an investment fund
based in Luxembourg by a non-resident is recorded under portfolio equity investment liability.
7However, it should be noted that Floreani and Habib (2015) show that the investors from peripheral euro
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We considered the inclusion of funds based in Ireland, another important financial centre
within the euro area. However, the foreign investor base of Ireland is much more geograph-
ically diversified with respect to that of Luxembourg. In particular, euro area investors
account for only 30% of Irish cross-border equity liabilities. Therefore, we may not claim
that Irish funds represent the behaviour of an average euro area investor and decided to
focus our analysis on Luxembourg-based funds.
2.3.2 The construction of the aggregated portfolio
Funds are classified in the EPFR database according to their main mandate by asset class
– equities or bonds – in a specific geographic area – Western Europe (WE), US and Asia
Pacific including Japan (USAPJ), Global (GLOB) or Emerging Markets (EM).8 We create
an aggregate portfolio composed by the assets held by these eight different fund categories
and, as explained in the next sub-section, we shall study the reallocation of fund investors
across these major categories.
The size and composition of this aggregate portfolio is shown in Table 2.2. As regards the
size of the Total Net Assets (TNA) under management, the coverage of the whole universe
of Luxembourg-based funds is significant. On average between 2012 and mid-2016, total
net assets of Luxembourg-based funds amounted to EUR 554 billion in our dataset; this
corresponds to 27% of the total universe of equity and bond funds, as reported by the ECB
(almost EUR 2.1 trillion). As regards the composition of our aggregate portfolio between
equity and bonds, the EPFR coverage is higher for equity funds (36%) than for bond funds
(19%), resulting in a portfolio tilted towards risky assets (60% of the total portfolio) and,
in particular, emerging market equities (21% of the total portfolio). The lower coverage for
bond funds is a disadvantage in our case, as we could miss the activity of the funds that
were most affected by ECB APP purchases. Moreover, the EPFR dataset does not provide
a breakdown for funds investing only in the euro area. However, the available aggregation
allows to study fund flows at a daily frequency, a distinct advantage compared to several
other studies using fund data, since it allows a clean identification of the monetary policy
shock and its impact.
area countries are generally overexposed to euro area financial centres, such as Luxembourg and Ireland,
compared to investors from core euro area economies and according to an international gravity model.
8We generate the category USAPJ ourselves, by aggregating data on North America and Asia Pacific
Japan from EPFR.
9For USAPJ bonds, the currency allocation reflects only US bond funds since EPFR does not provide
currency information on APJ Bonds. The country allocation is based on the monthly country allocation
dataset of EPFR. The coverage of this dataset is more limited, the average TNA of Emerging market funds
in the country allocation dataset is 49% of the total TNA of the flow dataset, which we use for the remainder
of our analysis. However, coverage is generally lower for bonds than for equities and, e.g. coverage of the
TNA of Global funds from the flow dataset is in the single digits in the allocation dataset. The category
USAPJ is entirely missing from the allocation dataset. We aggregate funds with suitable mandates from
Thomson Reuters Lipper for IM (e.g. United States, ASEAN, Korea, Japan) in order to extrapolate the
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Table 2.2: EPFR portfolio, Jan 2012 - Jun 2016 averages
Equity Bonds Total
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
EPFR Portfolio
TNA (EUR bn) 87.3 67.5 64.2 113.9 58.7 17.7 93.1 51.2 553.6
% of TNA in total portfolio 16% 12% 12% 21% 11% 3% 17% 9% 100%
Currency denomination of funds (% of TNA within each fund category)
EUR 92% 17% 38% 14% 92% 12% 43% 23% 43%
USD 3% 67% 60% 83% 0% 83% 46% 73% 50%
Other 5% 17% 2% 2% 8% 5% 11% 4% 7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Country allocation of funds (% of TNA within each fund category)
EA 62% 2% 13% 1% 83% 5% 29% 0% 26%
US 0% 67% 46% 0% 1% 73% 34% 0% 22%
Other 38% 32% 42% 99% 16% 22% 37% 100% 53%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: See also footnote 9
EPFR provides daily data on returns (Ri,t), the Total Net Assets (Ai,t), and flows (fi,t)
into our eight different categories of funds (i), e.g. Luxembourg-based funds investing in
Western European equities (see upper panel of Table 2.4 for summary statistics). The
original data are collected in the currency denomination of the fund and transformed by
EPFR into US dollars. Therefore, the dataset includes an additional term (fx i,t) to account
for changes in the valuation of non-US dollar denominated fund shares. Flows are derived
from the changes in a fund’s Total Net Assets and the daily returns at the level of fund
shares. Flows, assets and returns are then aggregated into the eight broad categories, which
form our portfolio. Flows and assets are summed up across all funds in a given category,
whereas the aggregate return for the asset class i (Ri,t) is the weighted average of the returns
of each single fund in that category, where the weights are the assets of each fund divided
by Total Net Assets in category i.
Applying the same methodology as EPFR, we convert our portfolio into euro, using the
end-of-day exchange rates from Datastream10 (Ticker: USEURSP) for Total Net Assets Ai,t
and the average exchange rate between the two days for flows (fi,t), obtaining a valuation
adjustment term in euro, fx i,t
11, which accounts for the currency impact of fund shares
denominated in a currency different from the euro. It is important to note that this term
country holdings for this category. For the totals we multiply the percentages from the country/currency
allocation table with the TNA of the EPFR flow dataset.
10The provider of the mutual fund database (EPFR) uses foreign exchange quotes from XE.com Inc., a
commercial provider of FX information. Since all TNAs and flows are reported by Luxembourg-based funds
with respect to the same market close, we apply the same conversion factor to all asset classes, and then focus
our analysis on the differential effects between asset classes, small mismatches between the two data providers
should not be consequential for our estimation. Quoting all results in Euro, however, makes the interpreta-
tion of the effects a lot easier. Our daily closing spot rates are quotes that are fixed at 4 p.m. UK time which
ensures that there is no overlap with our event windows. See also https://financial.thomsonreuters.
com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/financial/wm-reuters-methodology.pdf
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does not reflect the actual exchange rate exposure of the funds, whose impact is included in
the return (Ri,t) if the fund has a foreign (non-euro) currency exposure, but it is denominated
in euro. A simple example may clarify this point. In general, funds domiciled in Luxembourg
with a mandate to invest only in US stocks may be denominated in US dollar – usually to
target global investors, or in euro – to appeal to euro area investors. Assume that the
daily return of the US stock market is equal to zero, but the dollar appreciates by 1%
against the euro. In our dataset, the USD-denominated fund will correctly report a flat
daily return and an increase in valuation by 1% in the exchange rate term. Nevertheless,
the EUR-denominated fund will report a daily return by 1%, driven by the valuation effect,
and a zero contribution by our fx term. Therefore, the closer the denomination of funds to
the actual currency exposure, the better our fx term will capture the true valuation effect
related to exchange rate movements. Fortunately, comparing the middle and lower panel
of Table 2.4, it is possible to note a relatively broad correspondence between the currency
denomination of funds and their country allocation in particular for WE and USAPJ equity
and bond funds, and partly also for GLOB bond funds. Moreover, in the case of EM bond
funds, the country asset allocation does not reflect the currency exposure, as this market
segment is dominated by US dollar issuance and, only recently, domestic currency issuance
started to take place. Therefore, also for this asset class the currency denomination of funds
may offer a good indication of the direction of exchange-related valuation effects in our
broad portfolio.
2.3.3 Measures of active and passive reallocation
For our empirical exercise we take as a starting point the euro-based portfolio weight of





where Ai,t denotes the amount of assets under management in euro for all funds of category
i at time t. This measure enables us to answer the following question: how do unexpected
changes in the monetary policy of the ECB affect the global investment portfolio of fund
investors in Luxembourg?
The sum of the end-of-day portfolio weights is 1 at any point in time. However, a
change in the portfolio weight ∆wi,t = wi,t − wi,t−1 can be due to valuation effects (passive
rebalancing) or inflows/outflows (active reallocation). Figure 2.1 illustrates these terms,
which we use throughout the paper.
11If there are inconsistencies in the data reported by EPFR, e.g. a drop in overall AuM due to a fund
dropping out of the sample, this will also be asorbed by fx i,t.
46
What matters for portfolio weights are the changes in category i relative to the other fund
categories. This is why focusing exclusively on fund flows will only reveal a partial answer
to our question regarding active reallocation: for example there might be simultaneous
outflows from all fund categories without an effect on the individual portfolio weights.12 At
the same time, there might be positive returns in all asset classes; however, the weight of
the asset class with the highest return will increase at the expense of the weight of the asset
class with the lowest return.
Figure 2.1: Decomposition of portfolio changes
Total change in portfolio allocation 
Active reallocation  Passive reallocation 
Return effect Flows 
(injections/redemptions) 
Valuation fx effect  
(through currency 
denomination of funds) 
We extend the measures proposed by Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Curcuru et al. (2011),
incorporating the FX term from the EPFR dataset. These measures are based on the
following identity:
Ai,t = Ai,t−1Ri,t + fi,t + fx i,t
Total Net Assets Ai,t of fund category i at the end of period t, can be expressed as the
combination of the assets at the end of the previous period Ai,t−1 multiplied by the gross
returns over this period Ri,t = 1 + ri,t, inflows/redemptions by investors fi,t, and currency
valuation effects fx i,t due to changes in the value of the denomination currency of fund
shares vis-a`-vis the reporting currency. In our final dataset all these measures are in euro
terms, including the FX effect of the currency denomination of the funds, as explained in
Section 3.1.
Our goal is a decomposition of the changes in the portfolio weights due to passive real-
location (driven by changes in returns and exchange rates) and active reallocation (due to
new inflows and outflows of funds). We take as a starting point the decomposition of Ahmed
12This would happen if some investors convert fund shares in cash proportional to their ex-ante portfolio
weights.
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et al. (2016), which we extend by accounting for an additional FX term that captures passive
changes in the portfolio due to exchange rate movements.
∆Portfolio Share = ∆Passive reallocation (returns)
+ ∆Passive reallocation (FX)
+ ∆Active reallocation (flows).
According to this decomposition, it is possible to isolate the change in the portfolio that
is simply driven by differential changes in asset prices across the different categories in our
portfolio. In particular, to obtain the passive realloaction due to differential returns, one
should compare the new portfolio weight of category i abstracting from flows and FX effects
with the portfolio weight from the previous period:











where Ri,t denotes the returns of the portofolio between period t − 1 and period t and
the portfolio return is computed as RP,t =
∑N
j=1wj,t−1 · Rj,t. In a similar fashion, one can
compute the passive change in the weight of fund shares denominated in a currency different
from the euro that is triggered by exchange rate changes:13
∆Passive realloction (FX) =
Ai,t−1 + fx i,t∑N
j=1
(









Here we use the FX return Rfi,t = 1 +
fx i,t
Ai,t
and the average FX return across all fund
categories RfP,t =
∑N
j=1wj,t−1 · Rfj,t. As in Ahmed et al. (2016) the active reallocation,
the part of the decomposition that is driven by inflows and outflows of investors, can be
computed as the part of the shift in portfolio weights not due to returns or FX effects.













13As discussed in Section 3.1, EPFR data do not allow us to look at the true currency exposure of the
fund portfolio, but only a proxy through their currency denomination.
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This captures the active reallocation component of the underlying fund flows fi,t that
induces an actual change in the asset allocation. Active changes in the portfolio weight of
a certain fund category should be able to capture quite well the intentions of investors to
increase the exposure towards this specific asset class and geographic focus.
The value of this measure will be 0 both in the absence of flows, and in the case of
inflows/redemptions that affect every fund category in the same manner. It is measured on
the same scale as the portfolio weight wi,t which is strictly between 0 and 1. However, for
the purpose of our empirical analysis we multiply it by 100 to capture the active reallocation
in percentage points based on portfolio weights between 0% and 100% of the total portfolio.
Finally, we want to stress again two important properties of our reallocation measures
that are both implied by the fact that we provide a decomposition of portfolio shifts. First,
across the N = 8 fund categories all reallocation measures mechanically sum up to 0. We
exploit this in our estimation approach, by imposing an additional restriction on the fitted
values. Second, the sum of the active reallocation measure and the two passive reallocation
measures will indicate the total reallocation, i.e. the total shift in portfolio weights between
period t− 1 and period t.
Table 2.4 includes summary statistics for all our reallocation measures for the aggregate
portfolio, while Tables B.4 and B.5 in the Appendix provides detailed statistics for each
fund category. It is important to note that on a daily basis the volatility of these measures
is very low, ranging from 0.02 percentage points for the active reallocation measure to
around 0.1 percentage points for the total reallocation measure. This is not surprising and
consistent with the findings of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2017) who suggest that portfolio
decisions are ”infrequent” (at most once in 15 months). Therefore, aggregating all investors,
the adjustment of the total portfolio can only be at the margin. The interesting question
we tackle in this paper is whether ECB monetary policy surprises drive these marginal
adjustments for euro area investors, similarly to one of the main findings of Ahmed et al.
(2016) showing that active reallocations into emerging market equities by US investors, at
a low frequency, appear to be mainly driven by the level of US long-term interest rates.
2.3.4 ECB unconventional monetary policies and identification
strategy
Our sample period starts at the beginning of 2012 and ends in June 2016. Our focus is on
the second phase of unconventional measures that were implemented by the ECB, targeting
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in particular the European sovereign debt market, including the OMT programme and the
APP programme. Monetary policy surprises are calculated using an approach similar to
Rogers et al. (2014). The surprises (∆iEAt ) are based on changes in short-term interest rates
and long-term government bond yields for the euro area on the days of announcements
of ECB monetary policy decisions. We use quoted bid prices from the Thomson Reuters
Tick History Database within a 2-hour window around important ECB announcements – all
Governing Council meetings and other events, as identified by Rogers et al. (2014), Curcuru
et al. (2015) and Altavilla et al. (2015) – and select the first and last available observation
within each time window.14
We extract changes in the weekly, the monthly and the 3-month EONIA OIS and average
them to obtain our monetary policy surprise to euro area short-term rates. However, as
regards long-term rates, the choice of the benchmark for the euro area is not straightforward.
One candidate could be the Bund-yield, but, as noted by Rogers et al. (2014), price changes
in Bund prices may be driven by safe-haven motives, in particular at the peak of the euro
area crisis in 2012, rather than by changes in the expected future path of long-term interest
rates. A positive surprise that removes uncertainty in the market and reduces risk premia
would lead to an increase in equity market valuations, but it might lead to a decrease in
Bund prices, since holdings of safe haven asset become less attractive. At the same time, if
the markets were expecting more expansionary measures than those that were announced
during during a particular ECB announcement – a negative surprise – Bund yields could
decrease on the back of higher demand for safe haven assets. Therefore, in order to identify
a positive surprise, i.e. a loosening of the monetary policy, we use the inverse of the
(unweighted) average change15 in the 10-year sovereign bond yields of Germany, Italy and
Spain, so that a decline in the average yield would correspond to a monetary policy easing.
This approach bears some similarities to Rogers et al. (2014) who use the spread between
German and Italian bonds for the identification of monetary policy surprises in the euro
area. Our approach has the advantage that we would identify both a decrease in sovereign
risk through a tightening of the spreads and a simultaneous decrease in all three rates
as a positive monetary policy surprise, for instance an easing announcement such as the
launch of the APP that shifted the yield curve downward. At the same time by relying on
three instruments we can decrease the amount of noise in the small surprises, since we will
only identify a clear positive surprise related to the portfolio balance channel if all three
rates move in the same direction. The interpretation is straightforward. All coefficients
14We use intraday 1-minute data provided by Thomson Reuters Tick History. The last bid price before
the event window might come from a quote from some earlier one-minute window. Yields are re-matched
from tick data and identified by the (median yield of) RIC-day-bid price-combinations.
15Results with monetary policy surprises that are weighted by outstanding volume of debt securities
issued by the general government or the GDP of each of the three countries do not differ markedly from the
unweighted measures.
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can be interpreted as if we would look at the yield change in percentage points of just one
instrument.
The choice of the 10-year maturity in order to capture changes in the long end of the
yield curve is standard in the literature.16 For the German Bund yields the 10-year and
5-year maturities have historically been the most liquid segments.17 A high level of liquidity
ensures a timely response of prices to new market developments.
Figure 2.2 plots our surprises to euro area short-term rates (left panel) and long-term
rates (right panel). It is evident that the size and volatility of shocks to short-term rates
is much lower than that of long-term rates. Interestingly, even though ECB policy rates
approach the lower bound in September 2014, when the main refinancing rate is cut from
0.15% to 0.05%, it is still possible to identify significant shocks to the euro short-term rates
after that date. Similarly, the volatility of surprise shocks to average euro area long-term
rates does not seem to be affected by announcement of the APP.
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Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the largest shocks to euro area short-term rates
and long-term rates around ECB announcements. For short-term rates, we find the large
surprises concentrated around important rate cuts and announcements of measures targeted
towards the euro area banking sector. As regards long-term rates, our surprises capture quite
well the effects of the most important unconventional policy measures by the European
Central Bank between 2012 and mid-2016. We find large positive surprises around the
announcement of the Asset Purchases Program, around the announcement in July 2013
that interest rates would “remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time”
(forward guidance) and around the famous “Whatever it takes”-speech by the President of
the ECB, Mario Draghi in July 2012 (cf. Table 2.3).
16See for example Rogers et al. (2014), Curcuru et al. (2015) and Fratzscher et al. (2016a).
17See Figure 1 of Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) for a graph of the daily trading volumes (EUR billion) as a
function of time-to-maturity (years) We expect the level of the trading to have changed over time but not















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interestingly, the “Whatever it takes”-speech by the President of the ECB is associated
with the largest positive surprise to average euro area long-term rates, but with a marginal
negative surprise (i.e. a rise) in short-term rates. This stresses the importance to keep a
distinction between the identification of the impact of ECB announcements through short-
term and long-term rates. Indeed, Table B.3 reports the correlation among short-term rates,
long-term-rates and our two surprise indicators. In the more recent past (after September
2014) there is a strong correlation between long-term and short-term surprises. Furthermore
all single instruments from which we compose our aggregates are strongly correlated. How-
ever, in the first part of the sample (from January 2012 to September 2014), the correlation
between the Bund and the other sovereign yields is negative and the correlation between
the Bund and euro area short-term rates remarkably low. This means there were different
channels at work during the early part of our sample and many of the efforts of monetary
policy were concentrated on restoring the confidence of Euro area investors.
While a classification of surprises is relatively straightforward for the larger surprises (cf.
Table 2.3) it is hard to uniquely assign our whole universe of 63 surprises to a certain set of
policies. We do split the sample around the period when markets started to expect a major
balance sheet expansion by the ECB through purchases of public sector bonds – September
2014 – in order to distinguish the impact of the ECB APP from the set of conventional and
unconventional measures that had been adopted between 2012 and mid-2014.
2.4 Empirical methodology
Our goal is to assess the effect of euro area monetary policy surprises on the reallocation
measures defined in section 2.3.3: total reallocation (∆wi,t) across asset classes (i=1,2, ...,
8), active reallocation, passive reallocation through returns and passive reallocation through
FX effects on the fund share level. Moreover, we look also at a simple measure of fund flows
in percent of TNA (100 · fi,t/Ai,t). Our baseline regression approach is captured by the
following equation:












where the impact of our monetary policy surprises is captured by the vector θ estimated
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for each combination of: (i) reallocation measure and (ii) asset class. However, by definition,
our reallocation measures are constructed in a way that they sum up to 0 across categories.
We exploit this feature in our approach by imposing an additional constraint on the fitted
values and estimate a joint regression across asset classes for each dependent variable, i.e.
the measures of active, passive and total reallocation. The econometric approach of our joint
regression specification is outlined in Appendix B.1. Furthermore we discuss stationarity and
exogeneity assumptions in in Appendix B.2 which also includes some information regarding
model selection.
In our main specification, we look at the effect of monetary policy surprises over a one-
week horizon, to allow for a lagged reaction of fund investors to news. For the one-week
horizon we report
∑4
j=0 θij and test whether it significantly differs from 0 using a two sided
test (Wald-Test). This would capture the cumulative effect of a monetary policy shock
over the course of one week. Flows, active reallocation and total reallocation are ultimately
driven by (unsophisticated) investors, which are slower at incorporating new information.
A second specification looks at the contemporaneous effects of monetary policy, testing
whether the contemporaneous coefficient θi0 is statistically significant, excluding the lags
1−4 from our estimation equation. In this case, we are mainly concerned about the passive
return and FX effects that are driven by the reaction of asset prices, which are forward-
looking and embed immediately the new information. Therefore, the contemporaneous effect
of our surprises is the relevant one for these measures.
The main specification includes lagged dependent variables, and a number of control
variables, whose impact is captured by the coefficient matrix γ. In order to control for
additional pull and push factors that may influence investors’ decisions, we include the
change in the CITI Economic surprise index for the euro area (lagged) and the relevant
one(s) for the respective geographic focus of the funds (contemporaneous and lagged): G10
economies and emerging markets. This index tracks on a daily basis to what extent actual
economic releases18 have been beating consensus forecasts. Finally, we include a dummy
that differs from 0 for days with inconsistent data in the reports from EPFR.
We present our main results in Tables 2.5–2.6. Each line reports the sum of the rele-
vant coefficients associated with the impact of a monetary policy surprise based on a joint
regression for each the dependent variable.
2.4.1 Benchmark regressions
We compare our results on passive reallocation measures with the daily change in several
benchmark indices and the euro-dollar exchange rate as dependent variables. This ensures
that our results for passive rebalancing through returns and exchange rate effects properly
18These releases include monetary policy decisions by the respective central banks.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics
Summary Statistics
Description Unit N mean sd min max
Surprises (TR Tick History) 60-min yield change
EA 10Y rates %-points 63 0.005 0.052 -0.201 0.134
German 10-year yield %-points 62 0.003 0.035 -0.122 0.103
Spanish 10-year yield %-points 62 -0.010 0.073 -0.218 0.310
Italian 10-year yield %-points 63 -0.007 0.077 -0.274 0.340
EA ST rates %-points 63 -0.001 0.017 -0.050 0.093
Weekly EONIA OIS %-points 63 -0.000 0.017 -0.076 0.037
1-month EONIA OIS %-points 63 0.002 0.022 -0.106 0.055
3-month EONIA OIS %-points 63 0.002 0.021 -0.095 0.063
EPFR Raw Measures (All Funds)
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 9336 69.194 30.081 14.886 145.381
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 9328 0.024 0.554 -5.803 3.364
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 9328 -0.007 0.172 -3.524 2.730
EPFR Portfolio Measures
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 9328 0.000 0.016 -0.198 0.198
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 9328 -0.000 0.056 -0.618 0.506
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 9328 -0.000 0.043 -1.366 1.277
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 9328 0.000 0.071 -1.359 1.281
Benchmarks Daily Returns (euro-based)
WE Equity - S&P EUROPE 350 % 1167 0.031 1.054 -6.836 4.188
USAPJ Equity - S&P 500 COMPOSITE % 1167 0.062 0.973 -6.110 4.156
GLOB Equity - S&P GLOBAL 1200 % 1167 0.045 0.855 -6.005 4.098
EM Equity - MSCI EM USD % 1167 0.010 0.996 -7.145 5.015
WE Bonds - Barclays Pan-European Aggregate
EUR
% 1167 0.011 0.194 -1.143 0.770
USAPJ Bonds - Barclays U.S. Aggregate USD % 1167 0.014 0.586 -3.287 2.692
GLOB Bonds - Barclays Global Aggregate USD % 1167 0.019 0.574 -3.192 2.640
EM Bonds - Barclays EM USD Aggregate USD % 1167 0.013 0.590 -3.047 2.220
EUR/USD – Exchange rate % 1167 -0.012 0.561 -2.081 2.634
reflect price or exchange rate adjustments (keeping in mind that a simultaneous increase
in market values across categories does not necessarily lead to passive reallocation – it is
the differential effect across categories that matters). For the benchmark indices we obtain
daily returns from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
We use broad stock indices and bond benchmarks that include both government and
corporate debt. All indices are computed in USD except the Pan-European Aggregate
Bond Index and the S&P 350 Europe Index, which we use as a benchmark for bond funds
focused on Western Europe. We convert the returns of the US-dollar based indices to euro.
Table 2.4 also shows summary statistics for these variables.
We use the same estimation equation as above, including lagged bechmark returns and the
CITI Economic surprise indices as control variables. We estimate each equation separately.
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We provide results for two different types of monetary policy shocks, one to euro area short-
term rates and one to euro area long-term rates, in two separate tables, Table 2.5 and
Table 2.6, respectively. We also split our sample period. In each table, we first report the
results for our entire sample period from 2012 to mid-2016 (panel a). Then, we look at the
effects during the pre-APP period from January 2012 to August 2014 (panel b). Finally, we
look at the period in which the European Central Bank was conducting the Asset Purchase
Programme (panel c). Following Altavilla et al. (2015), we split the sample in September
2014, since a series of announcements related to the APP preceded the official launch of
this programme in January 2015. The analysis of time variation in parameters provides
statistical support for the choice of this particular break point. We sequentially estimate
Chow Test-statistics with respect to a break in all regression parameters at time t (Hansen,
2001) and find a sharp increase in the test statistic in mid-2014.19
As discussed, we present the results for the main specification with 4 lags of our dependent
variable to allow for a delayed response of investors to monetary policy news. However, we
check the results also with only the contemporaneous impact of the monetary policy surprise
(see Table B.6 and B.7 in the Appendix) and with 2 lags.20
The interpretation of the effects of our surprises are straightforward as all variables
have the same unit of measurement. For instance, a typical large positive monetary policy
surprises, say a two standard deviation shock – is characterised by a decline in euro area
short-term rates by 3-4 basis points and in average euro area long-term yields by 10 basis
points (see Table 2.3). In turn, the impact of a large shock to average euro area long-term
yields – a decline by 10 basis points – would lead to an increase in the portfolio weight of
Emerging Market equity by 0.13 percentage points over one week, on the back of an active
reallocation by 0.01 percentage points and, in particular, a passive reallocation due to the
19The results of this analysis are not shown for reasons of space and available from the authors upon
request.
20The latter set of results is available from the authors upon request.
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FX effect, almost 0.11 percentage points, as the euro depreciates by around 1.2%, boosting
the weight of funds that are not denominated in euro (see fifth column of Table 2.6a).
2.5.1 Results with surprises to euro area short-term rates
We start by analysing the impact of shocks to the euro area short-term rates following im-
portant ECB monetary policy announcements. As shown in Section 3, our sample period is
characterised by relatively stable policy rates – the main refinancing rate of the ECB grad-
ually declined from 1% to 0% – and relatively subdued policy surprises identified through
changes in euro area short-term rates. Tables 2.5 shows the results of the impact of these
monetary policy surprises on our portfolio of euro area investors. Generally, it is difficult to
identify a statistically significant effect of these surprises on flows and the active reallocation
to specific asset classes. Investors seem to reduce the weight of equity funds dedicated to
non-euro area developed economies following positive surprises identified through short-term
rates, as the active reallocation coefficient is negative and statistically significant (see first
row of Table 2.5a). However, the result does not appear to be particularly robust across
different time periods (see Table 2.5b and 2.5c), using a different lag structure of the main
specification (see appendix) and is not mirrored by the reaction of flows (as % of TNA, i.e.
not aggregated in a single portfolio) to ECB announcements. If any, splitting the sample
between the pre-APP period (panel b) and the APP-related period (panel c), we may note
that easing surprises lead to purchases of bonds of non-euro area developed economies – see
statistically positive coefficient for flows into USAPJ and Global bond funds and the active
reallocation into Global bond funds – possibly reflecting a search for yield.
However, Tables 2.5a-2.5c show that ECB monetary policy announcement surprises lead
to sharp exchange rate and price fluctuations that in turn generate significant passive shifts
in the portfolio of euro area investors. The impact on exchange rates is significant. An
unexpected large easing – say a decline in euro area short-term rates by 3 to 4 basis points –
leads to a depreciation of the euro against the US dollar by around 1% in one week (by 0.6%
on the day of the announcement, as shown in Table B.6 in the appendix).21 Interestingly,
the impact is much larger in the second phase of ECB unconventional monetary policies,
those that were associated with the announcement of purchases of euro area government
securities. The absolute value of the impact of a large positive surprise on the exchange
rate over one week (on the same day) increases from 0.6% (0.3%) in the sample until mid-
2014 to 2.3% (1.4%) in the period starting from September 2014.22 As a result, a positive
monetary policy surprise triggers on average a passive reallocation out of European equity
21Precisely, a two-standard deviation shock to euro area short-term rates around ECB announcements
corresponds to 0.034 percentage points, therefore to quantify the impact is sufficient to divide the coefficients
by around 3 and then by 10.
22Ferrari et al. (2017) show that the FX impact of monetary policy of major central banks, not only of
the ECB, has been growing significantly and is stronger the lower the level of interest rates.
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Table 2.5: Main results Euro area short-term rates (impact over 4 lags)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area short-term rates. Each line in the
table refers to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 3.2 in the main
text for the definition of dependent variables). For instance, the first coefficient on the top-left corner of the table indicates the
one-week impact of the surprise change in Euro area short-term rates on the active reallocation to Western European equity
funds.
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA ST rates – full sample
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation 0.036 −0.321∗ −0.188∗∗ 0.113 −0.040 0.114 0.167 0.065
Passive reallocation return 1.682 −0.886∗ −0.480 −1.691∗ 0.307 0.174 0.593 0.280
Passive reallocation FX −2.308∗∗ 1.221∗∗ 0.083 2.126∗∗∗ −1.290∗ −0.283 0.436 0.805∗∗∗
Total reallocation −0.464 −0.331 −0.592 −0.085 −0.950 0.169 1.354 1.251∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 0.746 −1.643 −0.382 1.260 1.223 4.046 1.264 1.135
Surprises 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−31.0∗∗∗ 15.0 14.9 13.6 12.5 9.6∗∗∗ 33.3∗∗∗ 34.6∗∗∗ 33.0∗∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA ST rates – before September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.210 −0.294 −0.166 −0.018 0.049 0.180 0.324∗ 0.065
Passive reallocation return −0.717 −1.230∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗ −1.856∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 1.932∗∗ 0.862∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −1.820∗∗ 1.070∗∗ 0.174 2.147∗∗∗ −1.140∗ −0.268 −0.113 0.831∗∗∗
Total reallocation −2.512∗∗ −1.147∗ −0.968∗∗ −0.936 0.359 0.623 2.636∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −1.346 −1.750 −0.200 0.531 1.378 5.554∗ 1.801∗ 0.430
Surprises 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−19.1∗∗ −13.7 −4.9 −6.8 −6.5 8.8∗∗∗ 24.8∗∗ 24.4∗∗ 22.1∗∗
(c) Impact of a surprise change in EA ST rates – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation 0.371 −0.302 −0.255 0.088 −0.080 −0.103 −0.212 0.127
Passive reallocation return 8.729∗∗∗ −0.151 1.342 −1.181 −2.430 −0.938∗∗ −3.913∗∗ −1.793∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −4.123∗∗ 2.598∗∗ −1.598 3.044∗∗ −2.913 0.393∗∗ 2.054 0.646
Total reallocation 5.795∗∗ 2.095 −0.751 1.844 −4.968∗∗ −0.442 −2.841 −1.304
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 3.865 −0.915 −0.807 1.470 1.375 −2.975 0.212 3.691
Surprises 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−67.3∗∗∗ 100.8∗∗∗ 65.6∗∗ 74.1∗∗∗ 73.6∗ 15.2∗∗ 62.2∗∗ 68.2∗∗∗ 68.0∗∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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funds (−0.08 percentage points) and bond funds (−0.04 percentage points), which are largely
denominated in euro, and a positive shift in the weight of USAPJ and EM asset classes that
include a relatively small share of euro-denominated funds (see Table 2.2). During the APP-
period, the passive FX reallocation out of European equity funds peaks at 0.16 percentage
points, a significant shift corresponding to 3 standard deviations of the daily distribution of
this series.
Asset prices also react dramatically to ECB monetary policy surprises. In particular,
bond prices of extra-European bonds rise by around 1.1% (0.7%) over one week (day) fol-
lowing a positive surprise. Even though not statistically significant, the impact on other
asset prices is also positive and, as a result, there is no clear trend in the passive reallocation
driven by returns. Moreover, splitting the sample, it is evident that, again, the announce-
ment of the launch of the APP-programme was associated with much sharper asset price
fluctuations compared to the previous period. Notably, European equity markets rise by
3.4% (1.9%) over one week (day) and extra-European equity markets by around 2.2-2.5%
following positive surprises since the autumn of 2014 (last row of Table 2.5c). Bond prices
also rise by around 2% outside Europe and by 0.5% in Europe. Eventually, in this second
phase of ECB unconventional policies, these relative changes in asset prices lead to a pas-
sive shift in the portfolio allocation towards European equity funds, increasing their weight
by 0.30 (0.14) percentage points over one week (day). This shift is large and offsets the
negative passive FX effect driven by the euro depreciation and, all together, results in a
total reallocation of the portfolio of euro area investors into European equity funds at the
expenses of European bond funds, whose weight is affected by the combination of a negative
FX effect and a negative return effect (relative to other asset classes) since the autumn of
2014.
2.5.2 Results with surprises to euro area 10-year yields
Tables 2.6a-2.6c show the results for the monetary policy surprise identified through the
change in average euro area long-term interest rates.23 As in the previous identification, we
find only scant evidence of active reallocation towards specific asset categories. A surprise
loosening of monetary policy leads to an active reallocation to Emerging Market equity
funds across the whole sample (Table 2.6a, first row), in turn driven by a positive impact
in the first part of our sample until mid-2014. In particular, in this first period, the active
reallocation towards Emerging Market equity funds comes at the expenses of a rebalancing
out of European bond funds. The last row of panel (b) shows that emerging stock markets
had the strongest positive price reaction to a monetary policy surprise, even though not
23We use an unweighted average in the baseline specification. Results with monetary policy surprises that
are weighted by outstanding volume of debt securities issued by the general government or the GDP of each
of the three countries do not differ markedly from the unweighted measures.
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statistically significant, whereas European bonds display the weakest performance. This
provides some support to the body of evidence suggesting that inflows into investment
funds are positively correlated with their return performance (see Levy and Lieberman
(2015)). However, even for statistically significant coefficients, the size of impact on the
active reallocation measure of a large shock – say, by 10 basis points – to average euro
area long-term rates is relatively small (generally, close to one standard deviation of the
distribution). Additionally, these results are not robust to the use of a different lag structure.
Flows into EM equity funds are also statistically significant following an unexpected ECB
monetary easing, amounting to 0.08% of their TNA, which corresponds to around EUR 90
million over one week. However, these numbers are not particularly large when compared
to the historical volatility of the series (see Tables B.4 and B.5 in the Appendix), confirming
one of the main findings of Fratzscher et al. (2016a) regarding the impact of ECB policies
between 2007 and 2012. Finally, we may note that the negative flows out of European
bond funds in the first phase of ECB policies until mid-2104 turn positive after September
2014. In this latter period, the impact of a large positive surprise to long-term yields is
associated with an inflow into European bond funds corresponding to 0.2% of TNA, which
however does not translate into a significant active shift in the portfolio. Overall, matching
these results with the impact of shocks identified through short-term rates, we may conclude
that the portfolio balance channel of ECB unconventional policies is substantially muted
according to our evidence.
Again, ECB monetary policy surprises identified through changes in long-term yields are
associated with fluctuations in asset prices and exchange rates, which trigger a passive re-
allocation of the portfolio of euro area investors (Table 2.6a). Differently from the previous
identification through short-term rates, though, the reaction in asset prices is mainly visible
in the second part of our sample (Table 2.6c), not in the period up to August 2014 (Ta-
ble 2.6b). This suggests that long-term yields may be a good proxy of the impact of balance
sheet unconventional monetary policies targeting public debt, but not necessarily of those
polices working through forward guidance on short-term rates through the expectations
hypothesis. Focusing on the impact of a large positive surprise – say a decline in long-
term yields by 10 basis points – in the APP-period, we find that the response of exchange
rates and asset markets in Table 2.6c are of a similar magnitude compared to the previous
identification (Table 2.5c). In particular, the euro depreciates by 2.6% (1.6%) against the
US dollar in one week (day). European equity markets display the strongest performance
+4.1% (1.9%) over one week (day), followed by extra-European equity markets, in par-
ticular Emerging Markets (+3.8% in one week). Bond markets outside Europe also react
positively to ECB announcement surprises, rising by almost 3% (1.8%) over one week (day).
European bond markets, again, are those showing the weakest positive performance (+0.6%
in one week). As a result the passive reallocation effects are largely similar to the previous
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Table 2.6: Main results Euro area 10-year yields (impact over 4 lags)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area 10-year yields. Each line in the table
refers to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 4.2 in the main text
for the definition of dependent variables). For instance, the first coefficient on the top-left corner of the table indicates the
one-week impact of the surprise change in Euro area 10-year yields on the active reallocation to Western European equity
funds.
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10Y yields – full sample
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.099 −0.061 0.004 0.124∗ −0.019 0.010 0.043 0.015
Passive reallocation return 1.390∗∗ −0.082 0.299 0.319 −0.447∗ −0.189∗ −0.806∗ −0.420∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −1.068∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗ 0.163∗ 1.051∗∗∗ −0.464 −0.365 0.018 0.359∗∗∗
Total reallocation 0.364 0.336 0.445∗∗ 1.278∗∗ −0.905∗∗ −0.512 −0.774∗ −0.140
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −0.207 −0.040 0.533 0.769∗∗ −0.052 0.736 0.533 0.440
Surprises 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Observations 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−12.0∗∗ 17.7∗∗ 15.7∗∗ 15.2∗∗ 18.4∗∗∗ 3.9∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗ 13.9∗∗ 13.4∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10Y yields – before September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.178 −0.003 0.049 0.194∗∗ −0.149∗∗ 0.025 0.034 0.058
Passive reallocation return 0.267 −0.018 0.129 0.391 −0.063 −0.091 −0.288 −0.275
Passive reallocation FX −0.504∗ 0.296 0.107 0.842∗∗ −0.218 −0.389 0.068 0.298∗
Total reallocation −0.315 0.206 0.268 1.153 −0.394 −0.371 −0.182 −0.000
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −1.083 0.191 0.757 0.798 −1.698∗∗∗ 1.146 0.259 0.638
Surprises 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−3.8 4.5 5.4 4.1 6.6 1.4 4.2 4.8 3.6
(c) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10Y yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.002 −0.120 −0.040 0.003 0.178 −0.037 0.054 −0.047
Passive reallocation return 3.377∗∗∗ −0.265 0.512∗∗ 0.156 −1.132∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ −1.679∗∗∗ −0.687∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −1.798∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 0.051 1.270∗∗∗ −0.987∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −0.007 0.355∗∗∗
Total reallocation 1.500∗∗ 0.604 0.520 1.294∗∗ −1.883∗∗∗ −0.174∗ −1.771∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 0.895 −0.125 0.304 0.764∗ 2.238∗∗ −0.248 1.082 0.252
Surprises 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−25.9∗∗∗ 40.6∗∗∗ 29.5∗∗∗ 33.6∗∗∗ 38.4∗∗∗ 7.8∗∗∗ 28.3∗∗∗ 29.8∗∗∗ 28.9∗∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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results. The FX effect leads to a reduction in the weight of European equity and bond
funds as the euro depreciates. Nevertheless, the weight of European equity funds benefit
from a strong offsetting passive return effect (+0.34 percentage points in one week), which
is instead negative for European bond funds, as well as other bond categories. Eventually,
summing up all components, ECB announcement surprises lead to a passive reallocation
into European and Emerging Market equity and out of bond funds, in particular European
bonds.
2.6 Robustness
We provide a series of robustness checks to our results, distinguishing between the effects
of large and small surprises, positive versus negative shocks and controlling that our results
are not driven by the particular choice of the universe of funds, drawing a new (and more
comprehensive) sample of funds starting from the beginning of 2014. Finally, we study the
long-term impact on portfolio weights. In our robustness checks, we focus on the second
phase of ECB policies since the autumn of 2014, where our study finds evidence of significant
shifts in asset allocation due to price and exchange rate effects.
2.6.1 Categorizing monetary policy surprises
To assess whether our results are mostly driven by large shocks to prices and yields, we
classify the monetary surprises using an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA)
volatility model based on daily trading between 13:30 and 14:30 Frankfurt time.24 Surprises
that exceed 4.5|σH,t| are classified as tail events. In our empirical specification we distinguish
between two types of shocks: tail events and small surprises. We estimate two separate
vectors, θnormal and θtail, for each type of shock by multiplying our monetary policy surprises
with a dummy that equals one for tail surprises. We use the regression specification outlined
in section 2.4.
Table 2.7 reports the results of this robustness check. In general, the direction of the
impact of normal shocks is usually similar to that of tail shocks. However, the main quali-
24For the EWMA model we use weights that are corrected for a finite observation window (Pesaran,
2015), and initialize our model with data from 2011. Denoting by H the length of the backward-looking





1− λH+1 · r
2
t−1−τ .
The return rt is a daily time series of one-hour changes in (median) bid yields and (median) bid prices
between 13:30 and 14:30 Frankfurt time, which we assume to be centered around 0. We use a decay factor
of λ = 0.97 (slow decay, more weight on past observations) and select subsets of our data such that H = 200
in terms of trading days.
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tative and quantitative results of the previous section are clearly driven by tail shocks. In
particular, the passive FX effect out of European equity and bond funds and the positive
return effect into European equity funds and out of bond funds are statistically significant
when isolating tail shocks. The size of the impact of tail shocks, moreover, is very similar
to those estimated across the whole sample of shocks. Therefore, unsurprisingly, we may
conclude that only major ECB announcements lead to significant shifts in the portfolio of
euro area investors.
Moreover, we split our announcements into positive and negative monetary policy sur-
prises. Overall, we find that the effects of positive and negative surprises do not seem to
differ (see Table B.8 in the Appendix).
2.6.2 Alternative fund universe
Our sample starts in 2012 and covers almost 30% of the universe of Luxembourg-based funds.
The coverage of funds by EPFR increases through time and we wonder whether our results
are affected by the particular universe of funds. For this reason, we drew a new sample of
Luxembourg-based funds starting from 2014 and checked whether the main results for the
APP-period continue to hold. Table B.9 shows the robustness of our results across different
fund universes. We formally test for the equality of the coefficients of interest, by jointly
estimating the same regression from two samples in a SUR setup. The subsequent test for
the equality of the coefficients takes into account the covariances across the coefficients from
different samples. Indeed, we never reject the null hypothesis that each coefficient of interest
is equal across the two samples.
2.6.3 Retail vs. institutional investors
In Tables B.10 and B.11 we look a flows and active reallocation by investor type, distin-
guishing between fund shares marketed to retail investors and those targeting institutional
investors or that have a minimum investment of USD 100,000. Generally, it appears that
flows in and out of fund shares targeting institutional investors react more strongly to our
monetary policy surprises compared to fund shares targeting retail investors. Interestingly,
the active reallocation into emerging market equity funds – in the sample before September
2014 – in response to a change in 10-year yields that we have underlined in Section 5.2 is
clearly driven by institutional investors, not by retail investors (see panel (b) of Table B.11).
This suggests that institutional investors follow active portfolio strategies more often than
unsophisticated retail investors, who instead prefer a buy-and-hold strategy.
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Table 2.7: Main results Euro area rates (outliers)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area rates. Each line in the table refers
to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 3.2 in the main text for the
definition of dependent variables). For instance, the first coefficient on the top-left corner of the table indicates the one-week
impact of the surprise change in Euro area 10-year yields on the active reallocation to Western European equity funds.
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10Y yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation (normal) 0.060 −0.152 0.065 0.157 0.328 −0.073 −0.303 −0.086
Active reallocation (tails) −0.009 −0.118 −0.065 −0.023 0.157 −0.035 0.111 −0.032
Passive reallocation return (normal) 8.590∗∗∗ −0.728 0.846 −0.448 −2.038 −0.775∗ −3.058∗ −1.905∗∗∗
Passive reallocation return (tails) 2.384∗∗∗ −0.212 0.430 0.235 −0.924∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ −1.362∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗
Passive reallocation FX (normal) −1.789 0.737 0.438 1.405 0.007 0.138 −0.995 0.324
Passive reallocation FX (tails) −1.727∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ −0.015 1.192∗∗∗ −1.138∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.179 0.353∗∗∗
Total reallocation (normal) 6.761∗∗∗ 0.004 1.258 0.924 −1.781 −0.429 −4.600∗ −1.889∗∗∗
Total reallocation (tails) 0.544 0.677 0.373 1.289∗∗ −1.827∗∗∗ −0.129 −1.190∗ −0.214
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) (normal) 2.117 0.279 1.780 1.788 3.912 2.136 −0.579 −0.051
Flows (% of TNA) (tails) 0.687 −0.238 −0.016 0.577 1.951∗∗ −0.792 1.319 0.370
Normal Surprises 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Tail Surprises 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks (normal/tails): Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−31.303∗ 75.884∗∗∗ 21.051 47.856∗∗∗ 45.626∗∗ 11.414∗∗∗ 26.959∗ 33.871∗ 30.818∗∗
−24.906∗∗∗ 31.170∗∗∗ 27.767∗∗∗ 31.314∗∗∗ 36.574∗∗∗ 7.082∗∗∗ 24.239∗∗∗ 25.588∗∗∗ 26.563∗∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA ST yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation (normal) 1.531∗∗ −0.407 −0.256 0.162 −0.613 −0.104 −0.778 −0.285
Active reallocation (tails) −0.646∗∗∗ −0.247∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.114 0.623∗∗∗ −0.092∗ 0.224 0.497∗∗∗
Passive reallocation return (normal) 8.610∗ −0.068 0.412 −3.582 −0.570 −0.613 −3.159 −1.893
Passive reallocation return (tails) 9.228∗∗∗ −0.165 2.292∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗ −4.694∗∗∗ −1.279∗∗∗ −5.098∗∗∗ −1.929∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX (normal) −2.378 2.150 −4.520 2.196 −2.538 0.147 4.969 0.090
Passive reallocation FX (tails) −5.871∗∗∗ 3.084∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 3.906∗∗∗ −3.069∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ −0.858∗ 1.173∗∗∗
Total reallocation (normal) 10.131∗∗ 1.470 −4.602 −1.458 −2.731 −0.504 0.003 −2.669∗
Total reallocation (tails) 2.135∗ 2.752∗∗∗ 2.837∗∗∗ 5.357∗∗∗ −7.049∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗∗ −6.220∗∗∗ −0.358
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) (normal) 10.182∗∗ −1.782 −0.346 1.393 −2.275 −4.039 −2.940 −0.930
Flows (% of TNA) (tails) −1.784∗ −0.328 −0.958 0.550 6.311∗∗∗ −1.932 2.479∗∗ 8.192∗∗∗
Normal Surprises 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Tail Surprises 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks (normal/tails): Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−60.775 74.734 24.670 48.989 12.173 11.462 39.751 53.916 51.935
−75.648∗∗∗ 113.066∗∗∗ 98.123∗∗∗ 108.591∗∗∗ 140.631∗∗∗ 18.912∗∗∗ 75.779∗∗∗ 77.444∗∗∗ 84.087∗∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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2.6.4 Benchmarking to Fratzscher et al. (2016a)
We have extended our results covering the period between January 2010 – the first sample
we had extracted from EPFR with a satisfactory coverage of bond funds – and September
2012 in order to estimate the effects of monetary policy surprises for a period that partially
overlaps with the sample of Fratzscher et al. (2016a).25 We find a statistically significant
reallocation into funds investing in Western European bonds following a positive surprise
change (a decline) in EA short-term interest rates and a reallocation out of equity in ad-
vanced economies and into emerging market equity funds following a positive surprise change
(a decline) in EA long-term interest rates (cf. Table B.12. These results largely confirm
that ECB monetary policy measures – in particular the Outright Monetary Transactions
announcements in the summer of 2012 – boosted global confidence, somewhat reviving the
appetite for euro area debt and emerging market securities, as shown by Fratzscher et al.
(2016a).
2.7 Conclusion
We study the impact of major ECB monetary policy announcements on a portfolio of
Luxembourg-based investment funds, broadly representative of euro-area investors, daily,
between 2012 and mid-2016. This period includes a variety of different unconventional mea-
sures. In order to provide evidence on the different channels of these unconventional policies,
we distinguish between active portfolio reallocation, driven by the redemptions or injections
by investors, and passive portfolio rebalancing, triggered by valuation effects related to
changes in asset prices and exchange rates. We find that the portfolio balance channel of
ECB policies is generally muted. There is only scant evidence of active reallocation by in-
vestors into specific asset classes, which is not robust to different specifications of the model,
different sample periods or the identification of the monetary policy shock. However, the
asset price impact and exchange rate impact of ECB announcements are large, in particular
in the APP-period starting from September 2014, leading to significant shifts in the total
portfolio of euro area investors. As the exchange rate of the euro significantly depreciates
following positive ECB monetary policy surprises, the portfolio of euro area investors pas-
sively shifts towards extra-European funds. This result is robust to different sample periods
and identifications of shocks. The asset price impact may change over time, but it is very
large following the announcement of the APP by the ECB, benefiting in particular Euro-
pean equity markets, but with important positive spillovers to other – extra-European –
equity and bond markets. As a results of these asset price changes, the portfolio of euro
25Fratzscher et al. (2016a) identify the effects of ECB policies via dummy variables on days of important
ECB announcements as well as explanatory variables capturing V/SLTRO liquidity injections and SMP
purchases.
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area investors passively shifts towards riskier assets, in particular European and Emerging
Markets equity funds, and out of bond funds.
Overall our empirical findings provide robust evidence that fund investors are affected
by monetary policy mainly through the impact it has on asset prices by changing expecta-
tions of future interest rates (the signalling channel). We find little evidence of retail and
institutional fund investors being exposed to the portfolio balance channel, whereby mon-
etary policy operates by changing risk premia and inducing active portfolio reallocation.
Since our main element of analysis is fund investor behaviour, including unsophisticated
retail investors, our findings are not necessarily in contradiction with the theories behind
the portfolio balance channel, since these theories operate through arbitrageurs who can be
thought of as relatively sophisticated investors. Our empirical evidence is also consistent
with the empirical evidence on the behaviour of investors in mutual funds, who are generally
reluctant to sell past winners, and the growing literature on rational inattention, predicting
that unsophisticated investors adjust their portfolios only rarely.
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Chapter 3
Process or Candidate: The
International Community and the
Demand for Electoral Integrity1+2
3.1 Introduction
“America adopted a somewhat different approach. Where Russia used force and fear to enhance
the results of a democratic election, the U.S. used money.”3
Despite much weakening of the sovereignty norm over the last decades, there is one area where
this norm remains very powerful: there is widespread consensus that foreigners should not inter-
fere or intervene in the democratic elections of another country, unless possibly to support the
democratic process. However, this norm is observed mainly in the breach. According to a new
dataset, actions by outsiders to support a candidate running for elections are observed in one-third
of all elections in the world.4
In this paper, we outline the conceptual distinction between processes, the “how” of elections,
and parties competing in them, the “who” of elections. We then use this distinction to develop
a theory of electoral intervention. The theory is built on a formal model of elections with bias.
Domestic parties compete for office using their resources and popularity, whether they win or not
is a function of the institutional rules of the game. Outsiders have a choice of investing in the how,
the who, or both. Outside actors care, to a degree that varies, about cleaner (more legitimate)
contests and about the policy platform of the prospective leaders.
1This chapter is joint work with Nikolay Marinov.
2This chapter has previously been published in the “American Political Science Review” as Bubeck and
Marinov (2017). Permission for reproduction has been granted by Cambridge University Press via License
Number 4354661022051 on May 23, 2018.
3Brian Landers. Empires Apart: A History of American and Russian Imperialism. Pegasus, New York,
2009.
4See Bubeck and Marinov (2018) for a more extensive data collection. This is likely an underestimate
as many interventions may be clandestine.
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The primary contribution we make is theory-building. Neither the possibility of links between
processes and candidates nor the existence of such a distinction have been studied. The model
produces predictions on three quantities of interest: the amount and mix of resources invested
by the outsider in the election, incumbent win or loss, and the degree of fraud (or compliance
with democratic rules). Some of the comparative statics can better illuminate cases that so far
have been puzzling. Others represent novel testable implications. We present some preliminary
evidence, illustrating the patterns predicted by the theory.
A key insight we seek to convey is that outsiders’ interest in elections of other countries can be
conceived of as a mixture of two types of concerns: geo-politics and democratic liberalism. Concern
with geo-politics motivates investment in candidates: this investment grows as the country’s viable
candidates grow further apart. Concern with liberalism motivates investment in fair contests.
Notably, a “cleaner” contest changes the probability of specific candidates to win, feeding into
the geo-political calculations of the intervener. This makes investments in candidates and processes
mutually dependent. The observation that clean contests imply a different probability of winning –
for incumbent and opposition – is not new by itself.5 We formalize it, alongside partisan concerns
by the outsiders for government or opposition to win, and demonstrate a number of non-trivial
implications.
For example, we can explain why non-democratic states, such as Qatar, would invest in
democracy-promotion during the Arab Spring.6 Instead of viewing such behavior as an insin-
cere aberration, we show that it may be a sensible strategy. Because investing in fair elections
helps support for the friendly opposition parties to go farther, democracy-promotion is an optimal
strategy even for a state that attaches no intrinsic value to fair elections.
Our argument can readily explain a neglected, yet prominent aspect of foreign interventions
in elections: namely that, historically, outside powers have often relied on a mix of interventions.
We show why outside powers would not invest exclusively in one strategy, i.e., the “how”, or the
“who” in elections. If the friendly party is in opposition, investing both in a fair election and in
more domestic appeal for the opposition is optimal for the foreigners. An outsider that prizes clean
elections, would invest in fairer rules of the game in a country governed by a friendly incumbent,
while using candidate interventions to offset possible electoral losses of the incumbent.
Election interventions often entail cases where different powers are intervening on different sides:
for the government or the opposition.7 We call these situations “election wars”. Existing studies
do not distinguish between process-based and candidate-based intervention strategies. Nor do they
allow for the strategic adjustment of the behavior of one power in anticipation of the response of
another power. Among other things, it is not readily obvious in such cases whether a liberally-
5We see it already in Sartori (1976)’s work on competition and competitiveness of democratic party
systems.
6Sebastian Sons and Inken Wiese, “The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since
2011”, DGAPanalyse, Nr. 9 October 2015 [LINK] and Kristian Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring:
Policy Drivers and Regional Implications”, Carnegie Endowment Paper, Sep 24, 2014 [LINK].
7See Tolstrup (2009); Risse and Babayan (2015).
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inclined foreign power would respond to the entry of an illiberally-minded foreign competitor
(“black knight”) by increasing or by decreasing investment in democratic process.
Our model allows the possibility to study these puzzles. Take as a starting point the case of a
liberal hegemon, e.g., the U.S., intervening, but consider adding a second – illiberal – intervener
to the contest. As the stakes for one power increase (meaning, the importance of the election), its
candidate does better. When it comes to election quality, there is a twist. If the liberal power likes
the opposition, increasing stakes lead to higher investment in candidates and processes, and we
have cleaner elections. If the liberal power likes the incumbent, higher stakes increase candidate
support, but, at first, lead to less investment in a fair contest. The same holds true for the illiberal
power. In this case we might even see a deterioration of democratic standards compared to their
level before the intervention.8
Thus, contrary to what the literature suggests,9 rising geo-political importance of a target state
is not always bad for democracy. Whether it is or is not, depends on whether the intervener is
liberal, on whether it faces a challenger, and whether there is polarization in the policy positions
of the government and opposition.
We extend our model in two directions of interest. In one extension, we allow outside powers
the option of dispensing with democracy altogether via a coup. We show that increased domes-
tic polarization leads outsiders to abandon election interventions in favor of coups. In another
extension, we allow for parties to change their positions in order to attract support from outside
patrons. We also demonstrate the conditions under which the latter occurs and the implications
for policy polarization.
We contribute to work on elections and democracy. Formal models of elections have been used to
try to understand the timing and role of elections as tools of accountability (Fearon, 2011). Lately,
scholars have applied them to the study of illiberal contests (Little, 2012; Gehlbach and Simpser,
2015; Rundlett and Svolik, 2016), including those in autocracies (Shih, 2013; Lorentzen, 2013).
We introduce the role of outside actors. While we model the effects of intervention on electoral
integrity, our work has implications for scholarship on the diffusion of democracy (Gleditsch and
Ward, 2006). We help identify the power distributions in world affairs most likely to further
democratization.
Our model also allows to study issues such as how the wealthy influence elections, the role of
donors for promoting policy agendas in American states, and how foundations fuel change and
backlash.10 The approach is adaptable to the study of interventions in democracy by different
actors, subnationally as well as cross-nationally.
8The interaction of c and p effectively puts an upper limit on the bias (cf. Section Predictions)
9Donno (2013); Kavakli and Kuhn (2016).
10See dedicated issue in PS: Political Science and Politics (vol. 49, issue 3) for a good overview of these
types of problems.
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3.2 The Who and the How of Elections: A Theory
with Interested Outsiders
Outsiders have a long and illustrious history of casting a “silent ballot” in other countries’ elections
(Forster, 1963). This attitude was summarized in an infamous Pravda editorial. On the eve of the
1945 Finnish elections, the Soviet daily upended the conventional view of the matter when it wrote
that “elections are not to be considered internal affairs” for the countries holding them. Soviet
Russia, which controlled some Finnish territory, exerted considerable influence in the election. Its
main objective was to remove anti-Soviet ministers – elected in 1939 – who led Finland into war with
Soviet Russia. The USSR accused some of the ministers of supporting fascism. It also demanded
the dissolution of the Finnish veterans’ association, “Comrades in Arms”, because it believed that
the 400,000-plus members would sway the outcome in favor of anti-Soviet parties. Moscow sought
to bolster support for the Democratic People’s Union (SKDL), which included the Communist
Party, and it publicly worried that the elections may be biased against leftist parties. Friendly
relations with the Soviet Union, however, were critical at the time because Finland owed the
USSR $300 million dollars in war reparations. In statements issued before the election, the Soviets
made it clear that financial support for Finland, and even its territorial integrity, depended on
the electoral outcome. The elections were free of fraud, and Soviet Russia’s party allies performed
well.
Elsewhere in Europe, Soviet behavior showed variation. In the Polish elections of 1947, the
Soviets helped the government bludgeon its way to victory. The political police recruited, for
example, almost half of the electoral commission’s members. About eighty thousand people –
members and suspected supporters of the non-communist People’s party (PSL) – were arrested
during the election period. Polling stations were also controlled by the militia and the army. Pro-
opposition activists were intimidated and sometimes murdered, many other voters were forced to
vote in public.11
This type of election-related activism is hardly reserved to the Soviet Union, or the early Cold
War. To take a more recent example, European leaders publicly urged the Bosnian electorate to
vote for pro-EU candidates in the Presidential and general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the
3rd of October, 2010. British and German foreign ministers William Hague and Guido Westerwelle
said in an open letter: “Our message to the Bosnian people is that our countries are sincere in
wanting to help and support you, but for that to be successful we need leaders who choose to work
with us towards the goal of EU integration.”12
These cases show outside powers spending resources to either impede or improve the process of
voting. They also show outsiders aiming to help a partisan ticket by extending resources to help
the party appeal to voters. Understanding these phenomena, and what they imply for electoral
11Soon after that Stanislaus Miko lajczyk left Poland in secret, fearing of his own life. LINK.
12The letter continued: “...we shall support the Bosnian people and work with leaders who look to the
future not the past.” See LINK and LINK.
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integrity, is important. We proceed to outline a theory that clearly lays out the stakes, actors and
set of available choices.
3.2.1 A Model of Outside Interventions in Biased Elections
We start with a simple model. We conceive of elections as manipulated contests (Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2009), where manipulation varies along a continuum from low to high (Hyde and
Marinov, 2012). For simplicity, we focus on elections in which the incumbent leader (or incumbent
political party) is running, the opposition is challenging the incumbent, and if the incumbent loses,
the opposition assumes power.
Elections
The outcome of an election is determined by the support among the voters for a certain candidate.
There is some vote share χ that the incumbent party would receive if elections were entirely free
and fair. Let χ be the support of a candidate, where 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1. Absent any distortion such as an
unfair advantage to one of the parties the outcome of the election is determined by the mapping
f(χ) = χ.
Bias
In recent years, there has been an explosion of work on the various ways in which democratic
elections can become less democratic (Schedler, 2002; Alvarez et al., 2008). Scholars and practi-
tioners have introduced the concept of electoral integrity: a series of (universal) benchmarks that
democratic elections must meet (Norris, 2015). These include voter registration laws, election
procedures, district boundaries, how the vote count is conducted, and many others. While the
collection and weighting of indicators remains a matter of debate, we borrow a simple insight from
existing work. The democratic ideal is obtained when a contest is held under rules that bestow
no special advantage to any candidate running in the election. Where electoral rules are without
flaws, observed vote share is most likely to reflect the true support of candidates. As rules be-
come less perfect, elections deviate more and more from the democratic paradigm. Usually this
deviation has a particular beneficiary and can be represented as bias, or asymmetric advantages.
These usually favor the incumbent (office-holding) candidate or party in the contest. We assume
that the bias always favors incumbents. Our model, however, can be adapted to study alternative
cases where the bias favors the opposition in some elections or does not benefit a particular party.
We formalize bias by uncoupling the final vote share in an election from the true support for
a candidate. Let β measure the election’s bias in favor of the incumbent. We observe vote share;
true incumbent support χ is unobserved. So far, outside intervention of any kind is absent.
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Interventions
We define an electoral intervention as a deliberate attempt by a foreign government to change the
electoral rules or the appeal of the candidates. We distinguish between pre-election interventions
(e.g., which include helping with election campaigns, threatening voters with consequences, in-
sisting on a fair vote) and post-election interventions (e.g., seeking to overturn the results of the
elections, making the results stick, or altering the composition of the elected government). In this
project, we focus on pre-election interventions. By pre-election, we mean everything before the
aftermath of voting. We include the counting of ballots, aggregation and announcement of results.
Empirically, many interventions occur pre-election. This distinction would allow future work to
study the logic of post-election decisions separately.13
We next distinguish between two different types of interventions – candidate-interventions and
process-interventions. We assume that incumbent vote support can be moved away from χ by
offering support c for that candidate . We choose the bias β to be a function of some choice
argument p, the process-intervention a foreign power can undertake. We will also assume that the
incumbent benefits when c > 0 (the opposition benefits when c < 0), and a fairer process results
if p > 0 (bias grows if p < 0).
Examples of candidate-interventions would be outsiders conditioning financial transfers to a
country on who wins, or threatening to invade if the “wrong” ticket won, or threatening to expel
guest workers that are citizens of the target country. Sometimes, economic sanctions amount to
pro-candidate interventions (Marinov, 2005, 566-67). Outsiders can also sponsor elements of a
candidate’s campaign (e.g., paying for a band of singers to promote a candidate or airing pro-
candidate messages on TV channels, as Russia did during the 2004 Ukrainian elections). Another
example is the signing of agreements and trade/aid deals close to an election, thus creating the
impression of support for the current incumbent. A country could also hand an incumbent gov-
ernment a diplomatic victory, as Portugal did for Kaunda in the Zambian presidential elections of
1968.14
Examples of process-interventions include paying for election observation and for the orga-
nization of elections, conditioning aid on the execution of free and fair elections or threatening
sanctions over fraud,15 calling for the repeal of discriminatory legislative acts,16 paying to train
political parties in democratic practices. To take one example of the latter, consider a Morocco-
targeted program by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican
13Also, our framework can apply to the case of non-state actors, influencing substate (federal) elections.
14Incumbent President Kaunda was thought to be much more moderate than Zambia’s vice-president,
whose supplanting of Kaunda as leader would risk turning Zambia into ‘the spearhead of black Africa’s war
of attrition against white-governed southern Africa’. Portugal mounted pressure on Rhodesia’s Smith regime
to settle the dispute with Great Britain over independence as a means to secure the Zambian elections in
favor of President Kaunda. A. J. Melville Williams, “Zambian election threat disturbs Portuguese officials,”
The Christian Science Monitor, November 30 1968.
15See Galtung (1967).
16In the run-up to the 2010 Presidential elections, the Sudanese ruling party’s political mobilization
secretary, Haj Majid Suwar, strongly rejected the U.S. Secretary of State’s calls to suspend the national
security Act as a guarantee to the freedoms of the coming elections. See “U.S. not in a position to ask for
suspension of Sudan security act - Official”, BBC Monitoring - Middle East, January 10, 2010.
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Institute (IRI), funded by USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the State
Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). This program comprised 17 separate
projects from 2003 to 2010, with time-frames ranging from three months to two years and funding
from $110,000 to $2,470,000. Project activities focused on strengthening political parties, support-
ing election-related activities, increasing the participation of women and youth, and strengthening
locally elected officials and parliament, for a total program cost of $12,255,699.17 A different kind of
process intervention occurred in 2007 in Bosnia. Under international pressure, campaign financing
was regulated for the first time, by enforcing disclosure of donations and stipulating limits.
We should emphasize that a country can engage in more than one type of intervention at the
same time – investing in candidates and processes. Finally, we do not require investments to be
very effective at achieving their goals.18 We say more about this later.
Formally, the election result becomes a function of ex-ante level of bias and ex-ante level of
support, which are now affected by the investment in candidates and processes: f (χ(c), β(p)) =
f(c, p).
(Geo-)political Concerns
The foreign power cares about the position of the incumbent on the political spectrum (Agov)
and about the position of the opposition (Bopp).
19 Since divisions between domestic factions are
important for our argument, we pause to offer some examples.
According to Thucydides, democratic politics in early Hellas featured divisions on whether to
ally with Sparta or Argos.20 Both powers were keenly aware of the need for allies, and sought to
influence the politics of Greek city states in order to install allies in office. Little has changed since
then. Imperial Russia, and the Soviet Union, have always been interested in a belt of friendly
states in Eastern Europe.21 In some ways, this is the Russian version of the ‘Monroe’ doctrine
the United States implemented toward Latin America. Friendly states may permit Russian bases.
Friendly neighbors are also more likely to accept Russian goods and welcome investment in key
value-adding areas, such as nuclear energy.
Apart from their geo-strategic objectives, sometimes, what foreign powers find objectionable
abroad is more closely related to nationalism and ethnic intolerance. Elections in the successor
states of former Yugoslavia often placed in office candidates with questionable commitment to
17The Washington Institute: Policy Brief 1282, September 6, 2007; USAID Morocco, Political Party
Program Evaluation, Final Report, May 2010.
18Even though, at least in the case of democracy promotion, a number of scholars have suggested that
outsiders can improve elections. See von Borzyskowski (2015); Collins (2009); Finkel et al. (2007); Hyde
(2011); Scott and Steele (2011).
19Assuming that voters cannot control politicians after the election, and deriving partisan preferences
from a “citizen-candidate” model of electoral races, is one way to derive durable candidate distinctions
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapter 5).
20See Book One in Robert Stressler (1998).
21Ramonaite (2010) gives an example from Lithuania, where the main political divisions are on policy
toward Russia and ‘lustration’, or stance toward cadres of the former Communist regimes. Estonia, Latvia,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia all have mainstream parties that are openly supportive of Russian interests and
ones that are opposed (Bu´torova´ and Bu´tora, 1998).
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ethnic peace and reconciliation. Foreigners clearly worried about the ability of democracy to
moderate the positions of winning candidates in the Western Balkans. Biliana Plavsˇic´’s loss in
the 1998 elections in Republika Srpska came after she had adopted very pro-US positions and
was characterized as the ‘United States’ running mate’.22 China frets over politicians with pro-
independence agendas in Taiwan.
When parties in a democracy have diverging policy positions, elections determine the relative
probability these positions will result in future policy. Within the context of our model, this
probability can be influenced by investment in processes and candidates.
The foreign power’s level of concern with positions may vary across countries. We define a
parameter Γ ≥ 0 that represents a country’s geo-political importance from the perspective of an
outside power. A high value would, for example, be more appropriate for former colonies, for
countries hosting a military base, or for countries with ethnic diasporas the intervener cares about.
Higher values of the parameter Γ indicate that the difference between party positions is more
consequential.
This leads us to the first component of a foreign power’s utility function:
u = Γ
[
f(c, p)×Agov + (1− f(c, p))×Bopp
]
Liberal Concerns
Research in international relations and political theory suggests that actors in world affairs may
care about democracy. The possible reasons are many. They include Kantian considerations, which
posit that democracies share values with each other – including pacific values (Russett, 1993). They
also include considerations related to human rights (Sen, 2000) and sustained economic growth, as
well as models of development (Narizny, 2007). We do not seek to explain why some states may
care about democracy. We simply allow this concern to vary.
A simple way to capture a power’s commitment to liberalism is to introduce a parameter Λ.
The term Λ is a reduced-form representation of the types of institutional, long-run benefits a state
may anticipate to arise from more democracy in another country.
We distinguish between liberal, aliberal and illiberal powers.
For liberal powers, we assume Λ > 0. Such states gain from democracy in another state.
We call states with Λ = 0 aliberal actors: they take no sustained interest in the existence or
lack of stronger rules for the democratic game abroad. It is a plausible conjecture to place Qatar,
possibly China, in this category.
By contrast, Λ < 0 represents illiberal states: countries that define their interests as poorly-
served by strong democratic institutions abroad. Putin-led Russia may be an example of such a
power.
22To this list of ideological divisions on foreign policy issues, one can add a medley of other examples.
Competitors in South Korea voice different views on how to deal with the North. Some parties in Japan
want U.S. bases closed (Okinawa). In Italy, America’s Cold War containment policy (Gaddis, 1987) turned
into a wholesale American support of the Christian Democrats (Nuti, 1998).
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We add a word of caution. We do not assume that a country’s observed actions vis-a`-vis another
country’s elections will always reflect the sender country’s genuine concern with liberalism abroad.
In fact, we will show that strategic considerations may elicit democracy-promotion strategies from
states that are indifferent to democracy and depress such impulses in otherwise liberally-inclined
powers.
In our model, outside interventions in processes p affect the bias β. The outsider has an
additional term in the utility function:
u = −Λβ(p)
This term basically says that any investment p > 0 in bias reduction has an (intrinsic) positive
effect for the liberally-minded power. We assume that investment in fairer rules of the game is
an investment in institutions. Such investment will not necessarily make the target country an
exemplary democracy, but it will bring the outcome closer to this ideal.
Cost Structure
When outsiders intervene, they pay a price. Fielding election observers and paying for better ballot-
counting equipment, for example, are costly. Diplomatic maneuvering thus requires commitment
and carries opportunity costs. In the 2010 election in Burundi, the opposition withdrew from the
election due to allegations of fraud and violence in the weeks before the election. Member states
of the East African Community (EAC) – Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania – where Burundi is
also a member, visited Burundi and urged the opposition parties not to boycott the elections in
order to prevent post-election violence.23 Aiding the campaign of a candidate is costly.
Costs can go beyond (expected) expenditure and can be defined in a very broad sense. They
might entail the reduction of domestic support for the intervener, at home and in the target country
– and in terms of lost support in the international community.
We assume that c and p are costly, regardless of whether they work for or against the incumbent,
and whether they foster democracy or go against it. The third part of the outsider’s utility function,
therefore, consists of two quadratic cost terms:
u = −c2 − p2
The Intervener’s Problem
Gathering all terms, this is the utility function of the foreign power:
uint = Γ [f(c, p)×Agov + (1− f(c, p))×Bopp]− Λβ(p)− c2 − p2
23Al Jazeera, 28 June 2010.
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We look at two broad, substantively important scenarios of interest (Figure 3.1): the case where
one power is intervening vs. the case in which it faces an opposing actor.






We call the one-power problem the election hegemon scenario. We speak of a “(regional)
hegemon” if there is no other influencer present. U.S. intervention in Bolivia or the Philippines, or
British intervention in Guyana are examples. “Hegemon” refers to a single intervener (or a coalition
of similarly-minded actors), whereas “regional” adds to this the regional proximity of the target of
interventions. In such cases, policy in target would matter a lot to the intervener (Γ is high). We
call election wars cases where two powers, such as the U.S. and Russia may intervene on opposing
sides, as they have done in Ukraine. Interveners are typically large states with substantial resources.
If not, their budget limitations would constrain behavior (cf. Appendix Formal Solution of the
Constrained Optimization Problem).
Domestic Conditions
Domestic conditions in the target state are captured, in a stylized form, by incumbent support χ,
the measure of bias b, and the policy positions of government Agov and opposition Bopp. These
parameters enter the optimization problem of the intervener(s). We can also accommodate cost
structures for the two types of electoral interventions, c and p, that differ among countries. We look
at cases when investing in p is not feasible or ineffective – as would be the case in a consolidated
democracy or against unwilling incumbents. We do the same for candidate investment c, which
could be unwelcomed or could backfire. Our model applies primarily to recipient countries that
are democratizing, but should also be relevant for countries with strong institutions.
3.3 Model Predictions
While the single-intervener case is only a decision-theoretic problem, its predictions merit some
discussion because they illustrate the basic mechanisms at work in our model. This facilitates the
transition to the election war case.
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Before we begin, we further simplify our model by introducing the concept of political polar-
ization. Maximizing uint is equivalent to the following maximization problem:
max
c,p
piΓf(c, p)− Λβ(p)− c2 − p2
The polarization parameter pi = Agov −Bopp measures the difference between the positions of the
government and the opposition from the point of view of the outsider.24 A positive pi implies the
incumbent is preferable and a negative pi implies the opposition is preferable.
We choose a simple linear effect of the bias β on the election result f (χ, β) = χ + β. Absent
any form of foreign intervention, a parameter value of β = 0.15 indicates an increase in the vote
share by 15 percentage points at any level of support χ.
We show predictions based on a workhorse model, where we use:






for the vote share (the election result) and β(p) = b−√bp for the resulting bias at c = 0.25
Before we present the main predictions of our model, we offer some notes on the main as-
sumptions built into the model and the functional form. First, we should note that investment
in candidates c directly affects the odds of victory, whereas investment in p is more complex –
affecting who wins, but also the rules of game. The starting point of our theoretical model is a
simple premise: any reduction in the bias of an election will affect the final vote count.
Second, we argue that foreign powers will often invest in candidates and processes simulta-
neously. In our model this is implied by the quadratic cost functions, which produce an interior
solution for suitable parameter choices. This is motivated by the empirical phenomenon of increas-
ing marginal costs (or, alternatively, diminishing returns) for specific actions or policies. Trying to
achieve a marginal increase in the vote share (e.g., by increasing the turnout of the core supporters
of a candidate) might be cheap at first but trying to influence large swaths of the population will
become increasingly expensive.
Third, we propose a way in which investments in processes and candidates are mutually related
and assume that the cost of a reduction of the bias depends on its initial level. Formally, a
decrease in the bias makes the mapping between the support for a certain candidate within the
electorate and the final vote share more immediate. The cost of a reduction of the bias by a
certain amount depends on the initial level of the bias. This is intuitive: starting form a high bias
(e.g., irregularities in the ballot counting process), reduction is less costly since better compliance
could be enforced more easily (e.g. through election observers and threats of cutting aid). If the
initial bias is already quite low, further improvements are more costly. For example, reducing
gerrymandering or reforming campaign finance are more difficult to achieve for an outside power.
24For simplicity, we normalize Bgov = 0, and introduce pi ∈ R, a directional measure of polarization
between the two main candidates for office on relations with the foreign power.
25We need χ ∈ [0, 1], β(p) > 0 and f(c, p) ∈ [0, 1] for all feasible combinations of c and p from our choice
set.
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By the same token, deterioration of the voting standards (through election fraud) that start
from a fair process, is assumed to be more costly than improving/deteriorating voting standards
in an already biased process. An additional property of our specification is the positive effect of
a bias reduction on the effectiveness of candidate support. A decrease in the bias (i.e. a positive
investment in p) enhances the effect of any investment in candidate support c on the final vote
share. Suppose that a foreign power promises aid to the country in case of opposition win. The
voters should learn of this promise in order for it to be effective for garnering votes. It follows
that the foreign power should pressure the government into providing enough freedom and media
access to the opposition for the message to get across.26
The interaction between c and p implied by the functional form gives an additional incentive to





would still use both – candidate and process support – if we use convex costs functions. Under
alternative specifications one would find a mix between investment in c and p under a wide variety
of sensible assumptions (assuming diminishing returns, some form of increasing marginal costs,
etc.).27
3.3.1 The Hegemon Case

















− c2 − p2.
Figure 3.2 shows analytical solutions for a set of reasonable parameter choices. This will be
our basic, or “work-horse” specification: other hegemonies change some parameters, and, in our
election war cases, the power with these parameters faces off another power.
We use an initial parametrization of Γ = 0.75 (i.e. target country is important) and Λ = 0.5 (i.e.
liberalism matters to the outsiders). We assume (here and in what follows) that the true support
26In more “democratic” elections, people are more willing to cast an informed vote, based on their
preferences and their knowledge about the candidates. Additionally, a high ex-ante level of the bias also
makes c less effective (this is in line with the positive externality of spending on p on c).
Interestingly, this specification effectively limits the degree of bias that will be created through process
interventions. Empirically, this could be motivated by a fear of negative consequences if vote rigging by a
foreign intervener becomes too blatantly obvious at some point.
27The results we present in the following depend on our choice of cost function. We provide a short
thought experiment using alternative specifications for our cost term to think about cases of c = 0 or p = 0
in the Online Appendix Alternative Cost Functions.
28Setting the following first-order conditions to zero identifies the optimal values of c∗ and p∗ in the


















These FOCs identify a maximum, whenever |piΓ| < 2 (see also Appendix Solution of the Election Hegemon
Problem).
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is at χ = 0.5 and that there exists an ex-ante bias of b = 0.15. Keeping those parameters in mind
is important, since they provide a comparison with the non-intervention case: an incumbent win
with a voteshare of f = 0.65, where 0.15 is from undue advantages. Outside intervention changes
this counterfactual, or status quo outcome.29
Figure 3.2 sheds light on the extent of and sources of partisan bias in democracy-promotion.30
Here, we compare our baseline case to the case where the geo-political importance of the target
country is reduced (Γ = 0.5, Figure 3.2b) and to the case where an outside power is aliberal (i.e.,
unconcerned about democracy – Λ = 0, Figure 3.3).
The difference in the positions of the government and the opposition is going to predict the
process/candidate mix, and the intensity of electoral interventions. This is true unless the country
is geo-strategically unimportant (Γ = 0). If the foreign intervener does not care about policy
outcomes at all, then there will be no candidate intervention (c = 0) and democracy promotion
p will be set according to the degree of liberal concerns Λ. The same outcome is observed when
there is no difference in the policy positions of the government and the opposition (pi = 0).
Figure 3.2: Optimal Choices c∗ and p∗ in (Liberal) Hegemony
























(a) Optimal Mix of Process and Candidate
Interventions with High Stakes
























(b) Optimal Mix of Process and Candidate
Interventions with Lower Stakes
Thus, U.S. intervention in the Solomon Islands, a strategically unimportant country, would only
be driven by a concern for liberalism. Also, in the Philippines, where “all five leading Presidential
candidates are vying with one another to convince voters how much they love America and how
much America loves them,”31 our specification would predict that only process interventions would
occur.
Predictions As polarization increases (the intervener prefers the incumbent in power), interven-
29The levels of the ex-ante outcomes are marked with a triangular symbol on the respective value of the
y-axis in the Figures of vote shares and bias.
30On the existence of such bias, see, for example, work by Spoerri (2010) on Serbia.
31“All 5 Philippine Election Rivals Friends of U.S.,” LA Times, November 10, 1957.
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Figure 3.3: An Autocracy May Press for Election Integrity
























ers adopt less democracy-promotion (lower p) and switch to pro-government candidate interven-
tions (c > 0).32
As the stakes for an intervener increase (i.e., an election becomes more consequential geo-
politically, Figure 3.2b to 3.2a), we see more democracy-promotion if its favored candidate is in
opposition (pi < 0) and less if it is in power (pi > 0).33 Thus, contrary to the view in the literature,
geo-political considerations do not always erode the commitment to promote free and fair elections.
A power that attaches no intrinsic value to strengthening democracy abroad would invest in
strengthening or in eroding democracy conditional on what serves its candidate (Figure 3.3). The
former occurs when the sender prefers the opposition, the latter, when the sender prefers the
government. One mechanism for this result is the mutual dependence of c and p. An extra unit
contributed to the campaign of a friendly party will purchase more influence if the election is
cleaner. Russian concerns with clean elections in post-war Finland resonate with this concern.
Soviet aid for the opposition – the Communist ticket – would buy more if the playing field was
more even.
On the right-side of Figures 3.2a and 3.2b , we see that a liberal foreign power may choose to
offset some of its investment in cleaner processes (which hurt the incumbent), by expending more
money into candidate support for its favored party. For example, officials of the Mubarak regime in
Egypt were consternated by the policy of the American government to aid pro-democracy groups,
32Due to the proposed interaction between c and p, the intervener will only increase the bias up to a
certain point, since investing in p hampers the effectiveness of candidate support. Therefore, at very high
levels of pi >> 0, we will see higher levels of both c and p if we further increase polarization. For the
parameter choices shown in our Figures the direct effect of p on the vote share still outweighs its negative
effect on the effectiveness of c.
33A foreign intervener that prefers the policies of the opposition (pi < 0) will always spend more on
democracy promotion if Γ increases. If the (liberal) intervener prefers the government (pi > 0) her behavior
is the following: as Γ increases and the policy outcome becomes more important relative to liberal concerns,
at first, the intervener will decrease p and increase c (both in absolute terms) in order to generate additional
vote shares. At high levels of spending c, however, there is an incentive to increase p in absolute terms
because the level of p has an influence on the effectiveness of c.
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arguing that this undermined their control over power.34 A policy of aiding the government via
loans and aid, while investing in more democratic rules, may be an optimal mix. In fact, the
regime may have received more candidate support to offset pro-democracy investments.
Budget
If we set a maximum amount of resources that could be spent on electoral interventions c2 +p2 ≤ y,
then this slightly alters the optimization problem of the election hegemon. A formal solution of
this case can be found in the Appendix Formal Solution of the Constrained Optimization Problem.
Whenever the budget constraint is binding, the election hegemon will spend her budget on c and
p proportional to the desired mix of c∗ and p∗ in absence of a budget constraint. A power with a
small budget influences elections in a small way.
Voteshare and Bias As Hegemon Turns More Liberal
Arguably, over the last decades, the U.S. has become more committed to democracy. This moti-
vates our next set of comparative statics. We illustrate how some quantities of interest are changed
by a rise in liberal concerns from Λ = 0 to Λ = 0.5. We compare the outcomes of the scenario
in Figure 3.2a with the scenario in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the impact on vote share
and bias. We mark the non-intervention status quo outcome (SQ) as a reference point on how
outsiders alter the domestic power game.
Figure 3.4: Outcomes of Election Hegemon Scenario


















































The changing mix of c and p interventions causes total expenditure to rise as concern with
liberalism grows. This is in part a reflection of the fact that concern with liberalism justifies
investment in the democratic processes. But, the effects are more subtle. In our model, investment
in processes increases the payoff of investing in candidates, thereby increasing the amount spent
34“Charges Against U.S.-Aided Groups Come With History of Distrust in Egypt”, by Scott Shane and
Ron Nixon. New York Times, February 6th, 2012.
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on one’s favored party. This also means that we expect a counter-intuitive effect: a rise in liberal
concerns leads to more candidate interventions. An implication is that, after the end of the Cold
War, we can expect more side-taking.
Predictions Figure 3.4 shows that the growing importance of liberal norms reduce the vote
share of the incumbent at any level of polarization (Figure 3.4a), primarily by reducing the unfair
bias enjoyed by the government (Figure 3.4b). Still, if the foreign power likes the incumbent, due
to offsetting candidate investment, this lower bias hardly hurts the vote tally.
Reducing the Effectiveness of Interventions
In consolidated democracies, the domestic rules of the game may be so strong that they cannot be
easily undermined (nor strengthened). Or, it may be the case that the target government refuses
democracy promotion (as Iran would do to the U.S.), or accepts only a blunted, non-threatening
version (Bush, 2012). There might also be local actors that capture democratic aid, and undermine
its intended effects (Jamal, 2007). One way to model these concerns in our framework is to imagine
that the investment in p becomes progressively less effective, until its impact is reduced to 0.
Parameter ρp ∈ [0, 1] captures the effectiveness of a unit investment in democracy.35
We can do the same for candidate interventions. While the targeted candidate always wins
additional votes from increased spending towards her campaign, there might be other reasons
(outside the realm of our model) that prevent her from receiving support from a foreign intervener.
One possibility is concern for corrupt allocation of finances or concern for nationalist backlash.
Thus, the effectiveness of c may converge toward 0 (again, variation in effectiveness can be captured
by a parameter ρc ∈ [0, 1]).36
Predictions Figure 3.5a shows us the impact of reducing the effectiveness of c. Due to the miss-
ing interaction of investment in processes p and candidates c, we see that the foreign power will
actually invest weakly less into democratization if candidate support is ineffective (Figure 3.5a).
Overall, prohibiting candidate support makes electoral intervention much more costly for the elec-
tion hegemon since she can only influence the result by a change in the rules.37 This decreases the
effect of polarization in the target country on the final vote share of the election.
Figure 3.5b is another illustration of the interaction between p and c: positive investment in p
gives the electoral hegemon an incentive to invest more (in absolute value) in candidates. If we

















− c2 − p2, with ρp ∈ [0, 1]

















− c2 − p2, with ρc ∈ [0, 1]
37An intervener would set c to 0 if they anticipate blowback.
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Figure 3.5: Changing the scope of intervention (Liberal Hegemon)
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c∗ with p = 0
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(b) Process Support is prohibited
set p = 0, the liberal hegemon will invest weakly less in candidates (in absolute values), because
there is no additional “boost” through candidate support.
While they might be motivated by different concerns, there is a mutually enforcing relationship
between the two of them. For the election war scenarios that we introduce next, one would come
to similar conclusions for a reduction of the effectiveness in spending on processes or candidates.38
3.3.2 Election War
The setup so far adequately captures some empirical cases. But, it would not deal satisfactorily
with the emerging problem of competition with powers that are not committed to democracy
(Ambrosio, 2008; Risse and Babayan, 2015; von Soest, 2015). Scholars have coined the term
“black knights” for powers entering a conflict between an incumbent government and an outside
actor in order to support the incumbent. When the conflict is an election, a black knight may
alter the dynamics of the competition between government and opposition.
We next introduce a simultaneous move game, where two powers invest in elections. We call
these scenarios “election wars” to emphasize the potentially conflictual nature of the interaction.
The term also suggests that elections can be “proxy wars”. Much like during the Cold War, the
U.S. and the Soviet Union would not combat each other directly, but used other arenas and players
to fight indirectly. Elections can be thought of as a proxy conflict over influence. The U.S. could
be considered to be (the liberal) power in the models that follow.
If both powers mutually support one side/party, or if the opposing side has a considerably
smaller budget or smaller stake in the election, then the problem becomes a special case of the
hegemony problem from the Section The Hegemon Case.
38We would still find the patterns that are characteristic for the election war: counteracting spending on
interventions. Changes in the effectiveness will simply alter the levels of spending in the two dimensions. If
we completely shut down one dimension, international powers will counteract each other’s spending in the
remaining one.
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We use the same formal specification for vote shares and bias as before, setting c = c− + c+
and p = p− + p+. The optimization problem of the respective powers becomes:
maxc+,p+ piΓ+
(
χ+ c+ + c− +
(√
b− (p+ + p−)
)(√
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The Nash equilibrium of this simple two-player game is derived in Appendix Formal Solution of the
Election War Case. Now investment c+ of the power that likes the government whenever pi > 0,
is a response function to the choices of c− and p− by the power that likes the opposition. The
same applies to investment in processes: the investment of the power that likes the government if
pi > 0 is denoted by p+, and it is a response function to the choices of c− and p− by the power
that prefers the opposite of the political spectrum.
The Liberal Symmetric Election War
The most straightforward election war case simply adds another power with opposite political
preferences that cares equally about liberalism and assigns the same geo-political importance to
the target country. We use Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5, Γ− = 0.75, Λ− = 0.5 and the rest of the
parameters as in the election hegemon scenario.
The Nash equilibrium, derived in Appendix C.3, consists of a unique combination of c∗+, c∗−,
p∗+ and p∗−, at which none of the powers has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to any alternative
spending pattern. Below, we discuss informally its properties.
In a symmetric election war, powers care about liberalism and therefore have aligned interests
in this regard. With respect to policies, however, their preferred platforms are on opposite sides
of the political spectrum. One consistent change in all war scenarios relative to the hegemon case
is that the entry of a second power improves the performance of the party the hegemon dislikes.
That party now has an ally. We refer to this as the “levelling effect” of conflict.
While the effects of spending toward a certain candidate will benefit one of the powers at the
expense of the other, the effects of spending on processes p are more subtle. The direct effect of
a bias reduction on the vote share is comparable to the effect of spending on candidates, but at
the same time spending on p has certain “public good” characteristics if both powers care about
liberalism. Additionally, process spending interacts with spending on candidates, which would
boost its effects whenever total net spending on candidates (c+ + c−) is non-zero. Therefore, each
power has the incentive to counteract spending by the other power.
Predictions The result is a perfect standoff between the two international powers. In our baseline
scenario, there is opposing investment in both candidates and processes, with c+ = −c− and both
p+ > 0 and p− > 0 – where p+ is decreasing in pi and p− is increasing in pi (cf. Appendix The
Liberal Symmetric Election War). The reasons for opposing investment in candidates are clear and
have to do with opposing preferences over platforms. Investment in processes rises for one of the
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powers as it falls for the other because having one’s favorite candidate in opposition increases the
incentive to invest in the rules, whereas having the favored candidate in government lessens that.
There is positive net spending on p (p+ + p− > 0), because both parties care about liberalism.
A change in polarization does not affect the overall sum of spending on candidates and processes
by the two powers. Therefore, the election result does not depend on polarization and for most
levels of polarization voters benefit from a lower election bias compared to the election hegemon.39
Prior work suggests that when liberal states hold a preponderance of power in world affairs, this
encourages democratization (Huntington, 1991; Boix, 2011). This proposition rests on many causal
arguments, one of which is international commitment to free elections. In the previous section,
we showed that when power is commanded by a single democratic hegemon, its commitment to
democracy depends on the stakes, polarization, and who is in power. However, when one liberal
power is pitted against another, the result is always cleaner elections.40 Thus, we clarify the logic
of liberal preponderance that leads to democracy by showing that some conflicts among foreign
powers may benefit elections.
The Asymmetric Election War
Next, we introduce two types of asymmetries, in the stakes and in commitment to liberalism. We
also clarify how our propositions may be tested.
First, we consider the asymmetric election war case, in which a liberal outside power (+)
competes against another power (−) with more at stake in the target country, i.e. a higher Γ. We
vary this parameter to offer a sense of how this changes the results. At the same time, the second
power is indifferent to, or even hostile towards, democracy. Recall that we call a power indifferent
to democracy “aliberal” and a power hostile to democracy “illiberal”.
Predictions Figure 3.6 illustrates the predictions.41 For the case of a contest with a power
indifferent to democracy (Λ− = 0), Figures 3.6a and 3.6b show opposing candidate investment,
and opposing, but overall positive, investments in processes. Since one of the powers has more
at stake in the target country, its total spending will always slightly exceed spending by the
other power. Note that spending on p has no “public good”-characteristics from the perspective
of the “−”-power in this case. Additionally, spending by an aliberal power will be completely
“opportunistic”, i.e. solely guided by the policy preferences of the power.
In an election war between a liberal and an illiberal power (Λ− < 0), just as before, both
investments in candidates and in processes are competing (cf. Figure 3.6c and Figure 3.6d), but
the overall bias might even increase compared to its ex-ante level b through the intervention of
the powers. For example, when the illiberal power likes the government in a polarized setting (the
left-hand side of Figures 3.6e and 3.6f), it invests heavily against democracy and for its candidate.
39Recall that (on Fig. 3.4b) the degree of bias reduction is a function of polarization in the hegemon case.
40Making the stakes asymmetric leaves this result intact.
41 Figure 3.6 is based on the differences between a case with Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5 vs. Γ− = 1, Λ− = 0
(asymmetric, liberal/aliberal conflict) and a case with Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5 vs. Γ− = 1, Λ− = −0.5
(asymmetric, liberal/illiberal conflict).
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium Choices in Election War against a Higher-Stakes Power
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(d) Illiberal Power: Investment in Processes
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Because the stakes are higher for the illiberal power, its spending dominates and drives the outcome
to the highest level of bias. It also leads to very good showing of the incumbent government.42
Note that election wars continue to have a levelling effect, so that the difference between in-
cumbent and opposition performance is less pronounced than it would be in the hegemon case.
To show how varying the stakes matters, we next consider a similar set of cases, except the
power opposing the liberal one has lower stakes in the elections (Γ+ > Γ−). Figure 3.7 illustrates.43
Figures 3.7a and 3.7b show opposing candidate investments, and opposing, but overall positive
process investments. Since the liberal power has more at stake in the target country, it will always
spend slightly more than the opposing power.
An aliberal opponent is opportunistic on democracy – sometimes spending to promote it, some-
times spending to erode it.
The picture changes for the case where the opponent is an illiberal power. Most of the time
investments in candidates and processes are competing in opposite directions (cf. Figure 3.7c and
Figure 3.7d). Even though the liberal power is the stronger one, the overall bias might still increase
from the intervention of the powers. Figures 3.7e and 3.7f show the implications for bias and party
performance. The party liked by the liberal hegemon does better (Figure 3.7e), and bias is at its
highest level when that party is in government (Figure 3.7f).
Case Studies
We recap some of the comparative statics we identify in election wars. Relative to the liberal
hegemon case, the entry of an illiberal power leads to lower net investment in processes and
more biased elections. The aliberal entry case is more nuanced. If the aliberal power likes the
opposition, then it results in lower bias. In all the “war” cases, as the stakes for one power increase,
the candidate favored by that power is doing better.
As the stakes for a power increase, there will be more investment in candidates by that power,
which will only be partly counteracted by the other power. This holds in the same way for the
liberal power, as well as for aliberal and illiberal powers. Investment in processes also follows
the general pattern of the hegemon scenario: if the foreign power likes the opposition, there will
always be cleaner elections; if the foreign power prefers the policy platform of the opposition, it
will lead to lower levels of p. The implications from lower levels of p might vary across different
scenarios. These implications include decreasing net positive spending on process improvements
in a war against an aliberal power or further deterioration of democratic standards for the election
war against an illiberal power.
Thus, we can help shed light on research on “black knights” (Risse and Babayan, 2015), which
leaves open the question of whether a liberal power may counteract the election-manipulations of
42As in the hegemon case, the bias will only increase up to a certain point for very high levels of polar-
ization, or extremely high stakes.
43Figure 3.7 is based on the differences between a case with Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5 vs. Γ− = 0.5, Λ− = 0
(asymmetric liberal/aliberal conflict) and a case with Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5 vs. Γ− = 0.75, Λ− = −0.5
(asymmetric liberal/illiberal conflict).
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium Choices in Election War against a Lower-Stakes Power
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the (illiberal) “black knight.” An election war against an illiberal power makes it very costly for a
liberal power to achieve its desired election outcomes. The impact also depends on the (relative)
stakes for the two powers.
Consider Ukraine’s 1991, 1994 and 2004 Presidential elections as illustrations of some of the
“election war” scenarios. While domestic conditions are important, so are the interests of outsiders.
Ukraine is an important country for both the U.S. and Russia. The 1991 election concluded
with the election of Leonid Kravchuk, in a case where the U.S. preferred the opposition (more
nationalist) candidate over Kravchuk.44 Polarization was relatively low, since both candidates
promised reforms and independence – the key issue at stake. During this period, the Soviet Union
was facing significant financial difficulties and it was not necessarily opposed to the promotion of
democracy. We can think of this case as an illiberal-aliberal war, or, due to the Soviet financial
problems, as a case that fits the stylized description of a liberal (U.S.) hegemonic intervention.45
Either way, based on the middle portion of the graph on Figure 3.7f, we would predict a relatively
clean contest. While the election was not problem-free, election observers were satisfied with its
integrity.
In the 1994 elections, Leonid Kuchma, the pro-Russian opposition candidate for President of
Ukraine, defeated the incumbent Kravchuk in an election that was biased but again substantially
free of significant fraud.46 In this case, both the U.S. and Russia invested heavily in opposing
campaigns: the U.S. preferred the incumbent (Kuchma) to win, whereas Russia (still relatively
liberal and so, not opposed to democracy) backed the opposition.47 This result is consistent with
the right-hand side (positive pi) of the election liberal-aliberal bias prediction in Figure 3.6f. Rising
stakes for the aliberal power and both powers contributing some investment for cleaner processes
puts the predictions of bias low, similar to the 1991 case.
In the 2004 elections, pro-Western opposition candidate Yuschenko faced significant vote-
rigging. Only after mass protests that followed the second round of voting – what became known
as the Orange Revolution, did he manage to win.48 The United States pressed for democratic
elections, whereas Russia helped the incumbent manipulate the electoral process. This was a case
where Russia had shifted to a less liberal position in its preferences (democracy deteriorated do-
mestically), and backed the incumbent to win. Russia had redefined its security interests in a
manner that made control of Ukraine a paramount strategic objective. For the purposes of our
model, bias is at the highest possible point in this context. The observed outcome – greater degree
44“Gorbachev puts future on line in Ukraine vote”, St. Louis’ Dispatch, December 1 1991; Lionel Barber,
“Four paragraphs speak volumes for U.S. Policy”, Financial Times, December 4 1991.
45The Appendix has a discussion on the impact of budget constraints.
46Seamus Martin, “Kravchuk is defeated in Ukraine Elections,” The Irish Times, July 12, 1994.
47The election-eve announcement in Naples by President Clinton and other leaders of the seven leading
industrialized nations of $ 4.2 billion more in financial assistance furthered the impression that the West
wants to see Kravchuk reelected. (See NELDA dataset, notes to variable nelda58 ).
48Nick Paton Walsh, “Ukraine in turmoil after vote: Thousands on the streets in protest at new president”
The Guardian, 23 November 2004.
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of fraud – is consistent with the predictions from the model. This is illustrated on the left-hand
side (pi < 0) of Figure 3.6f.49
Superpower utility
Finally, we note that investing in the elections of others is not necessarily utility-enhancing for the
outside powers. In election wars against powers that do not value – or even oppose democracy – a
liberal hegemon’s utility is generally low. In fact, both intervening states may be better off jointly
committing not to intervene, than expending resources against each other. Thus, even where an
election goes the way a superpower prefers, the victory of an election race may be of dubious value.
Figure 3.8 illustrates.
Figure 3.8: Utility of the Foreign Liberal Power





















War against Liberal (−)
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War against Illiberal (−)
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3.4 Discussion
The comparative statics, illustrated across different scenarios and parameter values, provide testable
propositions. We can use the geo-political importance of a country, the level of domestic polariza-
tion, and the strategic setting of one or more powers intervening, together with their commitment
to liberalism, to predict incumbent win and election bias.
Testing systematically the insights of the model in elections is a matter of identifying appropri-
ate data. Such data should include a measure of policy positions, especially ideological proximity
to important international powers, and differences between the government and opposition plat-
forms. Unfortunately, available data is either simply not at this level, or are noisy empirical
approximations.50
49The Orange revolution that followed was a dramatic reaction to the perceived fraud in this case: it was
the product of numerous contingent factors, and, possibly, a good amount of luck for the opposition.
50Consider some examples. International relations scholars use proxies, such as joint voting in the United
Nations, to code close relations between countries (Voeten, 2000). By construction, this measure omits an
indispensable variable to our theory: the position of the opposition. Comparative politics scholars have
developed codings of party platforms. The most extensive of these is the Comparative Manifestos Project
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Illustration
We construct a small dataset that tracks more closely our key variable polarization. The National
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) data has a number of election-level variables
for more than 3300 election events (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). As a preliminary evaluation of our
theory, we selected 63 election cases from NELDA and we coded whether the government and main
opposition party were divided in their position on cooperation with the United States, as well as
whether another power was active in the election.
We code the variable ‘polarization’ in analogy to our model parameter pi: ‘polarization’ is 1 if the
U.S. prefers the incumbent, -1 if the U.S. prefers the opposition, 0 otherwise. Conditioning variable
‘war usa’ indicates the U.S. faces an opponent, i.e., an election war scenario.51 For the model’s
two outcome dimensions, incumbent vote gain and bias, we use NELDA variables ‘nelda27’,52 and
‘nelda11’,53 respectively.
Table 3.1 shows the mean, standard deviation and number of observations conditional on po-
larization and whether an election “war” or “hegemony” case (hegemony here means a case where
the U.S. does not face competitors). Figure 3.9 presents the tabular information in graphical form.
Table 3.1: NELDA Data on Outcomes
Election Hegemon Election War
(War usa==0) (War usa==1)
Polarization -1 0 1 -1 0 1
Nelda27 0.25 0.3 0.6 0.63 0.43 0.5
sd(Nelda27) 0.5 0.47 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.52
N 4 20 5 8 7 12
Nelda11 0.13 0.38 0.5 1 0.43 0.33
sd(Nelda11) 0.35 0.50 0.55 0 0.53 0.49
N 8 21 6 8 7 12
Our liberal hegemon predictions (Figure 3.2) lead us to expect better performance of the can-
didate(s) aligned with the U.S. and worse performance for the candidates that oppose the U.S.
We also expect election bias to follow the same patterns. We see in Figure 3.9 that, when the
incumbent is friendly to the U.S., i.e. the variable ‘Polarization’ is coded as 1, the incumbent does
better in elections. The boost is non-trivial. We also see that this is correlated with bias (in favor
of the incumbent).
(Lehmann et al., 2016). There are two problems with this data, from our point of view: it covers mostly
fully democratic elections, and it is most reliable for coding the Left-Right nexus of party divisions – which
is often not the relevant division.
51Section Raw Data of the Online Appendix shows our cases and the raw codings.
52The variable is a binary indicator of whether the vote count was a gain for the opposition: we subtract
it from 1, to have the more relevant, gain for the incumbent (LINK).
53The question codes whether, before elections, there were there significant concerns that the elections
would not be free and fair (LINK).
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For election war cases we would expect a different dynamic (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). Whenever
the U.S. is aligned with the government, the rival power is aligned with the opposition. We would
expect a decrease in the effect of polarization on the vote shares (levelling effect). Figure 3.9a
shows that ‘wars’ level the playing field and lessen the importance of being an ally to the United
States (relative to the hegemony case).
From the election war cases, we see that the fraction of biased elections decreases for non-
negative values of polarization pi ≥ 0 (Figure 3.9b). This would be consistent with a conflict
between a liberal and an aliberal power, where the stakes are higher for the opposing, aliberal
power – possibly due to regional interests. If the aliberal power is aligned with the opposition (and
there is a pro-U.S. incumbent, i.e. pi > 0) there are cleaner elections because democracy promotion
is in the interest of both powers. While if the pro-U.S. party is in opposition, the U.S. is the sole
power with an interest in democracy. Our theory, thus, would predict spending by the aliberal
power on the deterioration of democracy for pi < 0.











































(b) Election Bias (Nelda11)
Our predictions are more fine-grained than the cases available for empirical examination. Future
data collection can enable us to test more rigorously the model’s predictions.54 The empirical
exercise suggests that external alignments are consequential for who wins elections, and how they
win them. Furthermore, the effects are clearly discernible simply in the raw data.
The Effect of Democratic International Organizations
International organizations, dominated by democracies, have different ways of cajoling elites into
committing to reforms and sticking with them (Pevehouse, 2002a). Unlike states, which feel com-
pelled to prioritize geo-political agendas over democracy promotion (Reiter, 2001), international
organizations can delegate the enforcement of democratic norms to specialized bureaucracies and
deploy impartial election observers (Hyde, 2011).
54Future empirical work can also allow us to develop measures for process and candidate interventions –
another set of variables utilized and predicted by the theory.
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If we add to our baseline scenario a strategic outside actor that is only committed to lib-
eralism, we can easily incorporate international organizations into our model. Since the policy
outcome (which party wins) does not matter to the international organization, it will spend a
constant amount p on bias reduction, regardless of political divisions. As we show in the Online
Appendix The Effect of (Democratic) International Organizations, international organizations,
committed to democracy, offset partisan-driven, democracy-eroding interventions in any strategic
context and are always good for democracy.
Regime Overthrow
One might think of the option to decide – ex-ante – to influence a democratic regime via contribu-
tions towards candidates and processes or whether to simply attempt to overthrow the regime. In
the case of Greece, for example, U.S. interventions helped nudge the political right to victory for
two decades after WWII. After the left won a decisive victory in 1965, the army intervened with
tacit U.S. backing (Couloumbis and Iatrides, 1980). One easy specification for this effect would be
to allow overthrow at a fixed cost r and an additional cost Λ for those international powers that
care about democracy. We look at this case in the Online Appendix Regime Overthrow. We show
that a high degree of candidate polarization may induce the interveners to abandon interventions
in elections in order to pursue supplanting democracy. The latter is more likely for an illiberal
power.
Endogenous Choice of Policy Positions
Realistically, parties may change their policy positions in order to attract outside funding. Indeed,
this is a possible explanation of what occurred in post-WWII Italy. National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy complained that the ritual of Christian Democrats petitioning for money to stave
off a Communist take-over – and the U.S. obliging – was America’s ‘annual shame.’55 Democrazia
Christiana adopted consistently, and rigorously pro-American stances, even volunteering that Italy
should join NATO at an early stage. The Online Appendix Endogenous Choice of Policy Positions
extends our model to allow for candidates choosing their platforms endogenously. This adds a first
stage in which both the government and the opposition simultaneously determine their platforms.
We present a simplified version of an exercise similar to Grossman and Helpman (1996). We show
that positions shift to a larger extent and polarization grows more in the hegemon case. When
both sides have an ally, there is a more level playing field and changing positions is less rewarding
for attracting support that generates additional votes. The gap in the policy positions of the two
parties shrinks when the party that is farther away from the outsider with higher stakes in the
election finds it easier to compromise its position and adopt a more pro-foreign stance.
55Mistry (2006, p. 319).
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3.5 Conclusion
The conceptual distinctions we develop in this paper should help further debates on democracy
promotion. Observers and scholars worry that the partisan bias in U.S. democracy assistance
undermines the effort’s effectiveness.56 We outline a distinction between candidate interventions
(i.e., the “who” of elections) and process interventions (i.e., the “how” of elections). We argue that
investments in processes and parties are mutually dependent. The value of additional investment
in candidates will depend on the rules of the game. Policy polarization between candidates and
the geo-political importance to the intervener determine the balance of candidate and process
investments in each contest.
We contribute to work on diffusion of democracy (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Weyland, 2009).
Scholars have asked how international forces change the conduct of elections (Rozenas, 2015; Flores
and Nooruddin, 2016). We offer a more precise understanding of how the distribution of power
affects electoral integrity. While interest in building institutions and in helping allies sometimes
clash, we show that this is not necessarily the case. Our work on what we call election wars –
conflictual investments by outsiders in different candidates – shows that outsiders sometimes bid
for a paltry return and may even be better off if they could jointly commit not to intervene.
Our theoretical approach suggests avenues for further research. Empirically, we need informa-
tion on how foreign actors value the opposition, not only the government. The gap in preferences
for a government or opposition win has bearing on election interventions, and, via this channel, on
democracy itself. Who holds power, how close relations are between states and what is the state
of democracy domestically all depend on the strategic incentives of outside powers.
Theoretically, our model can be extended to cover the different manners in which foreigners
“make votes count” (Cox, 1997). One could allow for more than one round to see the effects of
the differing persistence of investment in candidates and processes – incorporating a quintessential
feature of democratic elections: that they repeat over time. The possibility of corruption is another
natural avenue for further research. Finally, our model that can be applied to domestic elections,
where we can have, in a federal system, powerful lobbies square off against each other in investing
in better rules or in their candidates. These and other areas of study can benefit from the theory
we propose.
56See Stephen Krasner, “America’s Role in the World: The Costs of Walking Away”, USIP, Dec 11, 2011.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Notes on the optimal bond fund contract
















The bond fund needs to take into account the distribution of Θ and the influence of its choice of
d1 on withdrawals. The payoff d2 will be endogenously determined by the fraction of withdrawals
l, the fund’s cash holdings and the price schedule of fund assets.
Given two payoffs d1 and d2, the expected fraction of withdrawals is equal to the ex-ante
probability that a particular agent prefers to withdraw:






Where log(Pi) = ρi =
αθ¯+βxi
α+β is a transformation of the agent’s updated information, after
receiving a private signal xi = θ + εi:
E [l(d1, d2)] = P
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And then, since θ ∼ N(θ¯, 1/α), εi ∼ N(0, 1/β) and the assumption that εi is independent of θ,
their sum is normally distributed with θ + εi ∼ N(θ¯, 1/α+ 1/β).
I could assume that the fund prepares for withdrawals with cash holdings of [λ + l¯]d1, where
l¯ could equal the expected amount of cahs holdings needed in order to be right on “average”.
However, if cash holdings do not suffice to serve withdrawals, i.e. l > l¯, a fraction of the fund’s








The function p(l) describes the price schedule of bonds on the secondary market. Furthermore,
if l < l¯:
d2 =
(
1 + λ− [λ+ l¯]d1
)
R+ [l¯ − l(·)]Θ
1− l(·)
Note that if the fund holds excess cash during the second period, it needs to be stored in a
technology that is affected by the level of monetary policy Θ. In absence of specific assumptions
on the pricing function p(l), the fund might go bankrupt after the first period. This will happen
if the fund cannot generate enough revenue to pay d1 to all first-period withdrawers with mass
λ+ l(·).
In the bankruptcy case the fund will distribute all its resources among first-period withdrawers.






The fraction of early withdrawals lˆ that leads the fund to go bankrupt would be the l that
solves d′1 = d1. For values of l > lˆ, the fund goes bankrupt and second period withdrawers receive
nothing, i.e. d2 = 0.
An alternative assumption would fix cash holdings at a level of λd1. This means that fund
assets have to be sold in any case, for l > 0:
d2 =
(










λ+l(·) . This is a slightly
simpler payoff function and the bankruptcy option could be avoided via additional assumptions
on d1 and p(l), or alternatively by imposing an upper limit on l.
A.2 Proof: No asymmetric equilibria





2pi. It remains to be shown that there can be no other, hence asymmetric, equilibrium.
I will set κ = 1 without loss of generality and use an argument sketched by Morris and Shin (2001)
and used in a similar form in Morris and Shin (2004).
I will denote by un(ρ, ρˆ) the expected payoff of not withdrawing upon receiving posterior ρ,
when the other players use a switching strategy around ρˆ. Using my arguments from above, I can
denote the probability, that, given some investor receives a posterior of ρ, any particular other
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investor withdraws because she received a signal that implies a posterior larger than ρˆ by:
P (ρ′ > ρˆ|ρ) = P
(















ρˆ− θ¯ + βα(ρˆ− ρ)
))
Therefore un(ρ, ρˆ) is given by











where ρ indicates the posterior and ρˆ the threshold I expect others to use in their equilibrium
strategy.
I can easily verify that un(ρ, ρˆ) satisfies the following three properties:
Monotonicity: Since Φ(·) is a monotonously increasing function, un is decreasing in the
first argument (i.e. ρ) and increasing in the second argument (i.e. ρˆ).
Continuity: un is continuous.
Full range: For any ρˆ ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}, un(ρ, ρˆ)→ r − 1 as ρ→ −∞, and un(ρ, ρˆ)→ r as
ρ→∞
The intuition behind the monotonicity argument is the following: For a given running threshold
of the other agents, observing a higher ρ makes a run more likely and therefore reduces the expected
payoff of not withdrawing. On the other hand, given I observe ρ, assuming a higher running
threshold ρˆ for the other agents means that a run becomes less likely and therefore the expected
payoff increases.
Withdrawing simply rends uw(ρ, ρˆ) = ρ in expectation, independent of the actions taken by the
other players. For sufficiently large ρ, withdrawing is always a dominant action. Let us denote by
ρ¯1 the value of the belief at which withdrawal is the dominant action (i.e. un(ρ¯1,∞) = ρ¯1). Then
the depositor will always withdraw for all values of ρ > ρ¯1.
It is therefore rational to rule out strategies that assume that other depositors will leave their
money with the fund for values of ρ larger than ρ¯1. But then, investors will always run if the
posterior is higher than ρ¯2, where ρ¯2 solves:
un(ρ¯2, ρ¯1) = ρ¯2
By monotonicity it holds that ρ¯2 < ρ¯1. A switching strategy around ρ¯2 is a best response to a
switching strategy around ρ¯1 and there exists no reasonable belief for a switching threshold larger
than ρ¯1.
In the next round I can eliminate all switching strategies larger than ρ¯2. This leads to a
decreasing sequence of switching values
ρ¯1 > ρ¯2 > . . . > ρ¯k.
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Due to the monotonicity properties of un(·), the largest solution ρ¯ of the equation un(ρ, ρ) = ρ is
the largest lower bound of this sequence, and hence its limit. Any strategy that does not imply a
withdrawal for ρ > ρ¯ does not survive the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
There is an analogous argument that demonstrates that not withdrawing at values of ρ that are
smaller than the smallest solution ρ of the equation un(ρ, ρ) = ρ can be ruled out by an iterated
elimination of dominated strategies argument.
Since I have shown in section 1.3.4 that the equation un(ρ, ρ) = ρ has a unique solution, it
holds that ρ¯ = ρ and hence this is the unique equilibrium surviving the iterated elimination of
dominated strategies.
A.3 Derivative of γ with respect to α and β









β(α+ 2β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
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Since both α and β determine variances it has to hold that α > 0 and β > 0. This means I
can determine the sign of the sum in the squared brackets. For positive values of α and β it holds
separately that α+ 2β > α and 3α+ 2β > α+ β. Therefore:
(α+ 2β)(3α+ 2β) > α(α+ β)





β2(α+ 2β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[





For positive values of α and β it holds separately that β < α+β and α+2β < α+4β. Therefore:
β(α+ 2β) < (α+ β)(α+ 4β)
A.4 Results based on alternative measures of mone-
tary policy uncertainty
Additional empirical results are in Tables A.1 and A.2. These are base on alternative measures of
monetary policy uncertainty.
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Table A.1: FOMC projections and fund flows of corporate bond funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%)
median(FOMC)t -1.140*** -1.958*** -2.038*** -2.038*** -2.038***
(0.279) (0.317) (0.340) (0.298) (0.366)
range(FOMC)t 0.253 0.725*** 0.743*** 0.743** 0.743**
(0.250) (0.260) (0.262) (0.320) (0.341)
Returni,t−1 20.10 11.90 8.355 8.355 8.355
(12.74) (13.26) (13.74) (19.84) (20.05)
log(TNA)i,t−1 -2.167*** -11.94*** -11.95*** -11.95*** -11.95***
(0.241) (1.206) (1.209) (1.307) (1.366)
S&P 500t (%) 8.660 8.660 8.660
(7.937) (7.534) (7.995)
VIXt -0.0712 -0.0712 -0.0712
(0.0555) (0.0664) (0.0682)
Observations 83,803 83,799 83,799 83,799 83,799
R-squared 0.010 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE i/. i/. i/. ./t i/t
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.2: Federal funds futures prices and fund flows of corporate bond funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%) Flowsi;t (%)
SVEN1F01t -2.496*** -3.392*** -3.837*** -3.837*** -3.837***
(0.371) (0.445) (0.500) (0.521) (0.593)
sd21(SVEN1F01)t 12.77*** 8.911* 10.64** 10.64 10.64
(4.815) (4.766) (5.014) (8.689) (8.599)
Returni,t−1 17.90 5.429 -0.798 -0.798 -0.798
(13.25) (13.74) (14.22) (18.22) (18.58)
log(TNA)i,t−1 -2.164*** -11.89*** -11.91*** -11.91*** -11.91***
(0.241) (1.204) (1.207) (1.303) (1.362)
S&P 500t (%) 3.214 3.214 3.214
(8.070) (7.816) (8.137)
VIXt -0.142** -0.142** -0.142**
(0.0557) (0.0659) (0.0669)
Observations 83,803 83,799 83,799 83,799 83,799
R-squared 0.011 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE i/. i/. i/. ./t i/t
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Econometric approach
For each outcome the basic model setup is the following regression specification:












The main coefficients of interest are the parameters θij associated with the realizations of our
monetary policy surprise ∆iEA.
B.1.1 Joint estimation of reallocation measures
Before we explain the exact choice of specification for each of the reallocation measures, we want to
recall a specific property: portfolio shares sum up to 1 by definition, hence reallocation measures
sum up to 0. We exploit this property in our estimation approach by imposing an additional
constraint on the fitted values.
Joint estimation without a restriction
We take the dependent variable total reallocation ∆wi,t with respect to fund category i and write
the above equation more compactly. Instead of

















where the matrix Xi contains all values of the (lagged) regressors from the vectors ∆i
EA, ∆wi and
the matrix ci. We have I = 8 fund categories and δi consists of coefficients for K − 1 regressors
and a constant. There are t = 1, . . . , T time periods. In order to jointly estimate all portfolio
shares of the i = 1, . . . , 8 fund categories we can rewrite, ∆w = (∆w1, . . . ,∆wI) = Xβ + ε by
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The first part of our approach equals a SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) approach, where one
would jointly estimate ∆w = Xβ + ε by OLS – or if certain conditions were to hold with respect
to the error terms by (F)GLS. A joint estimation approach also enables us to correct standard
errors for correlation in the error terms across fund categories.
Introducing the Summing-up restriction
In order to exploit that, across our I = 8 fund categories, total reallocation sums to zero (s = 0) –
while portfolio weights sum to one (s = 1), we can rewrite the total reallocation into a certain fund
category as minus the sum of the total reallocation into the other fund categories (we subtract




∆wi,t = s− i′i,t∆w,
where ii,t is simply a vector of length IT containing (T−1)I+T zeros and I−1 ones, which extracts
the appropriate coefficents from the vector ∆w.1 Hence for the vector ∆wi, which contains the
full time series of total reallocation towards the fund category i, we can now write:
∆wi = 1 · s− i′i∆w = 1 · s− i′i (Xβ + ε) ,
where the T × IT matrix i′i stacks the appropriate vector i′i,t for all time periods t = 1, . . . , T .
Alternatively one can construct the matrix i′i by joining I − 1 identity matrixes of dimension
T and a matrix of zeros (from left to right, the matrix of zeros is at the i-th place among the
identity matrices in i′i). In a subsequent step, we can replace the vector ∆w with the equation
∆w = Xβ + ε (from the SURE approach).
1For a stylized example with I=3 and T=2, the appropriate vector in order to extract ∆w1,1 via the
equation ∆w1,1 = s− i1,1∆w would be i1,1 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
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Joint estimation with a restriction











































= X˜β + ε˜
The last step shows that we can estimate a combined KI × 1-vector β̂ of regression coefficients
for each fund category i = 1, . . . , I by using the transformed regression matrix X˜ with dimension









X1 0T . . . 0T





0T 0T . . . XI
−X1 −X2 . . . 0T

Upon close inspection of the resulting matrix X˜ and the vector w˜ we can add the following intuition:
in essence we exploit the summing-up restriction in order to add a (I+ 1)-th group of observations
where the w˜-values are transformations of the values of the last fund category (the last T values
of w˜ are obtained via ∆wI − 1T×1 · s) while the values in (I + 1)-th row of X˜ are coming from
the other groups (excluding the last group I).2
B.2 Model assumptions and model selection
In B.1 we have outlined our joint estimation approach for the parameters βi, θi and γi with respect
to each fund category i. This section will be dedicated to choosing the appropriate set of monetary
policy surprises, lagged dependent variables and controls for the joint regressions with respect to
our reallocation measures.
2We can therefore estimate this using a pooled regression setup (with appropriate correction of standard
errors for dependency over time and across fund categories) and can replicate the matrix operations needed
to get to X˜ and w˜ by using collapse, merge and append in Stata.
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B.2.1 Choice of specification and model diagnosis
Let’s recall our baseline estimation equation:












We need to choose the number of lags for our surprises s, for our lagged dependent variables p and
the set of (lagged) control variables contained in ci. Furthermore explain our choice of specification
and the underlying assumptions.
Stationarity For our reallocation measures stationarity is not of concern, because our reallo-
cation measures are a transformation of the first differences of portfolio weights over time. Indeed,
a Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for all of the fund categories.
Exogeneity assumptions We consider our monetary policy surprises as exogenous shocks. We
construct them from high frequency data in order to extract the unanticipated component of
announcements regarding monetary policy. Since we want to track their impact over time there
might be reactions to these surprises. In order to control for other changes in relevant push- and
pull-factors towards certain asset classes or geographies, we include a set of surprise indices that
track surprises to (forecasts of) macroeconomic variables in different geographies: For the joint
estimation, we use a surprise for emerging markets (Datastream: TBCESIR), for the G10 countries
(GXCESIR) and lagged values of an Euro area surprise indicator (EKCESIR).
Lag choice We expect our surprises to have both a short-term impact and longer-term impact.
The short-term impact should be related to asset price changes FX changes that immediately reflect
new information. If we want to track the impact on active decisions we need to look at a longer
horizon. We exclude ex-ante the contemporaneous lag of EKCESIR (due to possible collinearity)
and would prefer to select a model with s = p = q, in order to quantify also the impact of the
arrival of additional information.
Table B.1 shows the 10 best models by AIC with a maximum lag of 4 (we want to look a short-
term impacts over a maximum one-week horizon) for each of our reallocation measures, based on
the joint estimation approach and based on regressions covering our entire sample.
The table gives us some justification to look at the evolution of our reallocation measures over a
one-week horizon (instant impact and four lags). In a next step we will check for serial correlation
of the residuals.
Residual Analysis For the joint estimation approach Figure B.1 shows a plot of the autocorre-
lation in residuals by fund category. For the specification with s = 4, p = 4, q = 4 the remaining
autocorrelation in residuals is minor.
Final choice of specification
For our main tables we will use regressions with four lags for the surprises, as well as four lags of
the dependent variable and four lags for the controls.
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Table B.1: Information criteria for different lag choices
EA short-term rates EA long-term rates
s p q AIC BIC s p q AIC BIC
active realloc 0 4 0 -58172.2 -57650 0 4 0 -58166 -57643.7
1 4 0 -58159.6 -57579.3 1 4 0 -58157.6 -57577.4
0 4 1 -58146.4 -57450.1 2 4 0 -58143.3 -57505
2 4 0 -58145.9 -57507.6 0 4 1 -58140.2 -57443.9
3 4 0 -58136.3 -57440 3 4 0 -58132.7 -57436.4
1 4 1 -58134.1 -57379.7 1 4 1 -58131.9 -57377.5
0 4 2 -58133.9 -57263.5 0 4 2 -58126.9 -57256.5
4 4 0 -58126.8 -57372.4 4 4 0 -58119.3 -57364.9
1 4 2 -58121.3 -57192.9 1 4 2 -58118.6 -57190.2
2 4 1 -58120.3 -57307.9 2 4 1 -58117.6 -57305.3
passive realloc returns 0 4 0 -29354.3 -28832.1 0 4 0 -29428.1 -28905.9
0 4 1 -29350.1 -28653.8 1 4 0 -29422.7 -28842.5
1 4 0 -29340.7 -28760.5 0 4 1 -29420.7 -28724.4
1 4 1 -29336.6 -28582.2 1 4 1 -29415.3 -28661
2 4 0 -29332.6 -28694.3 2 4 0 -29413.3 -28775
3 4 0 -29329.5 -28633.2 2 4 1 -29405.8 -28593.5
2 4 1 -29328.3 -28516 3 4 0 -29402.2 -28705.9
3 4 1 -29323.6 -28453.2 4 4 0 -29396.6 -28642.3
4 4 0 -29316.5 -28562.1 3 4 1 -29394.3 -28523.9
4 4 1 -29310.9 -28382.5 4 4 1 -29389.9 -28461.5
passive realloc fx 1 3 0 -37077.1 -36554.9 2 3 0 -37230.4 -36650.1
2 3 0 -37069.8 -36489.5 3 3 0 -37220.5 -36582.2
1 4 0 -37066.1 -36485.8 2 4 0 -37220 -36581.7
3 3 0 -37060.3 -36422 1 3 0 -37218.3 -36696.1
2 4 0 -37058.8 -36420.5 2 3 1 -37210.8 -36456.4
1 3 1 -37057.2 -36360.8 3 4 0 -37210.2 -36513.8
2 3 1 -37050.1 -36295.8 4 3 0 -37209.3 -36512.9
3 4 0 -37049.4 -36353.1 1 4 0 -37207.8 -36627.5
1 4 1 -37045.7 -36291.4 3 3 1 -37200.7 -36388.3
4 3 0 -37045.1 -36348.8 2 4 1 -37199.9 -36387.5
total realloc 0 4 0 -25138.2 -24616 1 4 0 -25237.3 -24657
1 4 0 -25137.3 -24557 2 4 0 -25235.4 -24597.1
2 4 0 -25131.5 -24493.2 3 4 0 -25223.4 -24527.1
0 4 1 -25120.7 -24424.4 1 4 1 -25218.4 -24464
3 4 0 -25119.2 -24422.8 2 4 1 -25216.3 -24403.9
1 4 1 -25119 -24364.7 4 4 0 -25212.9 -24458.6
2 4 1 -25113.2 -24300.8 3 4 1 -25204 -24333.6
4 4 0 -25105.7 -24351.4 1 3 0 -25195.6 -24673.4
3 4 1 -25100.3 -24229.9 4 4 1 -25194.1 -24265.6
1 3 0 -25095.2 -24573 2 3 0 -25193.5 -24613.2
B.2.2 Specification of flow regressions
Stationarity There are no concerns regarding stationarity for flows measured at a daily frequency.
A sequence of Dickey-Fuller test for each category leads to values for the test statistic below -20
(the 1% critical value being -3.43). This is a clear rejection of the H0 of a unit root.
Specification The analysis of the information criteria in Table B.2 also points us towards
choosing a 4-4-4 specification. Overall the pattern for flows does not differ significantly from the
pattern from the joint estimation of our reallocation measures from above.
Residual Analysis If we want to avoid remaining autocorrelation in the residuals, Durbin’s
alternative test points us to minimum of 2 or 3 lags of the dependent variable “flows in % of TNA”
that are necessary in order not to reject “H0: no serial correlation in the residuals.” The inspection
of ACF plots indicates, that sometimes already 1 lag might be enough.
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(b) EA 10-year rates
B.2.3 Specification of benchmark regressions
Daily returns are stationary for the currencies and benchmarks in our sample. We use the specifi-
cation from the reallocation measures and the flow measures in order to be able to directly compare
the relevant coefficients.
B.3 Statistical foundation of the break point
We use September 1st 2014 as a (potential) break point and report estimates of the impact of our
monetary policy surprises on portfolio reallocation for the entire period, the period before and the
period after the 1st of September 2014. This section will provide some statistical foundation for
the choice of break point. We use two alternative approaches. The evidence in this section is based
on (joint) regressions using the variable total reallocation (∆wit).
B.3.1 Chow-Test for breaks in all regression parameters
If we want to allow all our parameters to vary ex-ante vs. ex-post with respect to the break
point, we can simply run a set of regressions for each possible break point candidate using the
full sample, the sample before the break point and the sample after the break point. From the
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three regressions we separately compute their sum of squared residuals, also called the error sum
of squares: ESSpre, ESSpost and ESSfull. Residuals are stemming from the joint regression – i.e.






Intuitively the test statistic captures how much better one can fit the data by splitting the
sample into two parts and running separate regressions. Our joint estimation approach estimates
each parameter and constant for each group, so we will have to correct for k = 208 estimated
parameters based on an estimation with s = 4, p = 4, q = 4. Then we can compare estimates over
time in order to check for the maximum evidence of a break point.
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(b) EA 10-year rates
Note: The red line indicates the break point used throughout our analysis, September 1st 2014. Altavilla
et al. (2015) use this date to distinguish the effect of post-APP monetary policy from previous measures,
since a series of announcements related to the preceded the official launch of this programme in January
2015.
In Figure B.2 we see how the level of the Statistic changes considerably in the months leading
towards the the announcement of the APP in January 2015. This provides a statistical foundation
for our choice of break point. The critical value for this sequential test is different from the one
for a known breakpoint, see also Hansen (2001) and Andrews (1993)
Since all parameters are free to change at the break point, the approach of this subsections gets
closest to how we deal with the potential break point in our sample. By reporting regressions for
the full sample, the pre-APP and the post-APP period we potentially allow parameters to change
in the different episodes of the sample. If we only allow for breaks in the the effect of monetary
policy surprises, the conclusions are roughly similar, pointing towards a break point in the second
half of 2014.
Our evidence regarding break points points towards a single break point rather than a series
of breakpoints. There are no large spikes in our Chow-statistics in the years 2012 and 2013.
Nevertheless, future work based on similar data at the daily frequency might benefit from a time-
varying parameter approach. In our point of view, however, splitting the sample into several
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(discrete) episodes characterized by a certain conduct of monetary policy fits our research question
best.
B.4 Additional Figures and Tables















Source: Data is obtained from the IMF CPIS dataset via http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60587812. The graph
shows the share of EA19 countries of the “Value of Total Investment” as reported in “Table 8: Derived Portfolio Investment
Liabilities (All Economies) by Economy of Nonresident Holder: Equity and Investment Fund Shares (Derived from Creditor
Data)” for Luxwembourg. The long run mean is at 73%. The mean over the sample period (marked by the two red bars) is
around 72%.
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Table B.2: Information criteria for different lag choices of the flow measures
EA short-term rates EA long-term rates
s p q AIC BIC s p q AIC BIC
LU/E/WE 0 3 0 -1079.86 -1039.39 0 3 0 -1076.91 -1036.44
1 3 0 -1078.03 -1032.5 1 3 0 -1074.97 -1029.44
0 4 0 -1076.73 -1031.21 0 4 0 -1073.77 -1028.25
2 3 0 -1076.05 -1025.47 2 3 0 -1073.47 -1022.88
3 3 0 -1075.62 -1019.98 0 3 2 -1072.56 -1001.74
0 3 2 -1075.56 -1004.73 3 3 0 -1072.03 -1016.39
1 4 0 -1074.91 -1024.33 1 4 0 -1071.83 -1021.25
0 3 1 -1074.12 -1018.48 0 3 1 -1071.2 -1015.56
LU/E/USAPJ 0 4 0 -1153.3 -1107.77 0 4 0 -1154.24 -1108.72
0 3 0 -1151.71 -1111.24 1 4 0 -1153.39 -1102.81
1 4 0 -1151.3 -1100.72 0 3 0 -1152.71 -1112.24
1 3 0 -1149.71 -1104.18 1 3 0 -1151.98 -1106.45
2 4 0 -1149.38 -1093.74 2 4 0 -1151.41 -1095.78
0 4 1 -1148.25 -1087.55 2 3 0 -1149.99 -1099.41
2 3 0 -1147.76 -1097.17 3 4 0 -1149.41 -1088.72
3 4 0 -1147.45 -1086.75 0 4 1 -1149.25 -1088.56
LU/E/GLOB 0 3 0 -1818.75 -1778.28 0 3 0 -1819.48 -1779.01
1 3 0 -1817.39 -1771.86 1 3 0 -1818.59 -1773.06
2 3 0 -1815.48 -1764.89 2 3 0 -1817.66 -1767.07
0 4 0 -1815.29 -1769.77 0 4 0 -1815.97 -1770.44
0 3 1 -1813.89 -1758.25 3 3 0 -1815.81 -1760.16
1 4 0 -1813.89 -1763.31 1 4 0 -1815.04 -1764.47
3 3 0 -1813.53 -1757.89 0 3 1 -1814.59 -1758.94
1 3 1 -1812.57 -1751.86 2 4 0 -1814.15 -1758.51
LU/E/EM 0 4 0 -1922.61 -1877.09 0 4 0 -1921.72 -1876.2
1 4 0 -1920.7 -1870.12 1 4 0 -1920.58 -1870
2 4 0 -1918.72 -1863.09 2 4 0 -1919.32 -1863.68
0 4 1 -1918.57 -1857.87 0 4 1 -1917.7 -1857.01
0 3 0 -1918.02 -1877.55 0 3 0 -1917.52 -1877.05
3 4 0 -1917.1 -1856.4 3 4 0 -1917.4 -1856.7
1 4 1 -1916.68 -1850.93 1 4 1 -1916.55 -1850.79
1 3 0 -1916.11 -1870.59 1 3 0 -1916.26 -1870.73
LU/B/WE 0 4 0 -1172.33 -1126.8 1 4 0 -1172.77 -1122.19
0 4 2 -1170.66 -1094.79 0 4 0 -1171.97 -1126.45
1 4 0 -1170.35 -1119.77 1 4 2 -1171.41 -1090.49
0 4 3 -1169.92 -1078.88 1 4 3 -1170.81 -1074.71
2 4 0 -1168.89 -1113.25 2 4 0 -1170.78 -1115.15
1 4 2 -1168.72 -1087.8 0 4 2 -1170.19 -1094.32
0 4 1 -1168.52 -1107.83 3 4 0 -1169.81 -1109.12
1 4 3 -1167.96 -1071.86 0 4 3 -1169.67 -1078.62
LU/B/USAPJ 0 4 0 218.1253 263.6464 0 4 0 217.7131 263.2341
2 4 0 218.9568 274.5937 1 4 0 218.5767 269.1557
1 4 0 220.1133 270.6923 2 4 0 220.5641 276.201
3 4 0 220.9534 281.6482 0 4 1 221.0085 281.7032
0 4 1 221.3768 282.0716 1 4 1 221.8693 287.622
2 4 1 222.1991 293.0096 3 4 0 222.3914 283.0862
4 4 0 222.9499 288.7026 2 4 1 223.8622 294.6728
1 4 1 223.3629 289.1155 4 4 0 224.3905 290.1432
LU/B/GLOB 0 4 0 -1801.09 -1755.57 0 4 0 -1801.97 -1756.45
0 4 1 -1799.95 -1739.25 0 4 1 -1800.73 -1740.03
1 4 0 -1799.27 -1748.69 1 4 0 -1800.52 -1749.94
1 4 1 -1798.07 -1732.32 2 4 0 -1799.3 -1743.66
2 4 0 -1797.28 -1741.64 1 4 1 -1799.24 -1733.49
2 4 1 -1796.1 -1725.28 2 4 1 -1798.07 -1727.26
4 4 0 -1795.62 -1729.87 3 4 0 -1797.58 -1736.88
3 4 0 -1795.28 -1734.59 3 4 1 -1796.25 -1720.39
LU/B/EM 0 4 0 -503.039 -457.518 0 4 0 -503.027 -457.506
1 4 0 -501.79 -451.211 1 4 0 -501.192 -450.613
2 4 0 -499.851 -444.214 0 4 1 -499.782 -439.087
0 4 1 -499.779 -439.084 2 4 0 -499.195 -443.558
1 4 1 -498.518 -432.765 1 4 1 -497.941 -432.189
3 4 0 -497.933 -437.238 3 4 0 -497.298 -436.603
2 4 1 -496.55 -425.74 2 4 1 -495.944 -425.134










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.4: Summary table of the EPFR dataset by fund category (Equity funds)
Summary Statistics
Description Unit N mean sd min max
LU/E/WE
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 87.273 21.894 55.712 129.131
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.043 0.888 -5.249 3.364
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 0.013 0.163 -2.135 0.700
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 0.004 0.020 -0.193 0.082
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 0.002 0.085 -0.618 0.402
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 -0.001 0.049 -0.379 0.390
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 0.005 0.095 -0.851 0.481
LU/E/USAPJ
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 67.502 11.617 49.238 91.913
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.045 0.675 -5.591 3.062
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 -0.017 0.151 -2.113 0.671
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 -0.001 0.015 -0.198 0.061
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 0.002 0.040 -0.293 0.156
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 0.000 0.028 -0.264 0.311
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 0.002 0.049 -0.337 0.297
LU/E/GLOB
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 64.177 6.350 51.746 79.736
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.034 0.660 -5.141 2.710
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 -0.014 0.112 -1.784 0.518
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 -0.000 0.010 -0.061 0.054
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 0.001 0.030 -0.198 0.118
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 0.001 0.036 -0.155 1.166
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 0.002 0.048 -0.208 1.183
LU/E/EM
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 113.909 16.529 74.667 145.381
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.012 0.802 -5.803 3.196
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 -0.042 0.116 -2.269 0.273
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 -0.006 0.017 -0.161 0.066
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 -0.003 0.086 -0.384 0.391
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 0.001 0.045 -0.334 0.429
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 -0.008 0.096 -0.507 0.484
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Table B.5: Summary table of the EPFR dataset by fund category (Bond funds)
Summary Statistics
Description Unit N mean sd min max
LU/B/WE
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 58.656 13.250 44.375 95.278
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.020 0.128 -0.676 0.766
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 0.019 0.154 -1.195 1.692
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 0.003 0.016 -0.101 0.146
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 0.000 0.053 -0.253 0.442
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 0.002 0.061 -0.427 1.277
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 0.006 0.081 -0.440 1.281
LU/B/USAPJ
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 17.713 2.059 14.886 24.810
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.012 0.122 -0.644 0.652
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 0.015 0.276 -3.524 2.730
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 0.001 0.009 -0.113 0.087
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 -0.000 0.014 -0.064 0.088
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 -0.001 0.043 -1.366 0.540
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 -0.000 0.046 -1.359 0.548
LU/B/GLOB
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 93.107 8.548 63.586 108.634
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.014 0.106 -0.716 0.430
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 -0.018 0.124 -0.630 0.904
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 -0.001 0.018 -0.088 0.198
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 -0.001 0.067 -0.246 0.506
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 -0.003 0.050 -1.277 0.262
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 -0.005 0.086 -1.263 0.518
LU/B/EM
Total Net Assets – Ai,t Euro (billion) 1167 51.217 6.915 39.553 69.078
Portfolio returns of the fund – 100 · ri,t % 1166 0.009 0.299 -2.441 1.588
Flows in percent of TNA – 100 · fi,t/Ai,t % 1166 -0.017 0.210 -2.126 2.047
Active reallocation (due to flows) – ∆wAi,t %-points 1166 -0.000 0.016 -0.086 0.152
Passive reallocation (due to returns) – ∆wRi,t %-points 1166 -0.001 0.029 -0.100 0.195
Passive reallocation (due to FX changes) %-points 1166 0.000 0.017 -0.161 0.189
Total Reallocation –∆wi,t %-points 1166 -0.002 0.036 -0.151 0.215
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Table B.6: Main results Euro area short-term rates (instant impact)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area short-term rates. Each line in the
table refers to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 4.2 in the main
text for the definition of dependent variables).
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – full sample
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation 0.180∗∗ −0.051 −0.044 0.083 −0.158∗∗∗ 0.000 0.040 −0.060
Passive reallocation return 0.662 −0.115 0.162 −0.298 −0.082 0.003 −0.161 −0.121
Passive reallocation FX −0.537∗∗ 0.215∗ −0.000 0.530∗∗ −0.367∗ 0.090 −0.101∗∗ 0.188∗∗
Total reallocation 0.294 0.072 0.109 0.268 −0.634∗∗∗ 0.100 −0.219 0.035
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 1.748∗∗∗ 0.094 0.312 0.958 −1.029∗ 0.126 0.668 −0.168
Surprises 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−18.57∗∗∗ 14.41 20.45∗ 16.40 18.85∗∗ 5.18 21.69∗∗∗ 22.01∗∗∗ 21.35∗∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – before September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation 0.130∗ −0.062 −0.073 0.142 −0.204∗∗∗ 0.042 0.016 −0.023
Passive reallocation return −0.326 −0.050 −0.266∗ −0.029 0.188 0.104 0.376 0.054
Passive reallocation FX −0.678∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.009 0.707∗∗∗ −0.549∗∗∗ 0.123∗ −0.128∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
Total reallocation −0.881∗ 0.193 −0.330 0.723∗∗ −0.558∗∗ 0.265∗ 0.288 0.311
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 1.526∗∗ −0.065 0.053 1.273 −1.663∗∗∗ 1.094 0.441 0.015
Surprises 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 689 689 689 689 689 689 689 689
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−9.79∗∗∗ −1.56 6.24 2.73 7.48∗ 1.64 11.43∗∗∗ 11.50∗∗∗ 11.16∗∗∗
(c) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation 0.291 −0.039 0.024 −0.139∗ −0.018 −0.105∗∗∗ 0.140 −0.150
Passive reallocation return 3.399∗∗∗ −0.285 1.294∗∗∗ −1.072∗∗ −0.810∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −1.690∗∗∗ −0.585∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −0.243 0.147 −0.015 0.113 0.115 0.000 −0.042 −0.007
Total reallocation 3.493∗∗∗ −0.171 1.285∗∗∗ −1.108∗ −0.761 −0.366∗∗∗ −1.693∗∗∗ −0.723∗∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 2.248 0.302 0.828 −0.186 0.600 −2.336∗ 1.493 −0.997
Surprises 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Observations 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−42.74∗∗∗ 56.18∗∗∗ 59.67∗∗∗ 53.97∗∗∗ 50.41∗∗∗ 14.89∗∗∗ 50.40∗∗∗ 50.93∗∗∗ 50.05∗∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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Table B.7: Main results Euro area 10-year yields (instant impact)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area 10-year yields. Each line in the table
refers to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 4.2 in the main text for
the definition of dependent variables).
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – full sample
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.036 0.019 0.004 0.007 −0.001 0.007 0.019 −0.012
Passive reallocation return 0.814∗∗∗ −0.043 0.246∗∗∗ −0.068 −0.204∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −0.122 0.055 0.015 0.090 −0.064 −0.009 −0.031 0.066
Total reallocation 0.663∗∗∗ 0.041 0.263∗∗∗ 0.025 −0.277∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.478∗∗∗ −0.123
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −0.003 0.348 0.243∗ 0.211 0.214 0.360 0.348 0.069
Surprises 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Observations 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−5.20 13.38∗∗∗ 9.70∗∗ 9.29∗∗ 8.28∗∗ 2.92∗∗ 6.12 6.50 6.17
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – before September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.054 0.037 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.019 −0.022 0.015
Passive reallocation return 0.624∗∗∗ −0.058 0.100 0.053 −0.113 −0.085∗ −0.347∗ −0.154∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −0.060 0.027 −0.008 0.039 −0.020 −0.018 −0.040 0.072
Total reallocation 0.503∗ 0.070 0.097 0.099 −0.164 −0.086 −0.411∗∗ −0.065
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −0.149 0.480 0.265 0.217 0.225 0.644 0.066 0.397
Surprises 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 689 689 689 689 689 689 689 689
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
0.99 9.93∗∗∗ 0.90 2.61 2.50 1.24 −1.07 −0.54 −0.61
(c) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.012 −0.006 0.005 −0.001 −0.011 −0.012 0.103∗∗ −0.052
Passive reallocation return 1.167∗∗∗ −0.008 0.469∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗ −0.378∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.677∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −0.192 0.069 0.046 0.163 −0.120 0.018 −0.014 0.038
Total reallocation 0.973∗∗∗ 0.047 0.528∗∗∗ −0.121 −0.512∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 0.217 0.179 0.239 0.215 0.184 −0.078 0.937∗∗ −0.362
Surprises 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−15.76∗∗∗ 18.73∗∗∗ 24.89∗∗∗ 20.66∗∗∗ 18.68∗∗∗ 5.68∗∗∗ 18.53∗∗∗ 18.39∗∗∗ 17.89∗∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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Table B.8: Main results Euro area rates (positive vs. negative surprises)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area rates. Each line in the table refers
to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 3.2 in the main text for the
definition of dependent variables).
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation (neg) −0.080 −0.086 −0.103∗ −0.050 0.261∗∗ −0.031 0.023 0.099
Active reallocation (pos) 0.109 −0.165 0.055 0.073 0.073 −0.046 0.083 −0.259
Passive reallocation return (neg) 2.624∗∗∗ −0.261 0.629∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗ −1.200∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ −1.646∗∗∗ −0.521∗∗
Passive reallocation return (pos) 4.487∗∗∗ −0.276 0.342 −0.550 −1.023 −0.452∗∗ −1.715∗∗ −0.962∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX (neg) −1.547∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ −1.108∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗ −0.149 0.295∗∗
Passive reallocation FX (pos) −2.211∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ −0.361 1.619∗∗∗ −0.902 0.213∗∗∗ 0.233 0.450∗∗∗
Total reallocation (neg) 0.818 0.440 0.844∗∗∗ 1.503∗∗∗ −2.038∗∗∗ −0.167∗ −1.996∗∗∗ −0.071
Total reallocation (pos) 2.444∗ 0.865 0.050 0.968 −1.727 −0.178 −1.414 −1.061∗∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) (neg) 0.171 −0.122 −0.546 0.071 2.462∗∗ −0.364 0.534 2.037∗
Flows (% of TNA) (pos) 1.949∗∗ −0.071 1.606∗ 1.708∗∗ 2.020 −0.108 1.774 −2.338
Negative Surprises 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Positive Surprises 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks (neg/pos): Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−21.569∗∗∗ 33.528∗∗∗ 26.057∗∗∗ 31.982∗∗∗ 40.853∗∗∗ 8.099∗∗∗ 20.838∗∗∗ 23.241∗∗∗ 26.237∗∗∗
−32.376∗∗∗ 45.536∗∗∗ 27.563∗ 37.824∗∗∗ 35.336∗∗∗ 7.290∗∗∗ 30.114∗∗∗ 32.931∗∗∗ 29.137∗∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation (neg) 0.068 −0.390 −0.287 0.225 −0.193 −0.014 0.059 0.254
Active reallocation (pos) 1.035∗ −0.013 0.168 −0.145 1.027 −0.381 −1.913 −0.367
Passive reallocation return (neg) 6.977∗∗ −0.084 2.162∗∗ 1.526 −3.583∗∗ −0.913∗ −4.448∗∗ −1.378
Passive reallocation return (pos) 20.340∗∗∗ −0.924 −1.728 −7.576∗ −1.258 −1.623 −5.194 −4.745∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX (neg) −3.280 1.667 0.984∗ 2.097 −0.485 0.303 −1.013∗ 0.593
Passive reallocation FX (pos) −8.942 6.644 −10.459 8.026∗ −12.384∗∗ 0.891∗ 11.478∗∗ 0.952
Total reallocation (neg) 4.578 1.043 2.544∗∗ 3.695∗ −4.031 −0.495 −6.311∗∗∗ −0.536
Total reallocation (pos) 12.732∗∗ 5.899 −12.054∗ −0.143 −11.223 −0.585 4.469 −5.179∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) (neg) 0.849 −2.486 −2.334 0.704 −1.255 −1.635 0.605 4.098
Flows (% of TNA) (pos) 12.285∗∗∗ 5.103 8.055∗ 4.908∗∗ 17.343 −6.687 −5.745 2.780
Negative Surprises 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Positive Surprises 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks (neg/pos): Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−46.165∗ 83.008∗∗ 55.315 69.474∗∗ 91.935∗∗ 14.710∗∗ 39.995 43.928 58.560∗∗∗
−173.442∗∗∗ 167.271∗∗ 115.236 142.056∗ 81.275 24.547 148.994∗∗ 166.779∗∗∗ 135.214∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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Table B.9: Results with different fund universe (impact over 4 lags)
For this table we fix the fund universe on the 1st of January 2014 (for the remainder of the analysis we use the fund
universe as of the 1st of January 2012).
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area rates. Each line in the table refers
to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 4.2 in the main text for the
definition of dependent variables).
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation 0.204 −0.116 −0.117 −0.304 −0.164 0.186 0.127 −0.010
Passive reallocation return 8.023∗∗∗ −0.008 1.546 −0.367 −2.522 −1.417∗∗ −3.574∗∗ −1.478∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −2.768∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ −0.723 2.277∗∗ −3.316∗ −0.464 1.784 1.080∗∗
Total reallocation 6.073∗∗ 2.395∗ 0.548 1.500 −5.567∗∗ −1.509 −2.344 −0.835
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 3.258 0.812 0.792 −0.904 0.815 5.682 3.235 1.251
Surprises 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−67.3∗∗∗ 100.8∗∗∗ 65.6∗∗ 74.1∗∗∗ 73.6∗ 15.2∗∗ 62.2∗∗ 68.2∗∗∗ 68.0∗∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.080 −0.033 0.001 −0.003 0.153 −0.017 0.086 −0.060
Passive reallocation return 3.100∗∗∗ −0.141 0.655∗∗∗ 0.372 −1.280∗∗∗ −0.600∗∗∗ −1.524∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −1.276∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.142 0.942∗∗∗ −1.237∗∗ 0.099 0.069 0.296∗∗∗
Total reallocation 1.688∗∗ 0.733∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ −2.289∗∗∗ −0.428∗∗ −1.533∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) 0.167 0.297 0.507 0.551 1.462∗∗ 0.696 1.188∗∗ −0.135
Surprises 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−25.9∗∗∗ 40.6∗∗∗ 29.5∗∗∗ 33.6∗∗∗ 38.4∗∗∗ 7.8∗∗∗ 28.3∗∗∗ 29.8∗∗∗ 28.9∗∗∗
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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Table B.10: Retail vs. Institutional investors: Main results Euro area short-term rates (impact
over 4 lags)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area short-term rates. Each line in the
table refers to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 3.2 in the main
text for the definition of dependent variables). For instance, the first coefficient on the top-left corner of the table indicates the
one-week impact of the surprise change in Euro area short-term rates on the active reallocation to Western European equity
funds.
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – full sample
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
All Funds
Active reallocation 0.036 −0.321∗ −0.188∗∗ 0.113 −0.040 0.114 0.167 0.065
Flows (% of TNA) 0.746 −1.643 −0.382 1.260 1.223 4.046 1.264 1.135
Retail fund shares
Active reallocation 0.274 −0.127 −0.213∗ −0.026 −0.063 0.176∗ −0.123 0.001
Flows (% of TNA) 2.915∗ −0.260 −0.276 0.787 0.673 5.583∗∗ −0.564 0.538
Institutional fund shares
Active reallocation −0.212 −0.546∗∗ −0.136 0.206 −0.108 0.080 0.537∗ 0.263
Flows (% of TNA) −0.658 −2.768 −0.067 1.686 0.111 3.799 4.709∗∗ 2.954
Additional Information
Surprises 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Observations 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – before September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
All Funds
Active reallocation −0.210 −0.294 −0.166 −0.018 0.049 0.180 0.324∗ 0.065
Flows (% of TNA) −1.346 −1.750 −0.200 0.531 1.378 5.554∗ 1.801∗ 0.430
Retail fund shares
Active reallocation 0.143 −0.182 −0.236 −0.097 0.264 0.210∗ −0.037 −0.045
Flows (% of TNA) 1.538 −0.747 −0.411 0.234 3.026∗ 6.008∗ −0.185 −0.364
Institutional fund shares
Active reallocation −0.584 −0.512 −0.042 −0.104 −0.255 0.216 0.892∗∗∗ 0.395
Flows (% of TNA) −3.438 −3.064 0.555 0.271 −2.446 7.751 6.647∗∗∗ 2.834
Additional Information
Surprises 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
(c) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
All Funds
Active reallocation 0.371 −0.302 −0.255 0.088 −0.080 −0.103 −0.212 0.127
Flows (% of TNA) 3.865 −0.915 −0.807 1.470 1.375 −2.975 0.212 3.691
Retail fund shares
Active reallocation 0.377 0.126 −0.048 0.068 −0.609 0.083 −0.378 0.046
Flows (% of TNA) 3.415 1.419 0.209 0.515 −4.809 3.724 −1.845 1.400
Institutional fund shares
Active reallocation 0.731 −0.698∗ −0.556 0.162 0.408 −0.333∗∗ −0.268 0.217
Flows (% of TNA) 6.183 −2.063 −3.243 3.438 6.714 −8.246 0.968 4.891
Additional Information
Surprises 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
117
Table B.11: Retail vs. Institutional investors: Main results Euro area 10-year yields (impact
over 4 lags)
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area 10-year yields. Each line in the table
refers to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 4.2 in the main text
for the definition of dependent variables). For instance, the first coefficient on the top-left corner of the table indicates the
one-week impact of the surprise change in Euro area 10-year yields on the active reallocation to Western European equity
funds.
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – full sample
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
All Funds
Active reallocation −0.099 −0.061 0.004 0.124∗ −0.019 0.010 0.043 0.015
Flows (% of TNA) −0.207 −0.040 0.533 0.769∗∗ −0.052 0.736 0.533 0.440
Retail fund shares
Active reallocation −0.024 −0.014 0.012 0.048 −0.076 0.030 0.004 0.003
Flows (% of TNA) −0.272 −0.064 0.194 0.155 −0.861 0.868 −0.077 −0.464
Institutional fund shares
Active reallocation −0.183 −0.128 0.018 0.191 0.047 −0.021 0.112 −0.019
Flows (% of TNA) −0.140 0.019 1.125∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.021 0.667 1.642∗ 0.752
Additional Information
Surprises 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Observations 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162 1162
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – before September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
All Funds
Active reallocation −0.178 −0.003 0.049 0.194∗∗ −0.149∗∗ 0.025 0.034 0.058
Flows (% of TNA) −1.083 0.191 0.757 0.798 −1.698∗∗∗ 1.146 0.259 0.638
Retail fund shares
Active reallocation −0.069 0.028 0.042 0.048 −0.169∗∗ 0.021 −0.027 0.068
Flows (% of TNA) −0.955 0.080 0.166 −0.176 −2.034∗∗∗ 0.375 −0.602 0.346
Institutional fund shares
Active reallocation −0.356 −0.065 0.074 0.339∗∗ −0.117 0.014 0.155 −0.006
Flows (% of TNA) −1.479 0.193 1.563 1.926∗∗ −1.080 2.352 1.844 0.743
Additional Information
Surprises 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
(c) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – after September 2014
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
All Funds
Active reallocation −0.002 −0.120 −0.040 0.003 0.178 −0.037 0.054 −0.047
Flows (% of TNA) 0.895 −0.125 0.304 0.764∗ 2.238∗∗ −0.248 1.082 0.252
Retail fund shares
Active reallocation 0.001 −0.031 −0.027 0.010 0.097 0.022 0.053 −0.102
Flows (% of TNA) 0.636 0.252 0.248 0.603 1.328 1.793∗ 0.759 −1.725
Institutional fund shares
Active reallocation 0.046 −0.182 −0.042 0.010 0.235 −0.103∗∗ 0.033 −0.024
Flows (% of TNA) 1.524 −0.237 0.691 1.188∗∗ 3.029∗∗ −2.803 1.343 0.954
Additional Information
Surprises 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
118
Table B.12: Benchmarking to Fratzscher et al. (2016a) using a different fund universe (impact
over 4 lags)
The fund universe is fixed as of the 1st of January 2010 and the sample runs until September 2012.
The table shows the (cumulative) effect associated with the surprise change in Euro area rates. Each line in the table refers
to a different regression with different dependent variables as indicated in the table (see Section 4.2 in the main text for the
definition of dependent variables).
(a) Impact of a surprise change in EA short-term rates – until September 2012
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.119 −0.184 −0.113 0.172 0.261∗∗ −0.010 −0.185 0.062
Passive reallocation return −1.484∗ −0.624 −0.477 −4.388∗∗ 1.666∗∗ 0.487∗∗ 3.291∗∗ 1.277∗∗
Passive reallocation FX −2.279∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗ 0.894 −1.061∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 1.546 0.509∗∗∗
Total reallocation −3.996∗∗∗ 0.085 −0.640 −4.023 0.995 0.536∗∗∗ 5.279∗∗ 1.850∗∗
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −1.610 −2.443 −1.868 −0.139 2.978 −1.471 −2.220 −0.240
Surprises 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
−26.3∗∗∗ −38.3∗∗ −13.6 −14.4 −17.4 6.2∗ 32.5∗∗∗ 30.7∗∗∗ 21.9∗∗∗
(b) Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-year yields – until September 2012
Equity Bonds
WE USAPJ GLOB EM WE USAPJ GLOB EM
Joint estimation with restriction on the sum of the fitted values
Active reallocation −0.281∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.082 0.397∗∗∗ −0.004 0.015 0.108∗ 0.046
Passive reallocation return −0.194 −0.486∗∗ −0.155 0.183 0.159 0.069 0.247 0.076
Passive reallocation FX −2.482 −0.912 −0.431 0.079 −1.610 −0.162 4.523 −0.299
Total reallocation −3.043∗ −1.705 −0.725 0.548 −1.557 0.032 5.277 −0.068
Separate estimation (equation by equation)
Flows (% of TNA) −2.314∗∗∗ −2.513∗∗∗ −0.936 1.014∗∗ −0.456 1.018 0.325 0.341
Surprises 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Benchmarks: Equity Bonds
EUR/USD WE USA GLOB EM WE USA GLOB EM
0.6 −2.8 −9.7 −6.5 −0.0 1.7 1.0 0.8 −1.4
Note: For coefficients the stars indicate the p-value of an F-Test of the sum of the contemporaneous effect of the monetary
policy surprise and lags 1 to 4 (* implies p < 0.1, ** implies p < 0.05, *** implies p < 0.01).
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B.5 Fund universe of 2012 vs. fund universe of 2014
This Appendix provides a formal statistical test of the robustness of our coefficients to different
sampling. We jointly estimate the coefficients from our baseline fund universe (as of January 1st,
2012) that we used in panel c) of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 and the secondary universe (as of January
1st, 2014) in Table B.9 in the Appendix of the main paper. Then we test the null hypothesis, that
the estimated cumulative response to a monetary policy surprise is equal for both fund universes.
In order to test for the equality of these coefficients, we jointly estimate the same regression
from two samples in a SUR setup. The subsequent test for the equality of the coefficients takes
into account the covariances of the coefficients. Throughout the paper we use either Driscoll-Kray
standard errors with a small sample adjustment or Newey-West standard errors. Here we use less
conservative standard errors (standard errors clustered by date, no small sample adjustment but
otherwise equal to Driscoll-Kraay standard errors) in order to rely on STATA routines for the SUR
estimation. Generally, this makes standard errors smaller and the rejection of the H0 more likely,
i.e. it is harder to establish the equality of coefficients as we aim for. The new joint estimation
using both universes will produce slightly different standard errors compared to those obtained in
the original regressions, while point estimates are unchanged.





θ2014 = 0. Tables B.13 and B.14 show that all p-values are larger than 0.1
– and many coefficients are virtually identical.
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Table B.13: Formal Comparison of Coefficients of the Impact of a surprise change in EA short-
term rates (after September 2014): Universe of 2012 vs. Universe of 2014 (after
September 2014)
This table shows differences in the estimated coefficient of interest
∑
θi between two samples, the fund universe of 2012 and
the fund universe of 2014. We jointly estimate both coefficients in a SUR setup. The last column reports the p-value of a












Equity – WE 0.371 0.204 0.167 0.76
Equity – USAPJ −0.302 −0.116 −0.186 0.65
Equity – GLOB −0.255 −0.117 −0.138 0.63
Equity – EM 0.088 −0.304 0.392 0.36
Bond – WE −0.080 −0.164 0.084 0.89
Bond – USAPJ −0.103 0.186 −0.288 0.28
Bond – GLOB −0.212 0.127 −0.339 0.51
Bond – EM 0.127 −0.010 0.137 0.72
Passive reallocation return
Equity – WE 8.729∗∗∗ 8.023∗∗∗ 0.706 0.84
Equity – USAPJ −0.151 −0.008 −0.144 0.93
Equity – GLOB 1.342 1.546 −0.204 0.88
Equity – EM −1.181 −0.367 −0.813 0.74
Bond – WE −2.430 −2.522 0.092 0.97
Bond – USAPJ −0.938∗∗ −1.417∗∗ 0.480 0.51
Bond – GLOB −3.913∗∗ −3.574∗∗ −0.339 0.89
Bond – EM −1.793∗∗∗ −1.478∗∗ −0.316 0.73
Passive reallocation FX
Equity – WE −4.123∗∗∗ −2.768∗∗ −1.355 0.48
Equity – USAPJ 2.598∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ −0.060 0.97
Equity – GLOB −1.598 −0.723 −0.876 0.68
Equity – EM 3.044∗∗ 2.277∗∗ 0.767 0.62
Bond – WE −2.913 −3.316 0.403 0.89
Bond – USAPJ 0.393∗∗ −0.464 0.858 0.33
Bond – GLOB 2.054 1.784 0.269 0.92
Bond – EM 0.646 1.080∗∗ −0.435 0.50
Total reallocation
Equity – WE 5.795∗∗ 6.073∗∗∗ −0.278 0.94
Equity – USAPJ 2.095 2.395∗ −0.300 0.88
Equity – GLOB −0.751 0.548 −1.299 0.63
Equity – EM 1.844 1.500 0.344 0.91
Bond – WE −4.968∗ −5.567∗∗ 0.600 0.87
Bond – USAPJ −0.442 −1.509 1.067 0.35
Bond – GLOB −2.841 −2.344 −0.497 0.88
Bond – EM −1.304 −0.835 −0.468 0.66
Flows (% of TNA)
Equity – WE 3.865 3.258 0.607 0.87
Equity – USAPJ −0.915 0.812 −1.727 0.62
Equity – GLOB −0.807 0.792 −1.599 0.48
Equity – EM 1.470 −0.904 2.374 0.49
Bond – WE 1.375 0.815 0.561 0.91
Bond – USAPJ −2.975 5.682 −8.657 0.11
Bond – GLOB 0.212 3.235 −3.023 0.41
Bond – EM 3.691 1.251 2.440 0.63
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Table B.14: Formal Comparison of Coefficients of the Impact of a surprise change in EA 10-
year yields (after September 2014): Universe of 2012 vs. Universe of 2014 (after
September 2014)
This table shows differences in the estimated coefficient of interest
∑
θi between two samples, the fund universe of 2012 and
the fund universe of 2014. We jointly estimate both coefficients in a SUR setup. The last column reports the p-value of a












Equity – WE −0.002 −0.080 0.077 0.56
Equity – USAPJ −0.120 −0.033 −0.087 0.43
Equity – GLOB −0.040 0.001 −0.041 0.65
Equity – EM 0.003 −0.003 0.006 0.95
Bond – WE 0.178 0.153 0.025 0.89
Bond – USAPJ −0.037 −0.017 −0.021 0.80
Bond – GLOB 0.054 0.086 −0.032 0.82
Bond – EM −0.047 −0.060 0.013 0.91
Passive reallocation return
Equity – WE 3.377∗∗∗ 3.100∗∗∗ 0.277 0.80
Equity – USAPJ −0.265 −0.141 −0.123 0.79
Equity – GLOB 0.512∗ 0.655∗∗ −0.143 0.72
Equity – EM 0.156 0.372 −0.215 0.76
Bond – WE −1.132∗∗ −1.280∗∗∗ 0.147 0.82
Bond – USAPJ −0.413∗∗∗ −0.600∗∗∗ 0.187 0.37
Bond – GLOB −1.679∗∗∗ −1.524∗∗∗ −0.154 0.82
Bond – EM −0.687∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗ −0.125 0.63
Passive reallocation FX
Equity – WE −1.798∗∗∗ −1.276∗∗∗ −0.522 0.37
Equity – USAPJ 1.006∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.068 0.86
Equity – GLOB 0.051 0.142 −0.092 0.70
Equity – EM 1.270∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.328 0.55
Bond – WE −0.987 −1.237∗∗ 0.250 0.77
Bond – USAPJ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.099 0.071 0.60
Bond – GLOB −0.007 0.069 −0.076 0.85
Bond – EM 0.355∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.059 0.68
Total reallocation
Equity – WE 1.500∗ 1.688∗∗ −0.189 0.86
Equity – USAPJ 0.604 0.733∗ −0.129 0.82
Equity – GLOB 0.520 0.796∗∗ −0.276 0.57
Equity – EM 1.294∗ 1.205∗∗ 0.089 0.92
Bond – WE −1.883∗∗∗ −2.289∗∗∗ 0.406 0.69
Bond – USAPJ −0.174 −0.428∗∗ 0.254 0.27
Bond – GLOB −1.771∗∗∗ −1.533∗∗∗ −0.238 0.77
Bond – EM −0.472∗∗ −0.447∗∗ −0.025 0.93
Flows (% of TNA)
Equity – WE 0.895 0.167 0.729 0.45
Equity – USAPJ −0.125 0.297 −0.422 0.66
Equity – GLOB 0.304 0.507 −0.202 0.80
Equity – EM 0.764 0.551 0.214 0.76
Bond – WE 2.238∗∗ 1.462 0.775 0.57
Bond – USAPJ −0.248 0.696 −0.944 0.60
Bond – GLOB 1.082 1.188∗ −0.106 0.92
Bond – EM 0.252 −0.135 0.387 0.79
122
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Solution of the Election Hegemon Problem
We can solve the first of the FOCs for c and plug into the second FOC:
p∗ =
√


































The second order sufficient condition for a critical point to be a maximum is that the Hessian
be negative definite at the critical point. Therefore, we need the principal minors |H11| = −2 < 0
and ∣∣∣∣∣ H11 H12H21 H22
∣∣∣∣∣ = 4− pi2Γ2 > 0.
This holds if |piΓ| < 2.










− c2 − p2
s.t. c2 + p2 ≤ y
123
We have:














− c2 − p2 − λ(c2 + p2 − y)
















b− 2p− 2λp != 0
c2 + p2 − y ≤ 0
λ ≥ 0
λ(c2 + p2 − y) != 0
If λ = 0 then the problem is the same as in the unconstrained optimization problem. If λ ≥ 0 then


























− 1 = λ.



















We plug in the two possible solutions for c (i.e. ±√) we obtained from the binding budget



















for p∗+ such that c∗+ =
√

























for p∗− such that c∗− = −
√




− 1. The utility maximum
for a binding budget constraint is at the solution to these FOCs for which λ ≥ 0 holds unless
the solution is a corner solution. We omit the second order constraints we could derive from a
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bordered Hessian here. If there is a solution with λ = 0 and c∗2 + p∗2 ≤ y, this solution points to
the optimal composition of spending.
C.3 Formal Solution of the Election War Case
There are two ways to approach this problem in general: One is to solve a system of 4 linear














b− 2p+ + piΓ+
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b− 2p− − piΓ−
(






This is equivalent to the more intuitive way of plugging in the best response of the “−”-power
into the FOCs of the “+”-power and thereby deriving a best response of the one power to the best
response of the other power. The necessary steps will be shown in the following:
First we derive the best responses of the “−”-player
c∗−(c+, p+) =








































b− 2p+ + piΓ+
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C.4 The Liberal Symmetric Election War
The Liberal Symmetric Election War adds another power with opposite political preferences
that cares equally about liberalism and assigns the same geo-political importance to the
target country.1
Figure C.1: Equilibrium Choices and Outcomes in Liberal Symmetric Election War













































































(c) Incumbent Vote Share Comparison
























C.5 Alternative Cost Functions
In order to shed light on the limits of our theoretical specification, we perform a quick
thought experiment. A possible specification that would lead to zero investment in processes
1We use Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5, Γ− = 0.75, Λ− = 0.5 and the rest of the parameters as in the election
hegemon scenario.
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− |c| − |p|
In the following we look at the case pi = Γ = 1: Since
√
b < 1, it would never pay off
to reduce the bias in this specification. If ρ = 1 (or even, ρ > 1), then one would like to
invest c∗ ∈ [0,∞), i.e. the maximum amount possible in spending towards a candidate –
realistically until one hits the budget constraint – allowing for all values c such that the
election result fulfills: f(c, p) = χ+ c ∈ [0, 1]. By including an additional term ’−Λ√bp’ in
the above utility function one could achieve investment p < 0 (while c = 0) for sufficiently
high values of Λ. In the case of ρ = (1 + Λ)
√
b = 1 one could use an arbitrary mix of p < 0
and c > 0 as long as χ+ρc+(b−√bp) ∈ [0, 1]. Any kind of comparative statics in these kind
of models would provide us with limited insights away from certain thresholds. We think
that the core assumptions of the decision-theoretic foundation of our model are reasonably
justified.
Our preferred way to think about cases with c = 0 (or alternatively p = 0), within the
framework of our model is the following: one could artificially increase the cost of the first















−(c2 + τc · 1c 6=0)− p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
alternative cost function
.
Depending on τc > 0 this could lead to c = 0 and p 6= 0 for low levels of overall investment.
Think of this as an entry cost one has to pay in order to get access to a certain political
force. For low levels of entry cost or very high levels of overall expenditure one would again
get quite similar results compared to our baseline scenario.
In our point of view, the most promising areas for future development of our theory would
lie in extensions that allow for explicit modelling of voter behavior, or take into account the
informational content of actions by a foreign power, rather than in a generalization of the
predictions of our simple decision-theoretic model to more general functional forms.
C.6 The Effect of (Democratic) International Organi-
zations
Pevehouse (2002a) and Pevehouse (2002b) argue that international organizations, domi-
nated by democracies, have different ways of cajoling elites into committing to reforms and
sticking with them. Unlike states, which feel compelled to prioritize geo-political agendas
over democracy promotion (Reiter, 2001), international organizations delegate the enforce-
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ment of democratic norms to specialized bureaucracies. If we add an outside actor that
only cares about liberalism to our baseline scenario, we can easily incorporate international
organizations into our model. Since the policy outcome does not matter to the international
organization, it will spend a constant amount p on bias reduction regardless of political
divisions.2
Figure C.2: Equilibrium Choices with International Organization
























(a) Equilibrium c* – Liberal Power


























(b) Equilibrium p* – Liberal Power
Predictions The result is a reduction in the bias of the election compared to the scenario
of an election hegemon, and higher expenditure for the intervening power, especially in
highly polarized contests.
Figure C.3: Outcomes with International Organization























Entry of Int. Organization
SQ
(a) Incumbent Vote Share Comparison





















Entry of Int. Organization
SQ
(b) Bias Comparison
2In Figures C.2, C.3 we use Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5 for the foreign power and Γ− = 0, Λ− = 0.5 for the
international organization.
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Facing an illiberal power, spending by the international organization on process inter-
ventions p might sometimes counteract the investment by the foreign power.3
Compared to the the illiberal election hegemon the bias will decrease. It is worthwhile to
note, that in our simple linear specification the spending of the international organization is
not influenced by the amount that the international power spends on p. This means there
is no crowding-out effect of spending by the international organization on the spending of
the international power.4
Figure C.4: Equilibrium Choices with International Organization
























(a) Equilibrium c* – Aliberal Power

























(b) Equilibrium p* – Aliberal Power
Figure C.5: Expenditure on p with International Organization



















Figure C.5 demonstrates that democratic international organizations consistently reduce
3In Figures C.4a and C.4b we use Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0 for the foreign power and Γ− = 0, Λ− = 0.5 for
the international organization.
4Another interesting consequence in terms of outcomes is the following: the case of an illiberal power
with Γ+ = 0.75 and Λ = 0 and the international organization with Γ− = 0 and Λ = 0.5, in terms of bias
and vote share, is just the same as the case of an election hegemon with Γ = 0.75 and Λ = 0.5.
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bias in elections, without crowding out pro-democracy investments by the liberal hegemon.
Thus, such organizations are good for democracy.
C.7 Regime Overthrow
One might think of the option to decide – ex-ante – whether to influence a democratic regime
via contributions towards candidates and processes or whether it seems more attractive to
attempt to overthrow the regime.
An easy specification for the resulting utility in these cases would be to allow overthrowing
at a fixed cost r while there is an additional cost Λ for those international powers that care
about democracy:
uint = ΓAgov − Λ− r
In this case, the regime is overthrown in order to give the government party the full discretion
over the choice of policies. If one installs the opposition in power after the revolt, the utility
would be.
uint = ΓBopp − Λ− r
The model can be easily adapted to work with an (endogenous) probability of success.
This would change the payoffs in expected terms, since one would have to take into account
the outcome of an election hegemon scenario or the election war that would ensue following
a failed attempt to overthrow. It would make overthrow less likely to occur. One could even
make the probability of success contingent on some exerted effort.
Formally incorporating a probability of success q ∈ (0, 1] in the election war scenario
would lead to:










Then overthrow happens if:









)− Λ− r > uint (c∗+, c∗−, p∗+, p∗−)












It can be seen that introducing a probability of success will only change the cost structure
of the problem – the cost component that depends on liberal concerns will increase to Λ
q
and the expenditure component to r
q
. In the following we assume q = 1.
To simplify matters, we will assume that any attempt of regime overthrow will succeed
and the policy that can be implemented in this case is either Agov or Bopp. Furthermore we
assume that only one power gets drawn to have an opportunity to overthrow. This avoids
something akin to a regime overthrow contest in the election war scenario.
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Predictions From Figure C.6a we see that an international power that cares about democ-
racy and election outcomes as specified by the parameters Γ = 0.75 and Λ = 0.5 will not
overthrow the regime in most cases5 since the utility of overthrowing is strictly below both
the hegemon and the symmetric election war case. However, under certain circumstances
– one could think of a liberal power with relatively low commitment to liberal values fac-
ing another power with considerably higher stakes – even a liberal power might decide to
overthrow.
Figure C.6: Utility of Regime Overthrow vs. Baseline Scenarios


















(+) Power – Hegemon
(+) Power – Election War
Regime Overthrow
(a) Liberal Election Hegemon and Liberal
Symmetric Election War


















(−) Power – Liberal
Overthrow – Liberal
(−) Power – Aliberal
Overthrow – Aliberal
(b) Liberal Symmetric and Aliberal
Asymmetric Election War
In the symmetric election war the foreign power with opposite political preferences com-
pared to Figure C.6a also prefers the election war over the regime overthrow.6 In an asym-
metric election war, however, if the target is sufficiently polarized and the power does not
care about democracy per se, regime overthrow might sometimes happen. From Figure C.6b,
we see that the utility of the aliberal power falls below −0.125 for large pi, this means for
Bopp = 0 and values close to Agov = 0.5 it will prefer to overthrow the regime and install
the opposition in power in order to obtain utility −0.125, and for values of pi close to −0.5
it will overthrow in favor of the government.7 Again, here we stick to the parametrization
5Let us assume for now that Bopp = 0 and Agov ∈ [−0.5, 0.5], r = 0.125 and we take the rest of the
parameters from our previous analyses. Overthrowing the democratic regime in favor of the opposition
would give us utility uint = 0.75 · 0 − 0.5 − 0.125 = −0.625 while overthrowing in favor of the government
would give an utility of uint = 0.75 · Agov − 0.5 − 0.125, i.e. between −1 for Agov = −0.5 and −0.25 for
Agov = 0.5.
6For the (−) power with Γ = −0.75 and Λ = 0.5 in the symmetric election war overthrowing in favor of
the opposition gives uint = −0.75 · 0− 0.5− 0.125 = −0.625 while overthrowing in favor of the government
would give an utility of uint = −0.75 · Agov − 0.5 − 0.125, i.e. between −0.25 for Agov = −0.5 and −1 for
Agov = 0.5.
7For the (−) power with Γ = −0.5 and Λ = 0 in the asymmetric election war, however, overthrowing
in favor of the opposition gives uint = −0.5 · 0 − 0 − 0.125 = −0.125 while overthrowing in favor of the
government would give an utility of uint = −0.5 ·Agov − 0− 0.125, i.e. between 0.125 for Agov = −0.5 and
−0.375 for Agov = 0.5.
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of our examples from the main body. Changing some parameters in a way that creates a
higher degree of asymmetry can make overthrow even more likely.
C.8 Endogenous Choice of Policy Positions
This section of the Appendix provides a simple extension of our baseline model to allow for
candidates choosing their platforms endogenously. We add a first stage in which both the
government and the opposition simultaneously determine their platforms. The candidates
take into account both the reaction of the foreign powers to their choice of platform and
the change in behavior by the other party. The coefficients γgov and γopp determine how
much a candidate cares about deviations of her platform from her ideal point. This is a
very simplified version of an exercise similar to Grossman and Helpman (1996) – the main
difference is the timing. In our setting parties are the first to determine their platforms.
We formulate the preferences of the government as:
ugov = f(Agov, Bopp)− γgov(Agov − Agov)2,
where Agov refers to the ideal point of the government and Agov to its chosen platform. The
function f(Agov, Bopp) maps from platforms to final voteshares according to the equilibrium
behavior of the international powers described in Section Predictions. In the same manner
we define:
uopp = (1− f(Agov, Bopp))− γopp(Bopp −Bopp)2,
where Bopp denotes the ideal point of the opposition.
We assume that the chosen platform will affect the support decisions of the foreign
power but in this simple extension we do not explicitly model how domestic voters might
be affected by a change in policy positions. This could be justified if candidates adapt their
policies in issues that are highly relevant for outside actors but less salient to the electorate.
Candidates maximize the sum of their vote shares and a term that penalizes deviations of
the chosen policy platform from the ideal point of the candidate.
Predictions For the case of γgov = γopp the FOCs of the candidates determine a unique
solution to the platform choice problem. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which both
parties move their positions closer to the election hegemon (or the “stronger” power in the
election war scenario). Each candidate moving her platform by the same amount.
The most important takeaway from the case γgov = γopp is the following: resulting ex-post
polarization pi = Agov − Bopp after the platform-setting game of the candidates equals ex-
ante polarization pi = Agov = Bopp (i.e. the level of polarization that would prevail without
the presence of a foreign intervener) in both the hegemon and the election war scenario. In
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Figure C.7 this can be seen best at Agov = Bopp = 0.25, when both parties choose the same
platform.
In the election war scenario political platforms have a smaller effect on the election result
since changing the results of an election becomes more costly and, therefore, the payoff of
trying to appeal to the foreign power is lower. This becomes apparent in the extent to which
candidates adapt their platforms.8 For the case of γgov 6= γopp the FOCs of the parties no
longer point to a unique solution.
Figure C.7: Candidates Care Equally about Their Platforms











































Table C.1: Sample Pilot Study
Country Year Election id Polarization War usa Power
Bahrain 2002 692-2002-1024-L1 1 0
Bhutan 2008 760-2008-0324-L1 0 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2000 346-2000-1111-L1 -1 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002 346-2002-1005-L1 -1 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2002 346-2002-1005-P1 -1 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 346-2006-1001-L1 -1 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 346-2006-1001-P1 -1 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2010 346-2010-1003-P1 -1 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2010 346-2010-1003-L1 -1 0
Bulgaria 1945 355-1945-1118-L1 -1 0
Continued on next page
8In the left panel of Figure C.7 we use the parameters of the liberal election hegemon with Γ = 0.75
and Λ = 0.5 and Agov = 0.25, where γgov = γopp = 0.25. In the right panel we use Γ+ = 0.75, Λ+ = 0.5,
Γ− = 0.5, Λ− = 0 with the same parameters for candidates as in the left panel.
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Country Year Election id Polarization War usa Power
Bulgaria 1997 355-1997-0419-L1 0 0
Burundi 1965 516-1965-0510-L1 0 0
Burundi 2010 516-2010-0723-L1 0 0
Cameroon 1964 471-1964-0426-L1 0 0
Cape Verde 2011 402-2011-0206-L1 0 0
Czechoslovakia 1946 315-1946-0526-L1 1 0
Czechoslovakia 1990 315-1990-0608-L1 1 1 USSR/Russia
Democratic Republic of Congo 2006 490-2006-0730-L1 1 1 China
Democratic Republic of Congo 2006 490-2006-0730-P1 1 1 China
Democratic Republic of Congo 2006 490-2006-0730-P2 1 1 China
East Germany 1990 265-1990-0318-L1 1 0
Gabon 2006 481-2006-1217-L1 0 0
Guatemala 2003 090-2003-1109-P1 0 0
Guatemala 2003 090-2003-1109-L1 0 0
Guatemala 2007 090-2007-0909-P1 0 0
Guatemala 2007 090-2007-0909-L1 0 0
Kenya 1966 501-1966-0611-L1 1 1 USSR/Russia
Kenya 1997 501-1997-1229-L1 -1 1 China
Kenya 1997 501-1997-1229-P1 -1 1 China
Libya 1952 620-1952-0219-L1 1 1 USSR/Russia
Libya 2012 620-2012-0707-A1 0 0
Morocco 2002 600-2002-0927-L1 0 0
Morocco 2007 600-2007-0907-L1 1 0
Myanmar (Burma) 1956 775-1956-0427-L1 1 1 China
Myanmar (Burma) 2010 775-2010-1107-L1 -1 1 China
Norway 1961 385-1961-0911-L1 0 1 USSR/Russia
Norway 2001 385-2001-0910-L1 0 0
Poland 1947 290-1947-0119-L1 0 1 USSR/Russia
Poland 2011 290-2011-1009-L1 0 1 Russia
Solomon Islands 2010 940-2010-0804-L1 0 0
Taiwan 1986 713-1986-1206-L1 -1 1 China
Taiwan 2001 713-2001-1201-L1 0 1 China
Thailand 2000 800-2000-0304-L1 0 0
Thailand 2001 800-2001-0106-L1 0 0
Thailand 2005 800-2005-0206-L1 0 0
Thailand 2006 800-2006-0402-L1 0 0
Thailand 2007 800-2007-1223-L1 0 0
Thailand 2008 800-2008-0302-L1 0 0
Ukraine 1991 369-1991-1201-P1 -1 1 USSR/Russia
Ukraine 1994 369-1994-0327-L1 1 1 Russia
Ukraine 1998 369-1998-0329-L1 1 1 Russia
Ukraine 1999 369-1999-1031-P1 1 1 Russia
Ukraine 2002 369-2002-0331-L1 -1 1 Russia
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Country Year Election id Polarization War usa Power
Ukraine 2004 369-2004-1031-P1 -1 1 Russia
Ukraine 2006 369-2006-0326-L1 1 1 Russia
Ukraine 2007 369-2007-0930-L1 1 1 Russia
Ukraine 2010 369-2010-0117-P1 0 1 Russia
Ukraine 2012 369-2012-1028-L1 -1 1 Russia
Uzbekistan 1991 704-1991-1229-P1 0 0
Zambia 1968 551-1968-1219-L1 0 1 China
Zambia 1968 551-1968-1219-P1 0 1 China
Zambia 1996 551-1996-1118-P1 1 0
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